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Summary 
 This thesis outlines the novel theoretical approach of social context mismatch theory 
(SCMT). SCMT outlines how changes in context can lead to mismatches between motives 
and their surrounding environment. For example, the basic human desire to care for others 
has become problematic in a modern context, where globalised identities are possible. We 
want to care for all the vulnerable members of society, but we are faced with numerous 
barriers. The conclusion of SCMT is that these mismatches provide fertile soil for hypocrisy 
to thrive, as people become accustomed to failing to meet their desired standards. 
 Having introduced the theory, three core chapters use this model to outline how 
broader contextual perspectives can bring different psychological concepts together in order 
to gain a novel perspective on well-established social psychological processes. Chapter 2 
outlines how people see their values as dynamic over time and illustrates relationships 
between this dynamism and well-being. Chapter 3 shows how people display different forms 
of hypocrisy in the realm of ethical consumption and how higher thresholds for ethical 
behaviour can encourage greater desire to change to a more pro-social position. Chapter 4 
manipulates perceptions of complexity of a little-known moral issue and shows how greater 
complexity can lead to less harsh moral judgements and a reduced willingness to engage with 
remedial action. 
 Finally, the thesis concludes by outlining a range of future directions that SCMT 
opens up, particularly for those who want to bring relatively isolated psychological ideas 
together. Accordingly, there is a strong focus on how a simultaneous awareness of multiple 
contexts can provide new perspectives on psychological processes. SCMT is a theory that is 
inextricably linked to working towards a more caring world and the dissertation reflects this 
motivation. 
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Chapter 1: A General Introduction to Social Context Mismatch Theory 
In a recent report on childhood obesity it was stated: 
Although the advent of agriculture about 14,000 years ago ensured [a] stable food 
supply, activities of daily living still required considerable energy expenditure until 50 
years ago, when radical changes occurred in food availability and required energy 
expenditures. The current obesity epidemic is then likely the result of our 
evolutionary legacy interacting with today’s technologically-advanced, consumerist 
society. (Han, Lawlor & Kimm, 2010, p. 1738) 
This quote underlines a mismatch between the evolved tendencies of humans and 
their current surroundings, leading to the problematic outcome of obesity. A review in the 
domain of public health suggested obesity is just one of several urgent health issues, 
(including high blood pressure, substance misuse and unsafe sex) that can be explained via 
such mismatches (Curtis & Aunger, 2011). The central theme of my thesis is that such a 
mismatch in social contexts also contributes to a broader outcome in human behaviour, 
namely, hypocrisy. I term this thesis social context mismatch theory (SCMT). 
The basic concept is that some social contexts have changed more rapidly than the 
self-concept has been able to adapt, either via evolution, cultural norms or even across an 
individual lifespan, and that the 21st century is a particularly important point in history to 
consider this issue. The consequences of these different speeds of development are 
mismatches between fundamental motivations and surrounding contexts. If unrecognised, 
these mismatches may lead to greater prevalence of hypocrisy and potential problems for the 
self. Such hypocrisy may then become perceptually inescapable and hence normative in and 
of itself, consistently reaffirming its position in the world.  
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The aim of my dissertation is to outline the logic of this overarching theory, 
summarise relevant existing evidence and present three chapters that begin to address ideas 
that the thesis raises. The discussion chapter will then outline the implications and future 
directions that SCMT invites. What is being put forward is an undeniably broad theoretical 
approach, which is both a potential strength (due to coverage) and a potential weakness (due 
to lack of specificity). It is my hope that the explanatory potential that this perspective offers 
can be of major utility to fields across psychology and further afield. In this regard, SCMT 
presents a perspective that requires evaluation in the long-term, well beyond the studies 
presented here. As Diamond (1997) noted in his Epilogue of the hugely popular summary of 
human development Guns, Germs and Steel, long-term analyses can bring insights that 
cannot be generated via short-term studies of individual societies. Whilst long-term 
perspectives are hence crucial, so is the need to integrate evidence from across subjects. As 
the then president of the American Psychological Association professed, interdisciplinary 
communication offers a powerful route for psychology to increase its impact in the future 
(Johnson, 2012). It is thus vital that theoretical perspectives are developed at broader levels of 
specificity, in order that frameworks are created that can adapt to more diverse sources of 
evidence. Later, I will describe SCMT in further depth, but first I need to outline some 
important premises and component parts of the theory. 
Appreciating Context 
Context is provided by history. Hergenhahn (2008) argues that there has been a 
disproportionate focus on contemporary research in psychology. This is not in itself a purely 
modern concern. For example, Gergen (1973) suggested that social psychology is necessarily 
an historical inquiry, and as Boring (1950, quoted in Hergenhahn, 2008, p. 5) succinctly put 
“… a psychological sophistication that contains no component of historical sophistication, 
seems to me to be no sophistication at all”. A lack of breadth in historical appreciation can 
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lead to students being taught from a skewed perspective, where they struggle to appreciate 
the history of theoretical development and the importance of earlier research in guiding 
current thinking (Hergenhahn, 2008). Perhaps more importantly, focussing solely on recent 
research exaggerates contemporary evidence as representing psychological processes as 
natural, inevitable and comparatively fixed, such as the bias towards seeing humans as 
inexorably self-interested (Miller, 1999). By appreciating the varied social contexts people 
have lived in throughout history, we can counter this tendency and respect the wide range of 
cognitions and behaviours available to us as a species. Such diversity can in turn provide 
great hope in offering the potential for change, making us no longer feel quite so governed by 
forces beyond our control (Cushman, 1990). In more academic terms, appreciating context 
can also help avoid over-specialisation in psychological research (Bevan, 1991) and allow 
greater cohesion between theoretical spaces (Ellemers, 2013). 
 In this respect, it is interesting that the latter half of the 20th century saw a clear trend 
in carrying out cross-cultural analyses of psychological mechanisms to note potential 
variability across the world (Cole, 1991). However, similar strides have not been made with 
temporal contexts, in part because of the methodological challenges inherent in using 
historical data (Baumeister, 1987). I do not pretend it is simple to apply contemporary 
research techniques to historical populations, but I do suggest that placing extant inquiries in 
broader contexts will give us a greater chance of understanding the true flexibility in 
psychological processes. In particular, a greater appreciation of contextual influences allows 
a greater understanding of hypocrisy. In other words, it can help to explain why we often fail 
to meet our own standards.  
This introduction will hence explain how SCMT offers a perspective that can help 
remedy some of the contextual weaknesses outlined above and offer a novel way of 
explaining why hypocrisy might be particularly prevalent in modern society. I will outline 
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why hypocrisy is an important concept for scientific inquiry, review the existing literature 
relating to hypocrisy and cognitive dissonance, summarise historical and contemporary 
evidence that shows why it is problematic to assume basic psychological concepts are fixed, 
and explain how a social psychological understanding of values can inform SCMT. 
Why Hypocrisy? 
 The first reason I chose to focus on hypocrisy is based on two philosophical premises. 
First, cultural and historical evidence suggests that almost all human behaviours have at some 
point in time and space been considered as, at the very least, morally neutral, and often 
morally right, by the values held as important by that society. Second, without the imposition 
of one person’s perception of morality on another person, using the belief that the imposed 
belief is qualitatively superior, it is impossible to objectively define moral absolutes (right or 
wrong). These two premises combine, to leave hypocrisy as the only pure example of 
immoral possibility, as holding a moral standard and then acting discordantly can only be 
defined as wrong for that individual, albeit of course, to different levels of degree. 
The first two premises map closely to the philosophical position of moral relativism 
(Levy, 2002), which is highly relevant to the scientist who wants to understand moral 
judgement, but who does not want to impose their own morality on their explorations. 
Current research methods in social psychology often carry an implicit bias to a morally 
preferred position (e.g., protecting the environment, anti-racism). In fact, such bias leads us to 
be concerned about the measurement error brought about via impression management 
(Paulhus, 1984). Tetlock (1994) argued strongly that social scientists risked fundamentally 
undermining trust in science by imposing their own values on their research, and that we 
should remember our different roles in society as academics and citizens. Additionally, Haidt 
and Joseph (2007) noted how moral psychology is dominated by researchers who would 
Commented [CF1]: Paragraph re-worded for clarification. 
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place themselves on the liberal side of the (American) political spectrum. This bias, they 
suggest, explains why moral research has been focussed on issues of harm and fairness, rather 
than other moral values such as loyalty to the in-group. 
The concept of hypocrisy offers a methodological avenue that can address part of this 
concern. If we can understand further the antecedents and contextual catalysts of hypocrisy, 
we can tackle real life social issues from a position of comparatively greater neutrality. The 
more we can do so, the more we ensure our actions will align with the positive values 
expressed across humanity (Schwartz, 1999). Of interest, however, this potential alignment 
with values is not straightforward. Initial discussions of my thesis with a range of people 
highlighted a common concern based around the notion that people will inevitably hold moral 
beliefs and values that necessarily conflict. 
This potential for conflict may be solved in two ways. Firstly, the right or wrong 
action in a situation of moral conflict can still be isolated if one can ascertain the context of 
the decision being made. For example, it is acceptable for some people to follow a utilitarian 
approach in a classic moral dilemma where harming one person saves the lives of many 
others (e.g. Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), despite their possession of a general moral rule that 
it is wrong to harm others. Knowing the context of a decision, we can measure the 
individual’s view of what is right or wrong for that situation and whether their actions differ 
from this standard. Secondly, it is possible that hypocrisy has become more prevalent over 
time, as our societal structures have become ever further interconnected (Seabright, 2010) 
and people have started to value acting in the interests of much broader collective identities 
(Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). This means that we are increasingly aware of others suffering 
and want to act in their interests, while nonetheless remaining limited in our ability to do so, 
because of external and internal (psychological) constraints. The increased tendency for 
hypocrisy has thus become seen as unavoidable in a complex world, hence why people see it 
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as inevitable that their beliefs will sometimes clash. I am not trying to suggest that such 
conflicts never occur, or that we can create a hypocrisy-free world. What I am suggesting is 
that modern contexts have exacerbated the potential for hypocrisy, that this has led to humans 
becoming less concerned about acting hypocritically and that these hypocritical actions have 
some concerning consequences. 
These reasons, in combination with the evidence I will present, form only part of the 
rationale for focussing on hypocrisy in this thesis. The other portion of the rationale comes 
from the aforementioned focus on context. A key argument in this dissertation is that the 
potential for conflicts between values has become a particular problem in modern society. 
The people who raised the concerns outlined above suggested they wanted to consume 
ethically, but also be financially prudent; that they wanted to enjoy travelling, but not harm 
the global environment; that they wanted to empathise with people suffering in the 
developing world, but they did not want to become emotionally fatigued. Each of these 
examples contain conflicts that are exacerbated by contemporary social contexts and would 
not have been present throughout most of human history. 
I thus suggest that hypocrisy is a particular problem in today’s global context. Over 
six million children under the age of five died in 2013, most from preventable causes (World 
Health Organization, 2014); a third of all food produced is currently wasted, whilst 795 
million people worldwide suffer from severe hunger and malnutrition (Lyons, 2015); and 
climate change continues to threaten people across the globe and demands urgent action that 
policymakers have so far failed to deliver (Bakker, 2015). Whilst these problems are 
evidently not easy to solve, the solutions required appear to map directly onto values that are 
held by the majority of societies. Few people would morally support a child dying because 
their family could not afford treatment, food being wasted whilst others die from a lack of 
nutrition, and long-term destruction of an environment in order to maintain unsustainable 
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consumption lifestyles in the short-term. There are consequences that humanity does not 
want, would not morally support and yet continue to occur every minute of every day. If 
people were unconcerned about these outcomes, then there would be no potential hypocrisy 
and the theoretical approach I am suggesting would not be tenable. In reality, hypocrisy is 
dangerous and prevalent, and we need to understand it further. 
What is Hypocrisy? 
 The central theme of my thesis is that contemporary contexts have exacerbated the 
potential for hypocrisy. However, the concept of hypocrisy has been around for a long time. 
Drefcinski (2003) noted that Aristotle’s discussion of ethics considered whether 
inconsistency across actions could be considered a vice, meaning that the notion of hypocrisy 
goes at least as far back as 4th century BC. Additionally, there is an argument that cognitive 
consistency is as basic as many essential biological needs, such as hunger (Gawronski, 2012). 
This argument suggests that notions relevant to hypocrisy will have arisen with the earliest 
social systems.  
Although the concept of hypocrisy is long-established, there is debate about how best 
to define and measure it. Psychological research on moral hypocrisy suggests the initial 
intentions of the act can help delineate between behaviour that is hypocritical and that which 
simply represents overpowered integrity (Batson & Thompson, 2001). Additionally, it 
appears that hypocrisy is considerably more likely to be ascribed when the words precede the 
deed, rather than vice-versa (Barden, Rucker & Petty, 2004). That is, people see hypocrisy 
more when somebody states that a standard is important and then acts in contravention to that 
standard, than when someone endorses a standard despite past failures to meet it. 
A further distinction of note is between inter-personal and intra-personal hypocrisy. 
Both these types of hypocrisy have been used as dependent variables in research. For 
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instance, inter-personal hypocrisy can be seen when people demand more of others than they 
would of themselves in a particular situation, such as when people think others should donate 
more to charity than they themselves should donate (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). Intra-personal 
hypocrisy instead reflects inconsistency within the person, such as differences in what you 
think you should do and what you think you would actually do in situations involving 
potential racial prejudice (Monteith & Voils, 1998). 
Hypocrisy has also been used as an independent variable. The cognitive dissonance 
tradition (Festinger, 1957) has used hypocrisy as a manipulation in order to facilitate attitude 
and behaviour change. As described later, this requires people to publically support a position 
and privately admit their own failings, which then leads to behaviour change (Stone & 
Fernandez, 2008). 
 Hypocrisy is necessarily a social construct, rather than a directly observable physical 
phenomenon. It also overlaps with the moral acceptability of changing one’s mind and failing 
via a weakness of will (Szabados & Soifer, 1999). It is therefore useful to examine people’s 
everyday understanding of its meaning (Alicke, Gordon & Rose, 2012; cf. Drefcinski, 2003). 
Alicke and colleagues (2012) presented a series of potentially hypocritical scenarios to 
participants and asked them whether each could be classed as hypocrisy. Their findings 
revealed clear differences between philosophical and lay interpretations of hypocrisy. For 
example, the intention to deceive is often considered a necessary condition from a 
philosophical standpoint, but the intention to deceive was not necessary for a sizeable 
proportion of the research participants to initially ascribe hypocrisy to an action. Although the 
intention to deceive increases lay perceptions of hypocrisy, the research outlined a number of 
other factors that can enhance or inhibit the likely accusation of hypocrisy, such as regularity 
of the offending behaviour, severity of the consequences and the level of self-deception. An 
additional finding was that for some people, almost any level of inconsistency can be deemed 
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to be hypocritical (see also Drefcinski, 2003). In line with this observation, Turner (1990) 
suggested that any discrepancy between belief and behaviour could be considered 
hypocritical. He did, however, acknowledge that this leads to a definition that is potentially 
problematic because of its broad nature, whilst also noting that not all hypocrisy is 
necessarily insincere or immoral. 
This multifactorial nature of hypocrisy makes it likely, at least in lay perceptions, that 
hypocrisy is more of a quantitative variable. Whilst a consensus on exactly what counts as 
hypocrisy is thus clearly far from being reached, for the purposes of this thesis, I work with 
the premise that hypocrisy can be assigned in graded terms and that there are two empirically 
interesting types of hypocrisy: intra-personal and inter-personal. The broad nature of SCMT 
encourages this broad treatment of hypocrisy, as I am interested in exploring any contexts 
that could prove fertile for raising discrepancies between beliefs and actions. If people act 
more closely to their own standards, the outcomes should be positive for psychological 
harmony in the individual and for society more generally. That is not to say any hypocritical 
act inevitably carries purely negative consequences and this is a point that is revisited in the 
discussion. But I am suggesting that at a broader level of analysis, and in line with SCMT, the 
costs of hypocrisy, as I define it, are currently huge for individuals, and society as a whole. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I thus place my definition of the concept close to 
Turner’s (1990) starting point outlined above. Hypocrisy exists when you fail to act in line 
with a standard that you set for yourself or a relevant other. Something we all do, every day. 
Being human is, after all, a necessarily imperfect and inconsistent experience. 
Moral Hypocrisy 
 The sections above outlined how the history of interest in hypocrisy goes to the 
beginnings of philosophical inquiry and how much variance still exists in agreed definitions 
Commented [i2]: As we discussed, I have made some changes 
across these two paragraphs to try and clarify the orientation of 
hypocrisy within the dissertation. 
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of the concept. This section aims to summarise how moral hypocrisy has been viewed and 
studied in contemporary psychological research. Moral hypocrisy can be defined as acting in 
order to appear moral, rather than acting morally because it is the right thing to do (Batson, 
Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf & Wilson, 1997). Perhaps the first point worth noting is 
that moral hypocrisy has been found to be highly prevalent in general. In experiments where 
participants were given the choice of assigning themselves or others an interesting or boring 
task, over 70% of people chose the positive task for themselves, despite less than 10% of 
them supporting this position morally (Batson et al., 1997). Adding the opportunity for 
fairness did not help much either. Repeating the situation described above, but including a 
coin flip as an option for random task allocation, over 80% of participants who chose not to 
use the coin gave themselves the positive task and even more shockingly, over 85% of 
participants who did use the coin gave themselves the positive task, despite the 50% you 
would intuitively expect (Batson et al., 1997). Interestingly, when a mirror was placed in 
front of participants doing the same task, the coin flippers allocated themselves the positive 
task 50% of the time (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney & Strongman, 1999). It thus 
appears that, in this context, moral hypocrisy is not hard to detect, although the simple 
addition of a mirror to encourage self-awareness can help to prevent it from arising. 
Batson and Thompson (2001) warn against using this evidence to presume that moral 
hypocrisy is somehow rife across society. Instead they argue that initial morally benevolent 
intentions can be overpowered when it comes to the actual point of task assignment. This 
proposition is supported by research showing that 80% of people who were offered the 
chance of having the experimenter flip the coin for them chose this option (Batson, Tsang, & 
Thompson, 2000, as cited in Batson & Thompson, 2001); although people were far less likely 
to give up control of the coin to the experimenter if the consequences of the task were made 
aversive, via the potential of electric shocks (Batson & Thompson, 2001). Using a broader 
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conceptualisation of hypocrisy, overpowered integrity is, however, still a hypocritical 
position. Participants facing the potential of electric shocks stated that deliberately allocating 
the shocks to others was not morally right, but the majority did so anyway. This is hence 
likely a case where lay perceptions of the act would assign those suffering from 
“overpowered integrity” with some level of hypocrisy, regardless of how the distinction is 
drawn academically. This evidence illustrates the problem of trying to specify exactly which 
types of behaviour represent hypocrisy.  
The paradigm of choosing between tasks that vary in pleasantness for oneself or 
others has been extended to the domain of inter-personal hypocrisy (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 
2007). Participants judged a confederate as being less fair when the confederate self-assigned 
an interesting task and assigned another person a boring task, compared with participants’ 
judgements of themselves for doing the same thing. Additionally, this effect extended to 
group membership. After a minimal group manipulation, participants judged the selfish 
behaviour of an out-group member more harshly than participants who judged the same 
behaviour of an in-group member. In a similar study, cognitive load was shown to eliminate 
the inter-personal moral hypocrisy effect, with the authors suggesting that the additional load 
caused the participants to judge others more leniently, as they could not devote resources to 
justifying their own transgression (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008). These findings suggest that 
the context within which hypocritical judgements are made matters greatly. Our moral 
judgement processes can be impacted by the cognitive resources we have available or the 
identity of the transgressor. 
Recent research into other contextual factors that can impact upon moral hypocrisy 
has investigated the role of emotional state (Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Tong & Yang, 2011). 
Indeed, it is possible to link the role of emotion to the previously described research designs 
of assigning positive and negative tasks. Batson and colleagues (2003) found that empathy 
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increased moral fairness in these situations, whereas non-affective perspective taking only 
increased fairness if the participant was in an initially advantageous position. Emotions thus 
clearly have a role to play if we are to further understand the contexts that encourage or 
discourage moral hypocrisy. This conclusion has more recently been extended to other types 
of emotion. Participants in one experiment recalled an angry, guilty, envious or emotionally 
neutral experience and then provided moral judgements of transgressions, imagining that they 
committed them or that other people committed them (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). Results 
showed that, compared to the neutral condition, participants in the angry condition showed 
greater moral hypocrisy (i.e. a larger gap between the acceptability for the self and the 
acceptability for others), whilst those in the guilty condition showed no moral hypocrisy, and 
those in the envious condition actually showed inverse hypocrisy, as they judged their own 
transgressions comparatively more harshly. In a similar study using positive emotions, those 
induced to feel pride showed similar levels of inter-personal hypocrisy to a neutral condition, 
but those induced to feel gratitude showed no hypocrisy (Tong & Yang, 2011). It thus 
appears that empathy, gratitude, guilt and envy can all reduce, or even invert, the likelihood 
of hypocrisy, whilst anger in particular appears to exacerbate its prevalence. The emotions 
that potentially reduce the prevalence of hypocrisy represent a diverse range of feelings, 
which further indicates the likely multifarious nature of socio-cognitive processes underlying 
hypocrisy. 
A final key question within the literature on moral hypocrisy is why it abounds, even 
though people dislike hypocrisy so much that they actually take pleasure in seeing hypocrites 
suffer (Powell & Smith, 2013). Some scholars argue that moral actions only take place to 
signal to others one’s virtue (Barclay & Willer, 2007); thus people will not behave morally in 
the absence of watching eyes. Other more optimistic arguments suggest that people are 
genuinely motivated by a desire for fairness and are thus willing to sacrifice their own 
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resources to maintain these standards (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), but this leaves unaddressed 
the reason for hypocrisy. In an attempt to address this question, Lonnqvist, Irlenbusch and 
Walkowitz (2014) modified the task allocation paradigm described above (Batson et al., 
1997, 1999, 2000) into a dictator-game situation, where participants could either assign an 
80/20 or 50/50 split of money to a passive participant, thus making the fair option an equal 
share of resources, rather than the acceptance of a boring task. Similar to the findings 
described earlier, the researchers found that the most popular decision was simply to choose 
the selfish option (47%), whilst a significant proportion of participants (40%) chose to flip a 
coin as an ostensibly fair method of allocation. Remarkably, every one of the 26 participants 
who chose to flip the coin ended up with the 80/20 outcome. Additionally, in a further study 
where participants were told they would have to abide by the outcome of the coin flip, they 
were far less likely to use it, suggesting people were more likely to display fairness if they 
could cheat the consequences. These results (in combination with results relating to values 
that will be discussed later) led the authors to conclude that people were more motivated by 
appearing moral than by genuine moral concern. 
In a further investigation designed to consider why moral hypocrisy thrives, a series 
of studies showed that participants were highly reluctant to blame or punish immoral acts of 
others, even when they strongly suspected the perpetrators were guilty of moral hypocrisy 
(Lonnqvist, Rilke & Walkowitz, 2015). Their results were described as being indicative of a 
general tendency to treat people as innocent until proven guilty; in other words, even 
relatively low levels of doubt are sufficient to deter people from blaming perpetrators for 
hypocrisy. This “benefit of the doubt” may make hypocrisy a useful inter-personal strategy, 
as the risks of being punished for hypocrisy are slim, whilst the benefits of getting away with 
not having to practice what you preach are potentially highly adaptive. Relating this idea 
back to SCMT makes it particularly concerning. As charted throughout this thesis, our social 
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contexts are more complex than at any other time in history; this complexity is likely to 
exacerbate notions of uncertainty and doubt, whilst weakening our sense of conviction in 
judging moral situations. It is thus possible that the 21st century contains the most fertile soil 
for hypocrisy to bloom in. 
Cognitive Dissonance 
 Consistent with Bevan’s (1991) concern about over-specialization in psychological 
research, the literature on hypocrisy based on cognitive dissonance theory (CDT) overlaps 
very little with the previously described research on moral hypocrisy. This section will briefly 
summarise some of the core findings that CDT produces in relation to hypocrisy. Festinger 
outlined the initial theory of CDT in 1957. The basic tenets of the theory are that self-
integrity is a core part of self-identity (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper & Aronson, 1997) and that 
discrepancies between two cognitions will threaten one’s sense of self-integrity and thus 
create a state of arousal that is aversive (Elliot & Devine, 1994). Additionally, the simple 
awareness of two dissonant cognitions should be enough to elicit dissonance, even in the 
absence of potential aversive consequences (Harmon-Jones, 1999), though Cooper (1999) 
disagreed on the need for negative outcomes. Since its beginnings, the majority of CDT 
experiments have looked to understand the conditions under which people feel dissonant, 
having been made aware of inconsistency between two or more attitudes, beliefs or actions. 
Instead of measuring hypocrisy directly, cognitive dissonance theorists tend to induce 
dissonance and measure its effects on attitudes, intentions or behaviour. 
 Although I am using a broader definition in this thesis, the extant CDT literature 
defines hypocrisy as a particularly powerful induction procedure that elicits different effects 
from manipulations that simply raise inconsistencies and associated dissonance. In their 
review of the literature, Stone and Fernandez (2008) suggest that many dissonance studies 
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have produced attitude change (justifying discrepant actions by changing attitudes), but 
studies that raise dissonance via hypocrisy tend to produce behaviour change (moving action 
closer to the initially positive attitude). Experiments have shown changes in intentions and 
behaviour in the areas of energy conservation (Kantola, Syme & Campbell, 1984), condom 
use (Aronson, Fried & Stone, 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow & Fried, 1994), water 
conservation (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson & Miller, 1992), sunscreen use (Stone & 
Fernandez, 2008) and road safety (Fointiat, 2004). Stone and Fernandez (2008) suggested 
that, for a manipulation to induce hypocrisy, the participant must publicly advocate personal 
support for a position and also privately admit recent failures to attain that standard. Attitude 
change is more difficult than behaviour change in this context. Changing the behaviour 
resolves the discrepancy in a relatively straightforward manner, whereas changing the attitude 
opens up potential new inconsistencies with other norms and public relationships.  
 Despite the relative simplicity of the basic theory, processes that produce cognitive 
dissonance are, however, likely to be multitudinous and qualitatively different in nature. For 
example, dissonance could relate to personal judgements of one’s own actions when 
standards relevant to the self are salient, whereas dissonance could relate to predictions of 
how others will judge actions of the self when norms or shared contexts are salient (Stone, 
1999). It is thus unsurprising that several moderating influences have been shown to impact 
dissonance production. Individual differences, such as perception of free choice (Stone & 
Fernandez, 2008), accessibility of recent past failures (Son Hing, Li & Zanna, 2002) and 
existing discrepancies between explicit and implicit attitudes (Rydell, McConnell & Mackie, 
2008), can thus moderate the likelihood of eliciting dissonance. However, more importantly 
from the perspective of SCMT, broader social contextual factors have been implicated as 
fundamentally altering when, where and how dissonance will arise. These broader factors are 
discussed next. 
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Variance in the Self Across Context 
Later I will outline some evidence showing how notions relevant to the self have 
changed massively over time. For now it is worth noting that substantial differences in 
representations of the self exist even between modern societies, reflected in part by greater 
individualism in Western culture and greater interdependence in non-Western cultures 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In fact, one of the first experiments demonstrating cognitive 
dissonance showed that participants would increase the difference in their attitudes towards 
equally attractive options (compared to a pre-choice measure) after being forced to choose 
between them (Brehm, 1956). This technique is known as the free-choice paradigm of CDT. 
The paradigm was tested in Canadian and Japanese samples, and it was found that only the 
Canadian sample displayed any attempts to reduce dissonance by increasing the difference in 
their ratings of two equally attractive music CDs after selecting one of them (Heine & 
Lehman, 1997). Additionally, this effect was moderated by threats to self-integrity. 
Participants who received positive feedback about their personality did not show dissonance 
in either sample, whereas those who received no feedback or negative feedback did exhibit 
dissonance, but only in the Canadian sample. This evidence showed that boosting the self 
eliminated dissonance in the Canadian sample, but boosting or threatening the self had no 
impact on the elicitation of dissonance in the Japanese sample. The authors thus suggest that 
dissonance processes differ between cultures because of fundamental differences in how the 
self is construed (Heine & Lehman, 1997). The Canadian sample showed dissonance because 
their culture treats the self as independent, whereas the Japanese sample did not show 
dissonance because their culture treats the self as interdependent. This explains why 
threatening the self had no impact on the Japanese participants, even though both samples 
found the threatening information equally unpleasant. 
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However, these results do not indicate that Japanese people do not feel or display 
dissonance. Another technique for eliciting dissonance is known as the induced-compliance 
paradigm, an effect first famously described by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). In their 
original study, participants completed a boring task and were then asked by the experimenter 
if they would mind suggesting to the next participant (a confederate) that the task was fun. 
They were offered either $1 or $20 for participating in this deception, dependent on 
condition. In a control condition they were not asked to talk to the next participant and thus 
received no money. Later, participants were asked to rate how much they enjoyed the original 
boring task themselves. The results showed that those paid $1 rated the task as more fun, 
compared to those who received $20 or the control condition. The investigators explained 
these results by suggesting that only those who received minimal compensation for 
effectively misleading the next participant experienced dissonance; they could not justify the 
deception they had carried out for a small reward, and thus changed their own opinion of the 
original task in order to reduce the dissonance from saying they liked a task that they actually 
disliked. Research that uses this paradigm has shown similar effects in samples from the USA 
and Japan (Sakai, 1999), suggesting that this form of dissonance will arise in different 
cultures. This highlights why it is vital to understand how context and processes relating to 
dissonance and hypocrisy interact. 
Aside from cross-cultural literature, research that integrates social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1974) into CDT provides some evidence to suggest that hypocrisy can lead to a 
rejection of behaviour change. For example, McKimmie and colleagues (2003) found a shift 
towards less positive attitudes to generosity as a personal quality when participants were 
made to feel hypocritical and exposed to information that made the group norm appear highly 
generous, but only when their university identity was highly salient. Additionally, they found 
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the participants in this crucial condition reduced their level of identification with their in-
group, compared to the other conditions.  
A similar rejection can occur when the context makes the hypocrisy publically visible. 
Fried (1998) found that participants who were made to feel hypocritical and whose private 
failings were perceived as explicitly identifiable were less likely to donate time and money to 
a recycling program and also reported less favourable attitudes towards recycling, compared 
to participants who received an induced hypocrisy manipulation but whose private failings 
were ostensibly anonymous. Stone and Fernandez (2008) argued that the combination of 
hypocrisy and public accountability may lead to a sense of shame or self-blame, which 
actually reduces the motivation to act pro-socially, leaving a shift to a more negative attitude 
as the simplest path for reducing the dissonance felt. The power of social contexts to 
influence dissonance processes is hence worth careful acknowledgement. 
These studies show that the context within which hypocrisy is induced can affect the 
type of dissonance reduction strategies that are employed and thus whether attitude or 
behaviour change occurs. Perhaps a point that these studies miss though, is the issue of how 
hypocrisy operates beyond the laboratory. If participants take their more negative attitudes 
into social contexts, will they be able to sustain them at their new less pro-social level? Or 
might social pressures actually still take effect and suggest that such attitudes towards 
recycling or generosity are not socially acceptable? If this is the case, then positive behaviour 
change may still be a possibility and the hypocrisy procedure could still have a prosocial 
effect, albeit at a later stage. Perhaps more disconcertingly, if hypocrisy itself becomes a 
normative behaviour, as SCMT suggests it might, then positive behaviour change will not 
occur, as everyone can reduce dissonance by suggesting that acting hypocritically is 
commonplace and thus not a serious moral concern. This meta-hypocrisy seems all the more 
likely in a complex society where there is plenty of room for doubt and thus a decreased 
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willingness to blame people for acting immorally (Lonnqvist et al., 2015). It is hence suitable 
to next consider how complexity, amongst other factors, has changed over time. 
Variance of the Self Over Time 
 The modern human brain came into existence 200,000 years ago and anatomically it 
is essentially identical to cave dwellers of 30,000 years ago (Robson, 2006). The raw material 
that allows our cognitions today is thus very similar to that of tens of millennia ago. 
However, the range of behaviours that humans have displayed throughout history suggests 
that the same anatomy is capable of producing actions, motives, values and morals that we 
would perceive as being almost polar opposites of one another. Indeed, progress in 
neuroscientific research has shown that the brain, whilst modular in some regards, has 
notable powers of adaptability (Greenfield, 2014). Consequently, the influence of social 
contexts in shaping behaviour must be very powerful, given the same raw material (brain) 
can produce such a diversity of outcomes. 
This section thus seeks to provide evidence relating to two interactive and 
fundamental parts of SCMT. First, historical evidence can provide some clues that are useful 
in outlining the individual and social potential of humanity today. Mapping out human 
behaviours in their social contexts will help us to further understand the antecedents of 
important psychological processes and can guide contemporary literature. Second, historical 
evidence can also counter-balance the tendency for psychology to disproportionately focus on 
recent research ideas (Hergenhahn, 2008). The danger of this bias is that it presents 21st 
century humans as far more fixed in their human nature than is actually the case, which can in 
turn become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1948). This is a danger for people in general, 
not just scientists. SCMT is a theoretical position wedded to positivity and optimism. 
Accordingly, I hope an increasing awareness of how social contexts can encourage 
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hypocritical tendencies, offers us great potential for social change, in line with the values 
people truly want to pursue. 
Cosmides (1989) showed the utility of integrating biological evolutionary theory with 
computational approaches to gain a better understanding of comparatively basic reasoning 
processes. More recently, evidence sourced from historical dictionary definitions, US State of 
the Union addresses and language usage over time, revealed clear variation in how the 
concept of happiness has changed over the last two centuries (Oishi, Graham, Kesebir & 
Galinha, 2013). Both of these research projects emphasise the importance of looking back 
over different periods of time, in order that we better understand the psychological processes 
we study today; they also underline the potential breadth of data sources available to us to 
achieve this goal. 
To link historical perspectives as efficiently as I can to SCMT, I have chosen to focus 
on summarising two papers that chart the history of the self. The first is written by 
Baumeister (1987; see also 1986) where he outlined how self-knowledge has become more 
problematic as human societies have developed. The second is written by Cushman (1990) 
and he used a similar approach to suggest that the self has become “empty”. This focus on the 
self comes in part because of its central importance as a foundation for psychological theory 
in general (Allport, 1943). However, it also allows me to concentrate on one vital concept 
that has developed across human history, namely that of societal complexity. The shift 
towards a market economy, and the associated shift from forces of nature to market forces as 
the major controlling force of people, has had profound impacts upon what it means to 
construct the self in society (Ehrenreich & English, 1979). People are now, more than ever, 
reliant on other people and organisations for meeting their basic needs, and this necessarily 
changes notions of self and identity, particularly in cultures where individualism is highly 
valued. This also links neatly into the fourth chapter of my dissertation, which presents an 
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argument that increased perceptions of complexity can lead to a reduced willingness to utilise 
moral judgement processes. 
Baumeister (1987) based his analysis of the development of the self over time on 
expert scholars’ interpretations of historical and literary evidence, rather than directly 
accessing the evidence himself. This approach offered a greater chance for objective analyses 
and it also meant he had multiple sources of evidence available to derive an understanding of 
historical contexts where data are sparse. His central thesis is that concern about the self is a 
comparatively modern phenomenon when one looks back over the course of (Western) 
human history and he begins by noting that medieval lords and serfs did not struggle with 
issues of self-definition in the way we often do today. One key development relevant to 
SCMT was the shift from the self being conceived as a reflection of how people acted 
outwardly in public, to a concept that saw the self as being something unseen or hidden, 
which Baumeister (1987) places being around the 16th century. This shift led to an associated 
development in notions of sincerity, as people could now act in ways that were in conflict 
with their inner selves and such conflicts were potentially threatening to others. Later, 
towards the 19th century, the fundamental components of how the self was recognised moved 
away from being features assigned to the individual at birth, such as social rank and role, and 
towards more potentially malleable and less clearly measurable factors, particularly 
personality. Additionally, the growing abandonment of religion by many individuals, either 
completely or at least as a guiding force in daily life, led to people having ever greater need 
to consider how their self-knowledge played a part in setting basic moral standards to guide 
their lives (Baumeister, 1987). 
It is relatively easy to see how these changes over time led to ever greater problems 
for the self. Before these developments, ideas of fulfilment were based on participating in life 
in a way that aligned to the basic criteria you had been given. After these developments each 
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individual had to make a greater number of decisions about core life activities, such as 
morality, employment and relationships. In essence, the social world was fast becoming a 
much more complex place. Baumeister (1987) charts how societal development led to ever 
greater choice for people in these principal domains, thus revealing how modern ideas can be 
notably distant from conceptions from the past. For example he reports that passionate love 
was essentially a luxury for the privileged few in early medieval societies. This was based in 
part on pragmatic constraints for everyone else, who endured hard working lives and poor 
health. However, there were also cultural differences at the time, such as the prevalence of 
arranged marriage, which added to this less idealised notion of love. 
In modern Western societies, love is often colloquially named as the most important 
ingredient in successful relationships, and without it such bonds are considered bound for 
failure. If lay and academic perceptions of relationship development relied exclusively on 
modern notions of how humans forge connections, we would risk creating a sense of 
something innate in humans that is actually very culturally responsive. This is not to dismiss 
the evolutionary perspectives concerning the innate processes that underlie constructs of love 
and pair-bonding (Fletcher, Simpson, Campbell & Overall, 2015). However, people could be 
pressured into feeling fundamentally inadequate if they do not attain the more contemporary 
and romanticised versions of concepts such as love. Furthermore, modern contexts can 
exacerbate the competition between home and work, causing problems for relationship 
development (Guest, 2002). Maintaining romantic relationships is hence a difficult task. 
Feeling pressured into idealised versions of love also maps onto the relatively contemporary 
problem of feeling pressured to be positive and happy (Oishi, Diener & Lucas, 2007). 
Historical evidence can help us challenge notions of fixity in human behaviour, which in turn 
can help people avoid feeling anxious if they cannot, or do not want to, strive for certain 
goals. 
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Baumeister (1987) described how the relationship between individual and society has 
also changed dramatically since medieval times. He suggests that the end of the Middle Ages 
saw the beginnings of social mobility, as intermarriage across classes became possible and 
individuals were becoming less defined by their place in the social hierarchy. These changes 
increased the importance of the self as a unit of interest separate to society and hence began 
to increase potential conflicts between the interests of individuals and wider society. 
Baumeister (1987) proposed that the concept of privacy developed alongside such changes, 
helping to dramatically separate public and private spheres. Later, industrialisation led to 
increased choice in the work domain, economic interdependence led to decreased needs for 
self-sufficiency and the broadening role of governments offered greater support for the 
individual. All of these changes led to an increased role for the individualised self and 
therefore carried with them an associated problem of choosing which social identities to 
follow or aspire towards. Increasing choice also produced increasing opportunities for 
conflicts between major life goals and between self and society. Such conflicts encouraged 
people to act differently in public and private, and to differentiate between appearing to act 
morally and actually acting morally. Additionally, increased conflicts would be associated 
with increased dissonance, so people could try to evade dissonance-eliciting situations by 
avoiding attention to self-discrepancies. 
Cushman’s (1990) analysis presented several areas of corroboration with Baumeister 
(1987). For example, he noted how the collapse of feudalism (14th - 15th centuries) created a 
context which encouraged a greater sense of a bounded self, rather than simply being part of 
a social structure. This also shifted the locus of control for people ever further inwards, 
placing greater responsibility for their actions on factors relating to who they were as 
individuals. The 16th century saw major shifts in basic social structures, such as science 
challenging religion for legitimacy in understanding, and people shifting to lives dominated 
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by industrial and urban environments, rather than rural and agricultural settings. Cushman’s 
(1990) approach suggested that, as these changes were developing, modern states were 
finding ways to control their populaces. Initially, in Victorian times, this control came 
through the suppression of inner desires, but the 20th century saw a shift towards control via 
creating and providing conditions that encouraged cycles of materialistic consumption. 
Whilst Baumeister (1987) charted the rise of societal complexity and the associated 
problems this caused the self, Cushman (1990) presented an arguably more disconcerting 
evaluation through his focus on an “empty self”. According to Cushman (1990) the 20th 
century saw several societal shifts that contributed to creating an empty self. For example, 
personality began to take precedence over character, hence approval from others became 
more important than strict moral integrity in many social situations. Furthermore, self-
reliance became less valued and skills in manipulating others for personal gain became more 
valuable, particularly in the workplace. In essence, people were emptier because they were 
losing the community aspect of life. Increased individualism in general was pushing people 
towards continued existential crises. 
Advertising was a central target for Cushman (1990) in explaining the existence and 
perpetuation of the empty self, as it consistently promised a solution to any broad sense of 
dissatisfaction through positive and idealised imagery. Economic strategy was an additional 
factor, as modern economies relied on manufacturing and consumption of non-essential 
goods and services. Additionally, Cushman (1990) suggested that the gradual shift from a 
savings economy to one ever more reliant on notions of debt is another driver behind the 
empty self. People get into a rhythm of borrowing to maintain pace with social standards and 
then need to pay off their debts, but there are always more and newer products to consume. 
Several contextual factors are thus in place today which continue to encourage people to 
pursue activities that at best bring temporary respite from feelings of emptiness, but at worst 
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consistently reproduce a society whose normative practices actually give people little chance 
at fulfilment and acting sustainably. The empty self that Cushman (1990) describes is 
therefore one that causes people’s actions to be hugely discrepant from the actions they 
would ideally carry out.  
Such discrepancies echo Baumeister’s (1987) emphasis on divergence between the 
private and public self and are a cornerstone of SCMT. We have seen a relatively rapid and 
fundamental shift in the self. Medieval society operated on defined roles and fulfilment came 
from working within those constraints. Modern society works on freedom to choose one’s 
roles, whilst also relying heavily on others for meeting basic needs. It is this transition which 
has contributed to making self-knowledge problematic. Changes over time have offered 
greater opportunities to pursue individual goals in hugely important parts of life. However, 
these opportunities have also meant greater reliance on self-knowledge, as people cannot 
chase their dreams if they do not know who they are. We have gone from having everything 
defined for us, such as our moral standards, our employment choices, our relationships and 
our social position, to a world where we theoretically have the freedom to choose our moral 
positions, our spiritual outlook, our romantic partner and our career. Making all these choices 
is difficult and necessarily demands compromises. It also places a heavy reliance on the self 
to decide what is right. It is thus unsurprising that self-knowledge has become problematic in 
modern times. It is disconcerting to think that the self may also have become empty. 
Paradoxically, a world of ever-increasing apparent choice may have led to a world of ever-
decreasing control over life. This is fertile soil for hypocrisy. We theoretically have choices 
over what we do, yet there are also numerous powerful external forces, such as advertising 
(Cushman, 1990), that shape our lives. This contributes to forcing gaps between what we 
think we should do and what we actually end up doing. Increasing social complexity has 
therefore given us plenty of scope for hypocrisy. 
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Whilst Baumeister (1987) and Cushman (1990) provide strong arguments for why the 
self might be an issue of fundamental concern today and clearly indicate the need for greater 
contextual appreciation in psychology, they do not offer a scientific method for tackling this 
problem further. Cushman’s (1990) conclusion is particularly pessimistic and it is interesting 
to consider his perspective now, 25 years later. I would speculate that, given the current 
issues facing psychological research and humanity more generally, it is unlikely that his view 
has vastly changed. One aim of SCMT is thus to provide a framework within which 
contemporary psychological methods can function. This can help us understand further how 
we can avoid some of the issues that a problematic or empty self poses today. 
Challenging Assumptions of Self-Interest 
The previous section outlined how fundamental aspects of life such as love, work, 
selfhood and social role have changed dramatically in a relatively short space of time. 
However, as noted earlier, some perspectives tend to ignore this variance and a 
disproportionate focus on contemporary psychological processes can lead to some parts of 
human behaviour being seen as fixed, or at least impractically hard to change. One central 
assumption that is popular from lay viewpoints, but also academic studies across the 
behavioural sciences, is that of self-interest (Miller, 1999). This section aims to challenge this 
assumption by summarising some research that provides evidence of how people are often 
motivated primarily by caring for others. 
Miller (1999) outlined how self-interest motives are driven by cultural factors, yet 
their powerful presence in the modern world is often seen as more representative of innate 
urges. He succinctly concludes “Homo economicus, it should not be forgotten, inhabits a 
social world” (Miller, 1999, p. 1059). A vital part of Miller’s (1999) analysis is the normative 
component of self-interested behaviour. It is such norms that perpetuate the acceptability of 
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current actions and the inevitability of future actions, whilst lowering the perception of the 
potential for radical pro-social change. Fortunately, there are people who consistently act pro-
socially, and even more importantly they can affect group norms in a positive direction 
(Weber & Murnighan, 2008). 
That is not to downplay the importance of understanding pervasive human biases. For 
example, people often assume initially conflicting interests are directly oppositional and do 
not easily see solutions that benefit both parties (Bazerman, Moore & Gillespie, 1999). Such 
assumptions can encourage self-interested actions. If such biases have an innate basis, then 
the route to moderating their influence may be different than if the biases were not innate. 
Furthermore, people value honesty but they also accept they are not perfect, and maintaining 
a positive view of the self does not preclude some self-interested dishonest activity (Mazar, 
Amir & Ariely, 2008). Importantly from the perspective of SCMT, Mazar and colleagues 
(2008) suggested that such dishonesty is more likely in contexts where the parties interact 
indirectly rather than directly. This supports a principal hypothesis of SCMT, namely that 
greater complexity in social environments can encourage greater discrepancies between 
actions and values. 
One area where self-interest is seen as particularly problematic is in shared resource 
dilemmas, prototypically represented by the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). In such 
contexts, people are assumed to be unable to sufficiently inhibit short-term self-interest in 
order to protect a shared resource in the long-term. However, Ostrom (2000, 2008) has shown 
that the effects of such dilemmas are context-dependent and that policy analysts who seek 
certainty often drive assumptions of self-interest, rather than more nuanced boundary 
conditions or moderating factors. For example, she showed in field settings that smaller 
groups with autonomy can coordinate their actions to make shared resource settings 
sustainable. Similarly, people will display concern for the interests of others in protecting 
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common environmental resources if they have the necessary information, a sense of relevant 
group identity and some trust in institutional organisations (Van Vugt, 2009). However, 
global issues such as climate change still present many properties reflective of a tragedy of 
the commons approach (Ostrom, 2009). This is why it is important to challenge the 
hegemony of views focussing on self-interest, as it is likely to contribute to the perceived 
intractability of the problem of getting individuals to act in the collective interests of the 
group. 
The social identity approach provides a framework for understanding how 
motivations between the individual and the group interact (Hornsey, 2008). Reicher (2004) 
outlined how, despite its deep contextual roots, this approach still faced dangers of 
disregarding social information via reductionist scientific practices. He argued that not only 
does this reduce the power of many social psychological investigations, it also threatens to 
disproportionately represent many human actions as prevalent and inescapable. For example, 
devoting little attention to processes of peaceful compromise and reconciliation, and 
focussing heavily on examples of intergroup aggression, self-interest and prejudice, can lead 
to making conflict seem normal and inevitable. Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest 
empathy induced helping can transcend group identities and thus represent concerns beyond 
self-interest or in-group concerns (Batson et al., 1997). Psychological research can thus offer 
us reasons to be positive for a future likely to contain even more blurry boundaries of 
identity. Unlike Cushman (1990), Reicher (2004) offered a greater sense of hope for the 
future. But this hope is based on psychology stepping back and appreciating the broader 
contextual landscape, where individual and group processes are far from permanent. In this 
regard, his approach ties in closely with SCMT and the need to question the fixed nature of 
self-interest. 
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A further reason to consider attenuating the perceived inevitability of self-interest is 
that it actually fails to bring fulfilment. People predict an almost direct relationship between 
money and happiness, but the actual relationship is small at best (Aknin, Norton & Dunn, 
2009). Income can contribute to self-reported well-being, but only in contexts where basic 
needs are not yet met (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002). Furthermore, wealth can actually 
have a negative impact on fulfilment, as it reduces the enjoyment of everyday experiences 
(Quoidbach, Dunn, Petrides & Mikolajczak, 2010) and leads to people consuming extremely 
luxurious experiences, which in turn make everyday life less enjoyable (Gilbert, 2006). 
Pursuing wealth at an individual level and economic growth at a national level is thus a 
powerful norm worth urgently questioning, in light of the environmental unsustainability of 
this focus (Jackson, 2009). 
There are thus a number of reasons why it is important that assumptions of self-
interest are challenged appropriately. Whilst it is clear that humans can act in selfish ways, it 
is also evident that this tendency is highly contextually dependent. What is particularly 
dangerous is if self-interest is seen as so innately human that it becomes socially normal to 
act in this way, especially in contexts where precious resources are being used inefficiently. 
Historical evidence and contemporary experimental methods can combine to show the 
antecedents of self-interest, the contexts where self-interest can be beneficial and the 
environments where self-interest can contribute to hypocritical action and inaction. The 
perspective of SCMT, outlined in detail later, aims to offer additional support towards these 
goals. 
Values 
 Before outlining the relationship between SCMT and the research presented in this 
thesis, it is important to briefly introduce the topic of human values and how it relates to 
 Page 30 
 
SCMT, particularly as values are measured in two of the three core chapters. Hitlin (2003) 
suggested that values are a useful metric for pragmatically accessing how an individual views 
the world, both individually and in relation to society more broadly. Values are commonly 
defined as trans-situational goals that guide people in life (Schwartz, 1994). Examples 
include honesty, power, creativity and tradition. Contemporary measures assess them by 
asking people to rate their importance as a guiding principle in their lives. 
SCMT is a broad theoretical position, and it is thus important to consider how it could 
explain variance in a comparatively equally broad psychological construct. The evidence 
presented in the last two sections suggests that people, now more than ever, are in a state of 
flux regarding how best to use self-knowledge to guide basic life decisions. Rokeach (1973) 
suggested that values are central in people’s self-concepts, making it appear likely that values 
reflect this instability. Chapter 2 will address this question directly and provide more detail 
on the theoretical foundations of values, but for now it is worth noting how values relate to 
hypocrisy and SCMT. 
In this regard, it is useful to consider the most widely researched model of values, 
Schwartz’s (2012) circular model. This model proposes that values can be organised in a 
circular structure, with values that oppose one another, such as equality and wealth, being 
placed on opposite sides of the circle. Individual values can be combined into two broad 
dimensions: self-transcendence – self-enhancement, and openness – conservation. 
In a study that examined the relations between values and moral hypocrisy it was 
found that those who attached greater importance to conformity values were more likely to 
act hypocritically, whilst those who attached greater importance to pro-social (universalism) 
values were more likely to act with moral integrity (Lonnqvist et al., 2014). Similarly, 
participants with higher self-enhancement values were more likely to condone cheating 
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behaviour, but this effect was attenuated by exposing participants to self-transcendent value 
terms embedded within a speech (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). Together, these studies suggest 
that values and hypocrisy are related and that pro-social values may have a protective effect 
against hypocrisy. Values are thus a useful tool in understanding the antecedents of differing 
types of moral and hypocritical behaviour. 
The aforementioned evidence regarding the self over time indicates that throughout 
much of history people would have faced little instability in the values they construe as 
important, as their self-knowledge was likely to be less problematised (Baumeister, 1987). 
However, in a modern world of much greater societal complexity and associated issues of 
defining the self, it is likely that people are more fluid in which values to assign importance 
to and how to instantiate these values in different contexts (Maio, Hahn, Frost & Cheung, 
2009). An implication of this is that values are malleable. This malleability is evident in 
research finding moderate stability in adulthood, but with change triggered by major life 
events (Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh & Soutar, 2009). In addition, experimental tasks that 
challenge people to think about whether their values are consistent with how they would like 
to view themselves also trigger value change (Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung & Rees, 2009; 
Rokeach, 1973). SCMT may help to understand this value malleability further, as outlined 
below and in the subsequent chapters. 
Social Context Mismatch Theory 
To conclude, this introduction describes SCMT in more detail and then indicates how 
it relates to the three core chapters that follow. This chapter began with a comparison 
between potential mismatch processes relevant to obesity and social psychology. SCMT was 
the bridging mechanism between these concepts. It is worth noting, however, that there are 
some fundamental differences between obesity and hypocrisy and their associated 
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antecedents. Obesity is a visible and directly measurable outcome and it is possible to 
relatively accurately track the diets of people and animals across history and culture (Kaplan, 
Hill, Lancaster & Hurtado, 2000). Hypocrisy however, is an invisible and semantically 
messier construct, and the contexts that SCMT proposes as contributory in its historical 
prevalence are harder to objectively quantify. It is thus the case that whilst the analogy to 
obesity is useful in explaining the structure of the theory, it needs to be used with caution. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Model of SCMT to explain obesity. 
As Figure 1.1 shows, SCMT can be used as a model for modern health problems, such 
as obesity, but its main role for this thesis is to explain why people may struggle to act in 
accordance with the generally benevolent values they espouse, i.e. act hypocritically. The 
shift between the two contexts of the model occurs over time. Crucially, the mismatch occurs 
because contexts change more quickly than motives. For example, social contexts can change 
much faster than evolution can adapt, or new technology can suddenly alter social 
environments whilst people take longer to become accustomed to its use. The speed and 
amount of contextual change can thus vary. Conceptually, a greater degree of overlap 
between the two contexts would be associated with smaller relevant differences and weaker 
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effects across the model, but for simplicity of presentation the degree of overlap is kept 
identical across each example. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Model of SCMT to explain hypocrisy and empathy. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the model with the example of empathy. It would have been 
relatively straightforward to empathise with all those people we felt connected to earlier in 
human history, as contact was direct and interactions were between a comparatively small 
number of people. Today, however, people can identify with all humanity (McFarland, Webb 
& Brown, 2012) and we are faced with regular reminders of suffering across the globe, 
mediated by newspapers, television and the internet. There is thus a mismatch between 
contexts in terms of the desire to care for others, and the presence of a potential in-group of 
over seven billion people. The result is that people genuinely care about others, but are 
overwhelmed by the situation. This encourages inaction, which is clearly discrepant with the 
pro-social position that people value. 
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Figure 1.3: Model of SCMT to explain hypocrisy and materialism. 
As displayed, the model could also extend to Cushman’s (1990) explanation of the 
empty self (Figure 1.3). People still have a strong need for community, but social contexts 
have encouraged individualism and thus taken away much of the provision of community 
support. This leads to a mismatch in contexts and thus an empty self. In order to compensate 
for this emptiness people are directed towards short-term fixes, such as material goods that do 
not fit with important values and fail to bring fulfilment, thus representing hypocrisy. 
In both the cases of empathy and the need for community, the implication is that the 
motives from the first context, caring for others and being part of a community, are inherently 
important but vulnerable to hypocrisy from the move to the second, more recent context. It is 
worth noting though that mismatches can also occur where the second context is less biased 
toward self-interest. For example, the last two decades of the 20th century saw notable rises in 
the importance people attached to values of tolerance in developed societies (Inglehart & 
Baker, 2000). However, we know from social identity theory, experimental research using the 
minimal group paradigm and historical evidence, that people have a longstanding tendency of 
using group identities in ways that favours their own groups, dehumanises other groups and 
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would oppose values of acceptance (Diehl, 1990). In this regard, SCMT can show how 
modern contexts conflict with pro-social motives from the past, as much as it can show how 
self-interested tendencies from the past can conflict with recently acquired pro-social 
motives. 
An additional element of the model that is not studied directly in this dissertation is 
that of social norms reinforcing the legitimacy of the hypocrisy. However, earlier I outlined 
the potential self-fulfilling nature of assuming self-interest as an inescapable part of human 
nature. This evidence provides plenty of reasons as to why people might begin to reaffirm 
hypocrisy as socially normative, thus supporting the feedback process outlined in the model 
by the bi-directional arrow. 
Essentially, SCMT shows that changes in social contexts can lead to gaps between 
what we truly value and how we act. These gaps are more likely in the 21st century, as the 
pace of social change in the last couple of centuries has somewhat mirrored the exponential 
rise in the global population. We are thus in a society set up to care a lot, but act a little. But 
by working together, we can turn this around. 
Present Research 
This final section simply outlines how SCMT relates to the three core chapters that 
follow. SCMT has been developed throughout my studies. Accordingly, the chapters do not 
test the theory directly as much as they illustrate aspects of it. Nevertheless, the research 
within the main chapters describes ideas that are worthy of interest in their own right and can 
still inform future directions via SCMT. Additionally, I concur with Festinger (1987/1999), 
who suggested that no psychological theory is ever complete. For me, SCMT is in an 
embryonic stage. 
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Figure 1.4: Overview of SCMT. 
 Figure 1.4 outlines a generalised model of SCMT. The model will be repeated at the 
start of each core chapter, to show how SCMT relates to the research conducted. The model 
shows how contexts change over time (from time 1 to time 2), yet motives often change little, 
or not at all, over the same period of time. It is these different paces of change that lead to 
matches or mismatches and their associated consequences. Whilst I focussed on time as the 
driver of context change, it is worth noting that other antecedents of context change would 
also work with this model; this issue will be revisited in the final discussion chapter.  
Chapter 2 is an investigation of a novel way of measuring values, where I ask 
participants to indicate how they see their values over time. Historically, broad life 
motivations were based on following more socially defined values, whereas contemporary 
society makes it more important to choose one’s own values (Baumeister, 1987). SCMT 
predicts that the social complexity in present times will lead people to perceive flexibility in 
their values over time, despite evidence of some stability across the lifespan (Bardi et al., 
2009; cf. Gouveia, Vione, Milfont & Fischer, 2015). I therefore investigate whether people 
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do perceive their values as malleable, whether they see any difficulties in pursuing two 
competing values, and how discrepancies over time relate to well-being. 
 Chapter 3 is aimed more towards the end of the model. This research measures intra-
personal and inter-personal hypocrisy within the context of ethical consumption. This is a 
context that is highly relevant for SCMT. Greater social complexity, particularly in relation to 
trading (Ehrenreich & English, 1979), has led to people having to consider a much broader 
range of values when consuming goods and services, hence the rise of “ethical purchasing” as 
high-volume trade in modern society. I thus test whether reminding people of how purchasing 
in a purely self-interested manner has harmful consequences for others, can increase the 
consideration of others’ plight. Essentially, this approach re-instigates the historically older 
foci of empathy and community in the mental representation of purchasing decisions. It then 
tests whether this context alteration changes intentions and reduces hypocrisy. Additionally, I 
test whether setting the bar high or low for pro-social behaviour works better for eliciting 
these changes. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the role of complexity in SCMT. This chapter tests whether 
increased perceptions of complexity lead to a reduced willingness to assign negative moral 
judgements to an ethically controversial issue. This finding would support SCMT’s view that 
increased social complexity can encourage hypocrisy by reducing people’s confidence to 
make moral evaluations. Additionally, more complex contexts can dilute the impact of an 
individual on their social surroundings, thus making them feel less efficacious in addressing 
moral concerns.  
 The intentions underpinning this research are to help us all get closer to who we really 
want to be. By understanding the role of context complexity and context mismatching, it is 
possible to form a greater awareness of the processes underlying hypocrisy in our behaviour. 
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This introduction and the next three chapters combine to address this aim by illustrating 
portions of the SCMT framework, while attempting to integrate a wide range of 
psychological literature (e.g., value measurement, consumer decision making, anchoring, 
moral judgement, attributional processes) into its overarching perspective. The final chapter 
will then wrap up by summarising what has been achieved so far and indicate the future 
directions and implications that are raised by SCMT. 
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Chapter 2: Values Over Time and Motivational Relations Between Values 
Introduction 
 In Gawronski’s (2012) recent review of cognitive dissonance theory, he emphasised 
the need for cognitive consistency as a basic psychological need for individuals, mirroring 
that of hunger and thirst. In the general introduction I outlined how self-knowledge has 
become more problematic for people, particularly over the last few centuries. If this is the 
case, a potential context mismatch will exist between this innate need for consistency and 
contemporary society, where continually acting in alignment with one’s values is highly 
challenging. Figure 5 places this idea within the SCMT model framework. An important goal 
for this chapter was thus to use values as a framework for understanding how people see 
themselves as changing over time and to see how these perceptions link to their current sense 
of well-being. 
 
Figure 2.1: Model of SCMT to explain value instability. 
Just under 30 years ago, Markus and Nurius (1986) introduced their concept of 
“possible selves”. Their work encouraged many other researchers to consider psychological 
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identity from a more fluid temporal perspective than had previously been the case, whilst 
sociologists also bemoaned a paucity of empirical investigations into how the self-concept 
changes over time (Demo, 1992). There has since followed a diverse range of work that has 
tested the direction and range of temporal variability in psychological constructs, covering 
areas such as personality (Biesanz, West & Kwok, 2003), well-being (Ryff, 1991) and affect 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). However, equivalent research into the perception of value change 
across the lifespan has been somewhat lacking. This chapter aims to begin addressing this 
gap.  
I begin by considering the literature on values and their potential structure, then move 
on to look at evidence examining how people perceive aspects of themselves as stable or 
dynamic over time, before also summarising some research on well-being and its association 
with values. These three broad areas of research are then pooled together to provide the 
context for the three studies that follow. I wanted to test how people see their values as 
changing over time, whether they perceive potential tensions in these changes and how such 
trajectories might relate to present feelings of well-being. 
Values and Value Structures 
 Hitlin and Elder (2007) suggest that the notion of the self is a necessarily temporal 
experience, yet social psychologists (and to some extent sociologists) have neglected to 
routinely use temporal contexts to explain the role of the self and agency in behaviour. This 
may be in part because the concept of the self is so complex. Multiple aspects of the self are 
presented in psychological theories such as self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), and the 
links between self-identities and social groups also offer a further range of options for 
understanding the self via social identity theory (Brown, 2000). Hence there are already 
enough degrees of complexity in simply analysing the self at one time point. Hitlin (2003), 
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however, suggests that values can be a coherent construct for bringing these multiple versions 
of the self and their associated relevant contexts together. He notes that established values at 
an individual level, such as benevolence, clearly relate to possible group identities such as 
volunteering. Furthermore, he suggests that values contain both emotional and cognitive 
components. This makes values an important metric for capturing the comparatively broad 
sense of what identity means for an individual, particularly over multiple time points. 
 Given the significance of values to the self-concept, it is important to consider notions 
of stability, progress over time and conflicting motivations in values. Schwartz (1994) defines 
values as trans-situational goals that guide people in life. But this leaves open the question as 
to whether people really see values as goals to achieve, or perhaps standards to maintain. If it 
is the former, then values should be aspirational and thus potentially change over time. If it is 
the latter, then values may be set at a constant level, which people do not wish to alter. 
Previous research has tended to rely on the premise that values are essentially stable but can 
vary to some degree over time (Bardi et al., 2009; Rudnev, 2014). However, no research has 
considered whether people themselves see their values as stable over time.  
These perceptions of value change are relevant to people’s perceptions of their 
general personal development over time, which is brought into focus in the next section. 
Important consequences emanate from how people construct their identity from past to 
present to future. These perceived trajectories often differ substantially from actual temporal 
change, but they remain relevant to many psychological mechanisms. 
 Before examining values in the context of general identity progress, it is worth 
looking at how values are structured, as this will provide the context for understanding how 
people perceive different values as changing over time. The dominant model of values in 
social psychology over the past two decades was presented in full by Schwartz (1992). His 
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model states that values form a continuum, which takes the approximate shape of a circle. In 
this circular structure, competing motivations appear opposite one another and 
complementary motivations appear close together. It is this model I use in my research (see 
Figure 2.2). The precise number, definition and structure of each value in the model has 
varied from its initial foundation (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) to more recent revisions 
(Schwartz et al., 2012). However, the broader dimensions of self-transcendence and self-
enhancement, and openness and conservation, have remained essentially constant, and it is 
these dimensions I focus on. The validity of the structure is reflected by evidence of tensions 
across the circle, for example people who attach more importance to self-transcendence 
values also attach less importance to self-enhancement values (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Circular model of values, adapted from Schwartz et al. (2012). 
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 The model has been successful in part because the values it assesses help to predict a 
variety of attitudes and behaviour. For example, those who were higher in openness values 
and lower in conservation values were more ready to embrace out-group contact (Sagiv & 
Schwartz, 1995). In addition, values are useful predictors of future concerns (Schwartz, Sagiv 
& Boehnke, 2000) and hence have clear relevance to people’s cognitions relating to time. 
However, the most important evidence supporting the model directly examines its 
assumptions about the circular pattern of motivational relations between values. The structure 
has a wealth of evidence supporting it across a range of samples and contexts (Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003; Fischer & Schwartz, 2011; Pakizeh, Gebauer & Maio, 2007; Schwartz & 
Boehnke, 2004). Also, priming research has shown that if people raise one value, they tend to 
also lower an opposing value, whilst leaving orthogonal values unchanged (Maio, Pakizeh et 
al., 2009). Similarly and perhaps most pertinent to my research, where values have been 
shown to change over time, the value structure has been maintained (Bardi et al., 2009). This 
evidence thus suggests that a circular structure is consistent across a range of situations and 
remains valid even when people change the importance they attach to different values. A 
fundamental question for my research was thus whether people perceive this apparent circular 
structure when they consider their own values over time. 
Stability and Change Over Time 
 Cross-sectional research has shown that values change across the lifespan, with age 
correlating positively with conservation values and negatively with openness values (Caprara, 
Caprara & Steca, 2003; Robinson, 2013). Additionally, in a longitudinal study, it was found 
that students shifted away from extrinsic values over their college career (Sheldon, 2005). So 
although values are a relatively stable construct (Bardi et al., 2009), it appears that gradual 
change over the longer-term is likely. 
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 An important part of understanding the relationship between identity and time is to 
understand how the perception of temporal distance matters in terms of attitudes and 
behaviour. Overall concern for the future can be separated into two factors of immediate and 
future interests, and individuals who placed greater emphasis on considering future 
consequences were more likely to exercise and eat healthily (Joireman, Shaffer, Balliet & 
Strathman, 2012). Similarly, comparisons between past and potential selves formed 
independent factors in relation to predicting future task performance (Elliot, Murayama, 
Kobeisy & Lichtenfeld, 2014). It also appears that self-evaluations differ when the future is 
projected as close or distant (Wilson, Buehler, Lawford, Schmidt & Yong, 2012; Heller, 
Stephan, Kifer & Sedikides, 2011), though interestingly there is some disagreement in this 
evidence as to whether the manipulation improves or worsens the self-appraisals. One line of 
evidence suggested greater positivity towards close future selves compared to distant future 
selves (Wilson et al., 2012), whilst the other suggested greater positivity towards self-
concepts placed in the distant future, compared to the near future (Heller et al., 2011). Such 
conflicts reveal a need to understand further how temporal perspectives can affect how we 
view ourselves over time. 
Construal level theory (CLT) has attracted a lot of interest over the last decade and is 
another useful theoretical perspective for thinking about self-changes over time (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). A central tenet of the theory is that psychological distance is related to the 
present self and that further perceived temporal distance relates to the level of abstraction of 
the relevant construal (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Ledgerwood, Trope & Chaiken, 2010). CLT 
is relevant to values insofar as it proposes that current values are a useful predictor of distant 
behaviour, as they are an abstract concept, lacking in concrete situational demands (Eyal, 
Sagristano, Trope, Liberman & Chaiken, 2009). Interestingly, in their research, the greatest 
congruence between values and intentions actually occurred in a control condition, when 
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neither abstract nor concrete construal framing was used (Eyal et al., 2009). This reflects the 
potential importance of not always constraining how people personally construct their mental 
representations of psychological measures. However, CLT has not yet considered mapping 
the trajectory of perceived value change onto current or future intentions. Values in the past 
and future might offer an even greater level of abstraction, whilst the component of relative 
progress over time adds an additional element of interest. Overall, it is clear that subjective 
temporal distance impacts upon psychological processes that are relevant to the progress of 
the self. 
There are, however, competing motivations that are likely to be at work when it 
comes to change over time. Kivetz and Tyler (2007) suggested that people feel motivated to 
present a stable view of their true self, but noted how the multifaceted nature of self-
representations offers many pathways to consensus and conflict. Interestingly, their research 
suggests that a tension exists between pragmatism and idealism and that distal priming 
(thinking about choosing a university course next year) compared to a proximal equivalent 
(choosing a course that starts in a few days), led to a greater focus on value-relevant features 
rather than instrumental benefits. This research indicates the potential for understanding 
further how temporal perspectives can affect the perception of tension in opposing 
motivations. 
There are also individual differences in how people focus on different aspects of time 
in their lives (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) and there is evidence to suggest that this focus can 
interact with how people actually progress over time to produce a range of outcomes. For 
example, those who tended to focus more on the future were found to perform stronger 
academically, though this was only the case for those already low in perceived self-control 
(Barber, Munz, Bagsby & Grawtich, 2009). It seems that perceptions of self-identity and 
temporal perspective regularly interrelate (Rappaport, Enrich & Wilson, 1985) and it is thus 
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vital to further our comprehension of how people perceive their core identity characteristics 
as dynamic or stable over time. 
 There might also be broad lifespan trajectories that are relevant across these 
interacting changes. People sometimes appear willing to denigrate conceptions of their past 
selves in order to boost their perception of their current self, yet their projections of 
themselves into the future are almost exclusively positive (Ross & Newby-Clark, 1998; Ross 
& Wilson, 2003). However, Ryff (1991) noted that older people do not always carry this 
general optimism for the future. In her research she asked young, middle-aged and elderly 
participants to assess their previous, current and potential wellbeing. In contrast to the studies 
I describe in this chapter, she did not explicitly ask participants to draw trajectories over time, 
but instead asked them for their ideal assessment, followed by their present, past and then 
future assessments. This method is thus notably indirect and asks participants to make their 
assessments out of chronological order. She found that younger and middle aged participants 
did predict improvements over time, but the elderly predicted less variability over time and 
also a general decline in the future. In a similarly designed study, but focussing on 
personality, Fleeson and Heckhausen (1997) suggested that perceived personality changes 
over time are not generally in one direction and relate more specifically to situational 
differences, for example being curious when first leaving home, or seeking security when 
raising a family. Being optimistic for the future is arguably a human trait (Peterson, 2000) 
and one that people ironically may be overly optimistic about in terms of its utility (Tenney, 
Logg & Moore, 2015), but the question remains whether such a general motivation will 
translate into predicted progress for the self, via positive change in values. 
 Alongside perceptual processes, we could ask whether people’s predicted progress is 
accurate. Are people actually good at predicting change over time? Work on affective 
forecasting (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; 2005) shows that people can predict the type of emotion 
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they will feel in response to a future event, but they are often relatively poor at predicting the 
intensity and duration of that emotion. In terms of self-evaluation, the improvements over 
time people perceive are frequently illusory (Ross & Wilson, 2003) and open to manipulation 
(Wilson et al., 2012). However, as I have already outlined, different stages of life do seem to 
offer realistic constraints on the self-concept (Ryff, 1991; Fleeson & Heckhausen, 1997). 
Whilst my research will not directly address changes across the lifespan, an interesting 
research question here remains as to whether the predicted trajectories of value change found 
map onto the apparent changes detailed at the start of this section (Caprara et al., 2003; 
Robinson, 2013), e.g. will people predict becoming more conservative? However, perhaps 
something more important than actual accuracy, is how perceived value change and well-
being interact. 
Values and Well-being 
 Assessing the well-being of an individual is seen as a difficult challenge, fraught with 
issues of definition, subjectivity and reliability; indeed, some academics have suggested 
avoiding even trying to measure the concept (Barcaccia et al., 2013). Yet for most, the 
positive potential in doing so outweighs the negative. Also, there are identifiable links 
between well-being measures and everyday behaviour (Kunzmann, Stange & Jordan, 2005), 
suggesting that the measurement of well-being, whilst clearly complicated, is a valid aim. 
Nevertheless, psychological well-being is a multi-faceted construct. Research has 
identified three key components: life satisfaction, affective well-being, and psychological 
flourishing (Diener et al., 2010). Life satisfaction can be measured using the Satisfaction with 
Life Scale (SWLS), which taps into cognitive judgements of well-being (Diener, Emmons, 
Larsen & Griffin, 1985). Affective well-being can be measured using the Scale of Positive 
and Negative Experience (SPANE), which identifies the current strength of emotional states 
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(Diener et al., 2010). Psychological flourishing can be measured with the Flourishing Scale 
(FS), which captures the extent to which people feel they are functioning well in important 
areas of human life (Diener et al., 2010). All three components are considered in the present 
examination of values and well-being.  
Given the aforementioned evidence placing values close to the heart of self-identity, it 
is plausible that there is a strong connection between values and well-being. Indeed, some 
researchers consider personal values to be relevant to every aspect of well-being, because 
values necessarily interact with the subjective experiences that contribute to each individual’s 
happiness (Felce & Perry, 1995). Essentially, what brings joy to each person is different and 
these differences can be captured in part by knowing their values and their social context. 
 Some research has assessed the direct relationship between values and well-being. 
Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) found people who were higher in affective well-being attached 
more importance to openness values and self-enhancement values, whilst those who were 
lower in affective well-being attached more importance to conservation values. No consistent 
correlations were found with cognitive well-being, measured via life satisfaction. In general, 
the size of the relationships were small (r < .25), as found in similar studies (Oishi, Diener, 
Suh & Lucas, 1999). This line of research also suggests that values work as a moderating 
influence on well-being, with the effects of success in different domains interacting with the 
individual’s personal value orientations. For example, students who strongly valued 
achievement values reported greater well-being when they experienced success in terms of 
academic performance, whilst students who strongly valued hedonistic values were happier 
on days they had gone to a party. 
Self-determination theory (SDT), conversely, suggests that extrinsic motivations are 
negatively related to well-being and that personal values do not necessarily moderate this 
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effect (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Additionally, acting with predominantly extrinsic motives can 
decrease the sense of autonomy in others and thus the well-being of groups, as well as 
individuals (Kasser, 2011). However, contextual effects relevant to the relationship between 
values and well-being remain a source of debate. For example, Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) 
found that students’ course of study can relate to their own value orientation, and this in turn 
can moderate the relationships between value importance and well-being. Specifically, 
business students with higher levels of self-enhancement values reported greater well-being, 
whilst psychology students with higher levels of self-transcendence values reported greater 
well-being. Kasser and Ahuvia (2002), however, found no evidence of moderation effects in 
their analysis of business students in Singapore: they found only that higher self-enhancement 
values predicted a lower sense of well-being. 
In Maio’s (in press) recent summary of the link between values and fulfilment, he also 
noted the need to consider the contextual situation of the individual. For example, placing 
greater emphasis on benevolence values when you are raising a family in an affluent setting 
is likely to lead to greater well-being, via increased motives to connect with others; whereas 
trying to survive in a context of relative poverty requires a need to focus on more self-
enhancing values in order to achieve greater well-being, as this will aid with striving for 
meeting basic needs. In sum, to understand the link between values and well-being, it is 
clearly important to know the value orientations of the individual, relevant details of the 
social context, and to consider different components of well-being. 
Some research suggests there can be both significant direct links and moderating 
effects of values in this domain (Burr, Santo & Pushkar, 2011). Whilst discussions of exactly 
how values and well-being interrelate are undoubtedly important, my main concern at this 
stage was simply to assess how the novel methodology of measuring values over time might 
directly relate to different components of well-being. Discrepancies in value importance over 
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time could indicate a frustration at failing to meet an ideal standard, or aspiration for a higher 
level of attainment. It was thus not possible to provide clear directional hypotheses. However, 
it was broadly expected that both positive and negative relationships between discrepancies 
of different value types and well-being measures would occur. 
Present Research 
The sections above present a brief introduction to three topics of study and their 
interconnections. The aim of the research here was to begin to integrate the personally central 
notion of values with our understanding of perceptions of change over time and then to 
consider how this integration relates to an important psychological construct, well-being. The 
majority of research in psychology that does consider change over time tends to either focus 
on a contrast between the past and the present, or the present and the future. Nonetheless it is 
important to consider the psychological potential for measuring how people feel their current 
life compares to past and future time points concurrently, because current perceptions and 
decision-making are likely to involve a mix of previous memories and future forecasts. The 
perception of one’s overall journey matters. 
In order to assess how value importance varied over time, it was important to consider 
how to frame the question for participants. Earlier I outlined how construal level framing of 
any type led to reduced congruence between values and intentions, compared to no 
constraining framework (Eyal et al., 2009), potentially because the additional contextual 
demands reduced the abstract nature of the task. Unlike many procedures that force the 
participants to consider a particular point in the past or the future (e.g. Ryff, 1991; Wilson & 
Ross, 2001), I hence chose to avoid specifying exact time-points, as such constraints were 
likely to cause participants to focus on the situational pressures of that specific time, rather 
than allowing them to respond at the abstract level that values ideally tap into. This was a 
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particular issue for students, for whom the recent past was likely to be hugely different in 
crucial contextual factors (e.g. living away from home). 
I had three main questions to address in this research. The first was to test whether 
people see their values as relatively stable over time, or predict some level of dynamism. The 
second was to test whether theoretical models of values that presuppose opposition between 
values were supported by people’s own forecasted progress. The third was to see if perceived 
value change over time related to current perceptions of well-being. These aims were pursued 
in three studies. Study 1 was exploratory: extant research offers conflicting evidence relevant 
to each of these questions, hence no specific directional hypotheses were put forward. Based 
on the findings of Study 1, I formed additional research questions for Study 2, which 
examined whether the trajectories for each set of values and apparent lack of opposition over 
time could be replicated, as well as testing how thinking about values over time might be 
demonstrably different to a single time-point measure. Study 3 also aimed to replicate the 
patterns of the first two studies and then considered how discrepancies between time points 
for different values would relate to well-being. 
Study 1 
 If people do see their values as changing over time, it is important to understand how 
they conceptualise such variance. I started to examine this issue with a simple study that 
aimed to ascertain three points of interest. First, whether people show any changes in their 
values between past, present and future; second, whether people see opposition in the pursuit 
of these values in a manner consistent with Schwartz’s (1992) model of values; third, whether 
these temporal trajectories would be affected by a subtle priming procedure. Whilst primes 
have been successfully used to alter social behaviour in a range of psychological systems 
(Bargh, 2006), they do not always have an effect, as factors such as strong availability of the 
self-concept can limit their impact (Smeesters, Yzerbyt, Corneille & Warlop, 2009). Whilst 
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there is little evidence that a basic prime should impact value importance per se, I was 
interested as to whether increasing the accessibility of particular values might alter people’s 
perceptions of past and future importance, particularly in contrast to the current time point. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 124 undergraduate students at Cardiff University (117 women, 7 
men) who took part for course credit. They were between 18 and 28 years of age (M = 21). 
All participants completed the study in the laboratory. 
Design 
 A between-participants design was used. There were three independent variables: 
value dimension (self-transcendence – self-enhancement or openness – conservation), prime 
type (self-transcendence or self-enhancement), and order of values (self-transcendence, self-
enhancement, openness or conservation first). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the eight possible conditions. The dependent measure was the adapted SVS that assessed the 
importance attached to values over time. The Preference for Consistency (PFC) scale 
(Cialdini, Trost & Newsom, 1995) was a potential moderator. 
Procedure 
 Participants were sat in individual laboratories. They first completed the scrambled 
sentences task, during which they were also asked to note down which of the words they 
found most interesting (in order to increase attention to the semantics of the stimuli 
presented). After completing this task, they moved to completing the values measure they had 
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been assigned. Finally, they completed the PFC scale1. Afterwards they were probed for 
suspicion, debriefed, and thanked for their time. 
Materials 
 A scrambled sentences task (Costin, 1969; see Appendix A) was used for the priming 
procedure. Five words were presented on a computer in a nonsensical order and participants 
had to rearrange the words to make a logical four word sentence (e.g. “having James cat 
control enjoyed”, becomes, “James enjoyed having control”). In total, 30 sentences were 
presented, of which 20 contained a relevant priming word (e.g. powerful, wealth, tolerant, 
honest) and 10 of which contained no priming word (as filler). 
 An adapted version of the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey (SVS) was used to measure 
how participants saw their values as changing over time (see Appendix B for the layout 
used). By placing the time points side by side and in chronological order, the task thus 
encouraged participants to effectively draw a trajectory over time for each value. Participants 
either received 10 values representing the self-transcendence (helpfulness, responsibility, 
forgiveness, equality, honesty) and self-enhancement (power, wealth, success, ambition, 
influence) dimension, or they received 10 values representing the openness (creativity, 
adventure, curiosity, an exciting life, a varied life) and conservation (politeness, moderate 
tendency, respect for tradition, obedience, devotion) dimension. For each value, participants 
were asked to rate the importance of each value as a guiding principle in their life in the past, 
present, and future. Answers were provided on a scale from -1 (opposed to my values) to 7 (of 
supreme importance). The measure was administered using pen and paper. 
                                                          
1 Analyses for Study 1and Study 2 revealed the PFC had no significant effects, it is thus 
mentioned here for procedural completeness, but is not discussed in the results sections. 
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To provide value scores for each motivational domain, the five values in each domain 
at each time point (past, present and future) were summed. Cronbach’s α for self-
transcendence values varied from .69 to .77, for self-enhancement values varied from .62 to 
.71, for openness values varied from .51 to .61, and for conservation values varied from .56 to 
.59. Although some of these reliability indicators were lower than the arguably arbitrary 
acceptable thresholds often cited in psychological research (Lance, Butts & Michels, 2006), 
they are certainly comparable with other research using shortened versions of the SVS (e.g. 
Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005). The obtained reliability indicators were thus considered 
acceptable, given the breadth of value type that each score necessarily encompasses (Sortheix 
& Lonnqvist, 2014), the introductory nature of the research, the long-established validity of 
the measure and the potential effects of asking participants to consider a temporal contrast of 
values (Study 2). 
In addition the 18-item Preference for Consistency (PFC) scale (Cialdini et al., 1995) 
was administered (see Appendix C). Example items include “I prefer to be around people 
whose reactions I can anticipate” and the reverse-worded “It doesn’t bother me much if my 
actions are inconsistent”. Answers were provided on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 
(strongly agree). The items form a single factor. Cronbach’s α for the PFC scale was .88. The 
measure was also administered using pen and paper. 
Results and Discussion 
 In Study 1, the choice was made to measure only opposing values for two main 
reasons. First, this was the first time values had been measured across temporal contexts in 
this fashion and it was therefore important to keep the process as simple as possible; 
otherwise, there was a risk participants would get fatigued with a potentially difficult and 
comparatively abstract task. Second, to reduce the risk of diluting the impact of an already 
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very sensitive priming procedure, the temporal values measure needed to be concise. One 
consequence of this however, meant that the values could not be centred around each 
participant’s mean value rating, which Schwartz (2009) recommends to control for 
differential use of the scale. The following analyses thus focus on the raw data.  
 A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each set of 
values. Figure 2.3 presents the overall pattern of data for each set of values. The within-
participants contrasts for self-transcendence values showed a very strong linear trend, F(1, 
61) = 112.02, p < .001, partialη2 = .65, and a weaker, but significant quadratic trend, F(1, 
61) = 8.99, p < .01, partialη2 = .13, such that the values were rated as increasing in 
importance over time, but to a lesser extent between present and future. The within-
participants contrasts for self-enhancement values also showed a very strong linear trend, 
F(1, 61) = 159.50, p < .001, partialη2 = .72, but no significant quadratic trend, F < 1, p = 
.79, partialη2 = .001; thus, these values were rated as increasing in importance over time. 
The within-participants contrasts for openness values showed a strong linear trend, F(1, 60) = 
22.32, p < .001, partialη2 = .27, and no significant quadratic trend, F(1, 60) = 2.18, p = .15, 
partialη2 = .03; thus, these values were rated as increasing in importance over time. The 
within-participants contrasts for conservation values showed no significant linear trend, F < 
1, p = .60, and a significant but relatively weak quadratic trend, F(1, 60) = 4.70, p =.03, 
partialη2 = .07, such that the values were rated as increasing in importance over time, but 
only between present and future.  
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Figure 2.3: Raw data for Study 1 showing perceived changes in value importance over time. 
These results clearly indicate that participants indicated a perceived shift over time in 
the importance they attribute to a range of values. There was a reliable tendency for most 
values to be seen as increasing in importance over time, with conservation values being the 
exception. These data provide a clear answer to the first point of interest: all but conservation 
values are seen as growing in personal importance over time. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that individuals perceive no between-value 
oppositions in change over time. For instance, participants reported that both self-
transcendence and self-enhancement values increase in importance to them over time. These 
two value types normally change in opposite directions: as either value type grows in 
importance, the other decreases in importance (Bardi et al., 2009; Maio, Pakizeh, et al., 
2009). However, the participants believed they could pursue both sets of values concurrently. 
It is worth noting that this does not simply reflect a process of general value inflation over 
time, because the conservation values did not show the same trend. These data thus provide 
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intriguing evidence for the second point of interest: participants did not intuitively see the 
concurrent pursuit of potentially conflicting values as being problematic.  
The third point of interest was whether these found trajectories could be altered by a 
priming procedure. Accordingly, mixed design ANOVAs were run on each set of values, 
with the values at each time point entered as a repeated-measures factor (past, present, future) 
and prime (self-transcendence or self-enhancement) and order (self-transcendence or self-
enhancement values presented first) entered as between-participants factors. No significant 
main effects or interactions were found on any set of values (all Fs < 3.77, all ps > .08). No 
support was thus provided for the impact of priming or order effects on the pattern of value 
changes reported above. 
Summary 
 The results of Study 1 indicate that participants saw their values as dynamic over 
time. Strong upward linear trends for self-transcendence, self-enhancement and openness 
values were obtained. Of interest, these upward changes did not reflect the motivational 
conflicts described in Schwartz’s (1992) model of values, in either the self-transcendence and 
self-enhancement dimension or the openness and conservation dimension. Furthermore, this 
pattern was uninfluenced by a procedure priming either self-transcendence or self-
enhancement values. The null effect of priming is not interpretable by itself (see Cesario, 
2014), but it suggests that the perceptions of value change over time may be robust even 
when different values are salient.  
Study 2 
 The findings from Study 1 provided an interesting first glimpse of how people might 
perceive their values over time; however, they also raised a number of additional research 
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questions that required attention before strong inferences could be made about the patterns of 
data produced. Study 2 thus sought to address a number of issues. Firstly, it investigated 
whether the patterns of Study 1 could be replicated and the sensitivity of the values measure 
to the testing context and modality. Accordingly, in this study, participants completed the 
study in a group setting and using a computer, rather than pen and paper. 
Secondly, it was important to gather values data that could be centred around each 
participant’s mean value ratings, as Schwartz (2009) recommends for most analyses. This 
would allow the data to be mean-centred at each time point; e.g. to obtain the centred score 
for self-transcendence values in the past, the mean past score for each of the five self-
transcendence values would be calculated and then subtracted by the overall mean score 
participants scored for all twenty values in the past time context. This mean-centring would 
allow for greater control over scale usage and provide the opportunity to analyse patterns of 
centred data, alongside the raw data. This would also allow more robust testing of the circular 
structure of values in individual’s perceptions of them over time. 
Thirdly, it was important to see how making the temporal contrast affects values 
compared to a control condition. This was a novel values measure and it was thus important 
to test how completing it compared to a well-established equivalent standard. Given the 
results from Study 1, it was plausible to suggest that participants might suppress their current 
values in order to leave room for future progression. Alternatively, they may enhance their 
current rating compared to the past, similar to the tendency to be critical of past selves (Ross 
& Wilson, 2003). 
Finally, if effects were replicated it would be important to note whether changes 
occurred for value instantiations as well as value importance, as such changes can be 
independent (Maio, Hahn, et al., 2009). People can maintain the same level of importance for 
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a particular value, but different contexts can change the way that value is seen as relevant to a 
particular action. For example, those primed with a typical example of egalitarianism 
(gender) then produced attitudes and behaviour more in alignment with the value of equality 
than those primed with an atypical example (right or left handedness), despite there being no 
change in the importance attached to equality as a value (Maio, Hahn, et al., 2009). Assessing 
values over time arguably requires greater thought about each value than a standard measure. 
It was thus possible that this process would lead to greater perceived applicability of self-
transcendent values in various situations, given that they are often rated as more important 
than self-enhancement values (Bardi et al., 2009). To test this proposal, I created a range of 
behaviours that were likely to be relevant to students in the future and that could vary across 
a dimension of concern for the self (self-enhancement) and concern for others (self-
transcendence). 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 92 undergraduate students at Cardiff University (85 women, 7 men) 
who took part for course credit. They were between 18 and 26 years of age (M = 19). All 
participants completed the study in the laboratory in small group sessions. 
Design 
 A between-participants design was used. Participants were allocated to one of two 
conditions: the temporal contrast SVS group (past, present and future) or the control SVS 
group (current only). The PFC scale (Cialdini et al., 1995) was again used as a potential 
moderator. 
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Procedure 
 Participants completed the study in group sessions in a computer laboratory. They 
first completed the values measure they had been randomly assigned. Next, they completed 
the items relating to value instantiations and they then completed the PFC scale. Finally, 
dependent on condition, they were asked to note the ages they were thinking about when 
considering the past and future contexts for the temporal contrast SVS and whether they 
imagined being employed, parenting, and in a relationship in the future context. Afterwards 
they were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked for their time. 
Materials 
 The materials used mirrored those from Study 1, with three main differences. Firstly, 
the SVS and PFC scales were completed on the computer, rather than using pen and paper. 
Secondly, the SVS scale contained 20 items representing both dimensions of the scale (self-
transcendence – self enhancement, and openness – conservation), rather than just one of the 
dimensions. Finally, as indicated in the design, there were two versions of the SVS for this 
study. Participants either completed the standard SVS, which asked only for their current 
rating of each value, or they completed the temporal contrast SVS, which asked for their 
rating of each value in the past, present, and future. 
As in Study 1, it was necessary to combine the five value scores representing the 
opposing sides of each dimension at each time point. Reliability estimates at each time point 
ranged as follows: Cronbach’s α for self-transcendence values varied from .66 to .78, for self-
enhancement values varied from .51 to .78, for openness values varied from .74 to .81, and 
for conservation values varied from .62 to .72. There were very little differences in reliability 
for the temporal contrast SVS and the standard SVS. These indicators thus reflected similar 
levels of internal consistency as in Study 1. 
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 In addition, to test for any effects of the temporal contrast on the instantiation of 
values, 10 items (Appendix D) were included providing scenarios that reflected germane 
behaviours for a student sample (e.g. deciding which career to pursue; voting in a student 
election). These items asked participants to think about each scenario and consider how their 
decision would be driven by personal interest vs. the needs of others. These items were thus 
designed to address the self-transcendence – self-enhancement dimension of values. Answers 
were provided on a scale from 1 (entirely driven by personal interests) to 9 (entirely driven 
by the needs of others). 
 This measure of value instantiations was also used in the research on ethical 
consumption (Chapter 3). The items were thus selected with certain themes in mind, such as 
purchasing habits. In order to test whether these themes were reflected in the structure of the 
overall measure, a factor analysis was conducted using the data from both research streams 
(Study 2 in this chapter and Study 2 in Chapter 3). The data were combined in order to 
achieve an adequate sample size for this type of analysis (see MacCullum, Widaman, Zhang 
& Hong, 1999). A principal axis factor analysis was conducted on the 10 items with oblique 
rotation (direct oblimin). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure suggested the sample size 
was acceptable for the analysis, KMO = .64. All KMO values for individual items were 
above the satisfactory limit of .5 (Field, 2013). Three factors had eigenvalues greater than 1 
and in total explained 38.75% of the variance, whilst the scree plot showed the point of 
inflexion as occurring at the third factor (Field, 2013), hence three factors were retained. The 
items that clustered on the first factor represented actions that were generally less 
individualistic in nature (voting in a student election, voting in a general election, donating 
money to charity, signing a petition and helping organise a party for a friend). The items that 
clustered on the second factor represented purchasing habits (buying clothes, a car and food). 
The items that clustered on the third factor represented personal work choices (selecting a 
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career and choosing a course at university). These factors are hence used in both this chapter 
and Chapter 3. 
Results and Discussion 
 The first goal was to test whether the data from Study 1 could be replicated. Figure 
2.4 presents the overall pattern of data for each set of values, excluding the control SVS 
group. Initial visual inspection suggested a similar pattern of results as obtained in Study 1, 
including the relative importance between values, as well as over time. A repeated-measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was thus run for each set of values, to identify the 
significance and strength of these data. The within-participants contrasts for self-
transcendence values showed a very strong linear trend, F(1, 45) = 60.72, p < .001, partialη2 
= .57, and a slightly weaker quadratic trend, F(1, 45) = 22.08, p < .001, partialη2 = .33. The 
within-participants contrasts for self-enhancement values also showed a very strong linear 
trend, F(1, 45) = 77.64, p < .001, partialη2 = .63, and a much weaker, but significant, 
quadratic trend, F(1, 45) = 4.44, p = .04, partialη2 = .09. The within-participants contrasts 
for openness values showed a strong linear trend, F(1, 45) = 27.40, p < .001, partialη2 = .38, 
and a strong quadratic trend, F(1, 45) = 17.91, p < .001, partialη2 = .29. The within-
participants contrasts for conservation values showed no significant linear trend, F < 1, p = 
.89, partialη2 < .01, and a significant but relatively weak quadratic trend, F(1, 45) = 4.94, p 
= .03, partialη2 = .10. 
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Figure 2.4: Raw data for Study 2 showing perceived changes in value importance over time. 
Replicating the patterns from Study 1, the strongest effects over time were linear for 
self-transcendence, self-enhancement and openness values. It is worth noting however, that 
the data here showed stronger quadratic trends than were found in Study 1, reflected by the 
larger effect sizes for each set of values. This issue will be revisited in the discussion of Study 
3. Also replicating Study 1, only a weak quadratic trend was detected for conservation values. 
Overall, the effects over time replicated and extended Study 1. 
The second goal of the study was to use mean-centred values scores. This process 
controls for individual differences in scale usage (Schwartz, 2009), and here it also enabled 
the analysis to look at how value importance changed over time in relative, rather than in 
absolute terms. 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run using the mean-centred 
data for each set of values. The within-participants contrasts for self-transcendence values 
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showed a significant linear trend, F(1, 45) = 4.85, p = .03, partialη2 = .10, and a significant 
quadratic trend, F(1, 45) = 6.19, p = .02, partialη2 = .12. The within-participants contrasts 
for self-enhancement values showed a very strong linear trend, F(1, 45) = 24.81, p < .001, 
partialη2 = .36, and no significant quadratic trend, F < 1, p = .74, partialη2 < .01. The 
within-participants contrasts for openness values showed no linear trend, F < 1, p = .52, 
partialη2 = .01 and a significant quadratic trend, F(1, 45) = 5.92, p = .02, partialη2 = .12. 
The within-participants contrasts for conservation values showed a very strong linear trend, 
F(1, 45) = 84.29, p < .001, partialη2 = .65, and a strong quadratic trend, F(1, 45) = 27.81, p 
< .001, partialη2 = .38. Figure 2.5 presents the pattern of data for each set of values, 
excluding the control SVS group. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Mean-centred data for Study 2 showing perceived changes in value importance 
over time.  
These results provide an interesting contrast to the raw data. By controlling for scale 
usage, the strongest effects are an upward trend for self-enhancement values and a downward 
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trend for conservation values. This pattern of data is particularly interesting given the wealth 
of evidence for the circular structure of the values contained within the SVS. The raw data 
from Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that participants did not consciously see the oppositional 
nature of each set of values. The mean-centred data in Study 2 also suggest that such 
opposition is not present, even though centring focuses on relative changes in value 
importance. This consistent result suggests that perceptions of value change over time do not 
reveal the same motivational relations between values as have been found when examining 
actual value changes over time (Bardi et al., 2009). 
The third goal of this study was to see if completion of the temporal contrast SVS 
yielded ratings of values in the present that differed from ratings in the standard SVS measure 
without the past and future contrast. This was a novel comparison and I had no specific a 
priori predictions about potential differences, particularly given the potential bi-directional 
pressures outlined earlier. 
 As Table 2.1 illustrates, the participants completing the temporal contrast SVS did 
differ from their control group counterparts. For each set of values, participants in the 
temporal contrast group tended to raise the importance of the values in the present, compared 
to the control group. This trend was reliable, however, only for openness values, with a 
marginal difference for conservation values. It would thus appear that thinking about values 
over time acts as a general enhancer of value importance in the current context, particularly 
for openness values. This finding fits with evidence that a future focus can shift attention 
towards the importance of values (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). 
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Table 2.1 
Comparing raw data from the temporal contrast SVS to the standard SVS 
  
Temporal 
Contrast 
Standard       
  M (SE) M (SE)   t Cohen's d 
Self-transcendence 5.37 (0.14) 5.24 (0.13)   -0.70 -.15 
Self-enhancement 4.28 (0.14) 4.18 (0.10)   -0.60 -.13 
Openness 5.02 (0.17) 4.03 (0.17)   -4.10** -.86 
Conservation 3.47 (0.17) 3.04 (0.16)   -1.87† -.39 
All Values 4.54 (0.11) 4.12 (0.09)   -2.88** -.61 
Note: †p < .10; *p < .05, **p < .01. Higher means represent greater importance. 
 
It was then necessary to check whether these differences from the control condition 
also arose in the mean-centred value scores. Table 2.2 shows that the centred data revealed 
different trends from the raw value scores. Participants who considered their values over time 
significantly increased the importance they attached to openness values, similar to the raw 
data. However, as the centred data are necessarily relative in nature, opposing effects are 
needed to balance any such change. Here, the opposing effects are reflected in relative 
decreased importance in self-transcendence and self-enhancement values. Again, these data 
do not offer support for participants reporting potential conflict across the value dimensions. 
In comparison to the control group, participants who thought about the temporal trajectory of 
their values clearly increased the importance they attached to openness values in the current 
context, but this was not accompanied by a decrease in the importance they attached to 
conservation values.  
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Table 2.2 
          
Comparing mean-centred data from the temporal contrast SVS to the standard 
SVS 
  
Temporal 
Contrast 
Standard       
  M (SE) M (SE)   t Cohen's d 
Self-transcendence 0.84 (0.08) 1.12 (0.10)   2.15* .45 
Self-enhancement -0.25 (0.10) 0.05 (0.09)   2.25* .47 
Openness 0.48 (0.12) -0.09 (0.14)   -3.10** -.65 
Conservation -1.07 (0.12) -1.08 (0.11)   -0.11 -.02 
Note: †p < .10; *p < .05, **p < .01. Higher means represent greater importance. 
 
 The final goal of this study was to see if the different versions of the SVS produced 
any consequential effects on value instantiation. T-tests were run on the three factors 
identified earlier (other-focussed actions, purchasing habits and personal work choices). 
Those in the temporal contrast condition perceived purchasing decisions from a more selfless 
perspective (M = 2.28, SE = 0.12) than those who completed the standard measure (M = 1.91, 
SE = 0.10), mean difference = -0.37, [-0.68, -0.06], t(90) = -2.37, p = .02, d = -0.50. The 
other two factors did not differ between conditions (both ts < .02, ps > .98). Whilst this result 
is interesting in showing a potential increased focus on the accessibility and applicability of 
self-transcendent values, further work is needed to outline exactly how an assessment of 
values over time might help with this process. Additionally, the ten scenarios were aimed at 
the self-transcendence and self-enhancement dimension, rather than the openness and 
conservation dimension of values; given the results earlier indicated the strongest effects of 
making a temporal contrast on value importance occurred in the domain of openness values, 
it would be worth using instantiation items that tapped into openness and conservation values 
to check for any potential effects of instantiation in this dimension. Nevertheless, it is 
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interesting to note the effect of taking a temporal contrast on the value instantiation of 
purchasing behaviour. 
Summary 
 Study 2 replicated the initial patterns found in Study 1. The temporal contrast SVS 
produced similar results in both individual sessions with pen and paper (Study 1) and in 
group sessions with a computer (Study 2). The mean-centred data indicated that participants 
projected a rise in self-enhancement values and a fall in conservation values over time. 
Neither the raw data nor the centred data provided evidence that the participants saw 
traditionally opposing values as being in competition. Finally, the completion of the temporal 
contrast SVS enhanced the importance of all values in the current context, but openness 
values were particularly strongly affected. 
Study 3 
The first two studies provided consistent evidence that people see the majority of their 
values increasing in importance over time, without indication of the usual tension that 
opposing sets of values should bring. Study 3 had two specific aims to extend these findings. 
The first was to attempt to replicate the pattern of centred data found in Study 2 in a larger 
sample. The second aim was to look at how the temporal changes reported by the participants 
might be associated with well-being. As indicated in the introduction, previous research has 
revealed interesting associations between values and well-being. However, this research has 
not looked at the extent to which people’s sense of progression in values over time relates to 
well-being. An interesting issue was whether the upward trends exhibited for most values are 
detrimental to well-being and whether discrepancies over time are adaptive for some values 
but not for others.  
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Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 198 first-year undergraduate students at Cardiff University (175 
women, 23 men) who took part in a pre-test research session during their induction week. 
They were between 17 and 50 years of age (M = 19). All participants completed both parts of 
the study in large group sessions. 
Design 
 A simple correlational design was used. All the participants completed both the 
temporal contrast SVS and each of the three measures of well-being. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed the study in large group sessions in a computer laboratory. The 
research was presented as two separate studies within a large testing session, wherein 
participants completed a diverse range of psychological measures for a number of researchers 
in the School of Psychology, in addition to the measures used in my research. Accordingly, 
participants were free to complete the measures in any order they preferred. Upon completion 
of the session, participants were debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Materials 
 The same temporal contrast SVS was used as in Study 2. Three scales were used to 
measure well-being, all of which were presented on computer. The first measure was the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; see Appendix E), which taps into cognitive judgements 
of well-being (Diener et al., 1985). Example items included “In most ways, my life is close to 
ideal" and “So far, I have gotten the important things I want in life”. The response scale 
varied from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and the five items formed a single 
 Page 70 
 
reliable factor (α = .88). The second measure was the Scale of Positive and Negative 
Experience (SPANE; see Appendix F), which identifies current emotional well-being (Diener 
et al., 2010). Example items for positive emotions included “happy", “joyful” and “good” and 
example items for negative emotions included “sad”, “angry” and “bad”. Participants were 
asked to think about how much they had experienced each feeling over the last four weeks. 
The response scale varied from 1 (very rarely or never) to 5 (very often or always). The 
positive emotions (α = .88) and negative emotions (α = .84) formed reliable factors, as did the 
combination of both scales (α = .87). The third measure was the Flourishing Scale (FS; see 
Appendix G), which captures the extent to which people feel they are functioning well in 
important areas of human life (Diener et al., 2010). Example items included “I lead a 
purposeful and meaningful life" and “I am competent and capable in the activities that are 
important to me”. The response scale varied from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
and the five items formed a single reliable factor (α = .86). 
Results and Discussion 
Firstly, it was important to test whether the raw value scores replicated the effects 
from the first two studies. A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run for 
each set of values, to identify the significance and strength of these data. The within-
participants contrasts for self-transcendence values showed a very strong linear trend, F (1, 
197) = 202.30, p <.001, partialη2 = .51, and a weaker quadratic trend, F (1, 197) = 49.32, p 
<.001, partialη2 = .20. The within-participants contrasts for self-enhancement values also 
showed a very strong linear trend, F (1, 197) = 265.41, p <.001, partialη2 = .57, and a much 
weaker, but significant, quadratic trend, F (1, 197) = 9.63, p <.01, partialη2 = .05. The 
within-participants contrasts for openness values showed a strong linear trend, F (1, 197) = 
104.61, p <.001, partialη2 = .35, and a slightly weaker quadratic trend, F (1, 197) = 43.12, p 
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<.001, partialη2 = .18. The within-participants contrasts for conservation values showed a 
marginally significant linear trend, F (1, 197) = 3.47, p = .06, partialη2 = .02, and no 
significant quadratic trend, F < 1, p = .86, partialη2 < .01. Figure 2.6 presents the overall 
pattern of data for each set of values. 
 
Figure 2.6: Raw data for Study 3 showing perceived changes in value importance over time. 
This pattern of raw data maps onto the previous results well. In all three studies, there 
have been strong linear effects for self-transcendence, self-enhancement and openness values, 
but not for conservation values. Notable quadratic trends have also emerged for each value 
set, though it is worth noting that where a linear effect exists the associated effect size is 
always more robust (i.e., a lower p-value and a larger effect size). The significant quadratic 
trends reflect a flattening of the curve, most noticeably for self-transcendence and openness 
values. This may reflect a ceiling effect, as these values consistently represent the two highest 
ranked sets of values. It may also be that young adult participants see their current selves as 
closer to their future selves than their past selves in terms of value development. This 
possibility should be considered in light of the evidence from Study 2 that participants inflate 
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their values to some degree when they make a temporal contrast, in particular when they 
consider their openness values. This issue will be discussed further in the general discussion.  
Having found consistency in the raw value scores across studies, it was important to 
see if the pattern of centred data from Study 2 was also replicated. A repeated-measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run for each set of values. The within-participants 
contrasts for self-transcendence values showed a significant linear trend, F (1, 197) = 13.17, p 
<.001, partialη2 = .06, and a significant quadratic trend, F (1, 197) = 9.70, p <.01, partialη2 
= .05. The within-participants contrasts for self-enhancement values showed a strong linear 
trend, F (1, 197) = 79.00, p <.001, partialη2 = .29, and no significant quadratic trend, F < 1, 
p = .50, partialη2 < .01. The within-participants contrasts for openness values showed no 
linear trend, F < 1, p = .25, partialη2 = .01 and a significant quadratic trend, F (1, 197) = 
10.67, p <.01, partialη2 = .05. The within-participants contrasts for conservation values 
showed a very strong linear trend, F (1, 197) = 156.74, p <.001, partialη2 = .44, and a 
significant quadratic trend, F (1, 197) = 37.20, p <.001, partialη2 = .16. Study 3 thus 
produced data trends that were very closely matched to Study 2. Figure 2.7 presents the 
overall pattern of data for each set of values. 
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Figure 2.7: Mean-centred data for Study 3 showing perceived changes in value importance 
over time. 
Having ascertained the reliability of the data patterns, the second aim was to look at 
the relationship between these patterns and well-being. This was tested in two main ways. 
First, the correlations between each value set at each time point and the measures of well-
being were assessed. Second, the discrepancies over time and their correlation with well-
being were evaluated. The following tables display six measures relating to well-being. The 
SWLS and FS are calculated as in Diener et al. (2010). The SPANE measures are also 
calculated as in Diener et al. (2010), hence the two subcomponents of positive and negative 
emotions are presented separately to show the strength of the effect on each factor. To 
calculate the SPANE overall score, the negative items are reverse coded. The final measure 
presented is a Well-being Index which is a standardised composite of the SWLS, SPANE and 
FS (α = .84).  
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Table 2.3 
      Correlations between raw values data and well-being 
   
  
SWLS 
SPANE 
Positive 
SPANE 
Negative 
SPANE 
Overall 
FS 
Well-
being 
Index 
Self-Transcendence Past 0.15* 0.15* -0.04 0.10 0.14 0.15* 
Self-Transcendence Current 0.23** 0.27** -0.18* 0.26** 0.28** 0.29** 
Self-Transcendence Future 0.21** 0.29** -0.16* 0.25** 0.24** 0.27** 
Self-Enhancement Past 0.00 -0.04 0.13* -0.11 0.12 0.01 
Self-Enhancement Current -0.07 -0.06 0.19** -0.15* 0.09 -0.05 
Self-Enhancement Future -0.01 0.02 0.12 -0.07 0.11 0.01 
Openness Past -0.01 0.11 -0.04 0.09 0.14* 0.08 
Openness Current 0.00 0.22** -0.05 0.15* 0.23** 0.15* 
Openness Future 0.00 0.15* -0.06 0.11 0.20** 0.12 
Conservation Past 0.12 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 0.04 0.03 
Conservation Current 0.15* 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.10 0.11 
Conservation Future 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.10 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01             
 
Table 2.3 represents the correlations between each set of values at each time point and 
the well-being measures. For self-transcendence values, there was a consistent association 
between higher value importance and higher well-being on the SWLS, SPANE and FS, with 
the values being most strongly linked to the current and future time points. This finding 
suggests those who report trending toward higher self-transcendence values also report higher 
well-being across a diverse range of cognitive, emotional and flourishing components. For 
 Page 75 
 
self-enhancement values, the association with well-being is less clear, though the opposite 
direction of effects does appear for SPANE Negative, indicating that those reporting higher 
importance for these values also report a more negatively emotional state. For openness 
values, no association appears present for SWLS. However, for SPANE Positive and FS there 
are consistent positive relationships. This indicates those who attached more importance to 
openness values also reported greater emotional well-being and flourishing. For conservation 
values, there were some positive correlations with SWLS. There were no clear associations 
between conservation values and emotional well-being and flourishing.  
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Table 2.4 
      Correlations between centred values data and well-being 
   
  
SWLS 
SPANE 
Positive 
SPANE 
Negative 
SPANE 
Overall 
FS 
Well-
being 
Index 
Self-Transcendence Past 0.11 0.14* -0.11 0.14* 0.03 0.11 
Self-Transcendence Current 0.17* 0.17* -0.21** 0.23** 0.11 0.20** 
Self-Transcendence Future 0.12 0.16* -0.17* 0.19** 0.06 0.14* 
Self-Enhancement Past -0.07 -0.12 0.13 -0.14* 0.03 -0.07 
Self-Enhancement Current -0.18** -0.22** 0.24** -0.27** -0.10 -0.21** 
Self-Enhancement Future -0.12 -0.13 0.16* -0.18* -0.05 -0.13 
Openness Past -0.09 0.08 -0.11 0.11 0.04 0.02 
Openness Current -0.10 0.10 -0.06 0.10 0.06 0.02 
Openness Future -0.11 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.01 
Conservation Past 0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 
Conservation Current 0.11 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 
Conservation Future 0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01             
 
Table 2.4 displays the associations between relative, mean-centred value importance 
scores and well-being. The pattern of results for self-transcendence values was somewhat 
similar to the raw values in that there were consistently positive correlations between value 
importance and SWLS and SPANE, although the association between self-transcendence 
values and FS was lower and non-significant. For self-enhancement values, there were 
consistent negative correlations between value importance and well-being, particularly in the 
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current time context, but, as with all the centred value scores, the association with FS was 
weaker and not significant. For openness and conservation values, there were no significant 
correlations with well-being. 
The raw and centred data thus provide an interesting first look at how a temporal 
contrast SVS compares with a range of well-being measures. In both the raw and centred 
data, there was consistent evidence to suggest that those who attached more importance to 
self-transcendence values reported greater well-being, whereas those who attached more 
importance to self-enhancement values reported lower well-being. In Sagiv and Schwartz’s 
(2000) investigation of relations between value priorities and well-being, they reported 
associations between a range of values and emotional, but not cognitive, well-being. Their 
analysis focused on the ten more specific value motivations that underlie the four broader 
value sets being assessed in these studies, so direct comparisons are awkward. However, their 
sample did not show any associations between self-transcendence values and well-being, nor 
with a cognitive well-being measure. Instead, they found those who were higher in self-
direction, stimulation and achievement values reported greater affective well-being, whilst 
those who were lower in security, tradition and conformity values reported lower affective 
well-being. 
The pattern of results in Study 3 suggest the findings are thus more in line with Kasser 
and Ryan’s (2001) analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic goals and their association with well-
being. They found that intrinsic aspirations, which broadly fit with self-transcendence values, 
were positively associated with well-being, whilst extrinsic aspirations, which broadly fit 
with self-enhancement values, were negatively associated with well-being. Maio’s (in press) 
review of the relationship between values and well-being outlined how the literature supports 
the existence of both a direct link and a moderating influence. There is evidence for a direct 
link between certain values and well-being and the link appears strongest for values which 
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encourage positive relationships with others (Maio, in press). However, there is also evidence 
to show individual differences in value importance are important too. For some individuals, 
the higher their well-being, the more they report acting in alignment with the values that 
matter most to them. 
The debate on how values and well-being interrelate will continue, but a separate 
issue is whether perceived changes in values over time also predict well-being. Table 2.5 
shows the associations between raw value scores and well-being. The changes from past to 
current contexts and current to future contexts have been analysed separately. 
Table 2.5 
      Correlations between raw value discrepancies over time and well-being 
 
  
SWLS 
SPANE 
Positive 
SPANE 
Negative 
SPANE 
Overall 
FS 
Well-
being 
Index 
Self-Transcendence C-P 0.04 0.07 -0.14 0.13 0.10 0.10 
Self-Enhancement C-P -0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 
Openness C-P 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Conservation C-P 0.05 0.14* -0.15* 0.17* 0.09 0.12 
 
      
Self-Transcendence F-C -0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.12 -0.20** -0.17* 
Self-Enhancement F-C 0.11 0.15* -0.14 0.17* 0.03 0.11 
Openness F-C -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Conservation F-C -0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01             
C-P = Difference between current and past value rating 
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F-C = Difference between future and current value rating 
    
Looking at the change from past to current, the only significant effects were with 
conservation values, where participants reporting a greater difference in value importance 
also reported greater emotional well-being. Looking at the change from current to future, 
there is an interesting turnaround when compared to the earlier correlations in Tables 2.3 and 
2.4. Those who predicted attaching greater importance to self-transcendence values in the 
future generally reported a lower sense of well-being, particularly with FS. Whilst those who 
predicted attaching greater importance to self-enhancement values in the future generally 
reported a greater sense of well-being, particularly with SPANE. Working from correlational 
data, it is impossible to infer the exact process of this relationship. It is certainly plausible to 
suggest that those who report greater levels of well-being at the moment, may be able to do 
so because they are already living close to their ideal position on self-transcendence values, 
hence why a larger difference correlates with less happiness, as they already feel able to 
consistently act with the concerns of others in mind. However, this logic works less well with 
self-enhancement values, as it is more difficult to intuitively see how people who are happier 
now would also be aspiring to attach greater importance to such values, which are more 
relevant to meeting personal needs via concern for the self. Further research is thus necessary, 
to understand the relationship between perceptions of value importance in the future and 
well-being. 
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Table 2.6 
      Correlations between centred value discrepancies over time and well-being 
 
  
SWLS 
SPANE 
Positive 
SPANE 
Negative 
SPANE 
Overall 
FS 
Well-
being 
Index 
Self-Transcendence C-P 0.04 0.01 -0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08 
Self-Enhancement C-P -0.09 -0.08 0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.13 
Openness C-P 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 
Conservation C-P 0.06 0.09 -0.10 0.11 0.07 0.09 
 
      
Self-Transcendence F-C -0.14 -0.07 0.15* -0.13 -0.14 -0.16* 
Self-Enhancement F-C 0.13 0.18** -0.16* 0.20** 0.10 0.17* 
Openness F-C -0.01 -0.16* 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 
Conservation F-C -0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01             
C-P = Difference between current and past value rating 
   F-C = Difference between future and current value rating 
    
The centred value scores, detailed in Table 2.6, revealed no significant associations 
between current-past discrepancies and well-being. However, the future-current discrepancies 
reflected a similar pattern to the raw value scores. Participants who predicted attaching 
greater relative importance to self-transcendence values in the future also reported lower 
well-being, whilst those who predicted attaching greater relative importance to self-
enhancement values, reported a greater sense of well-being. Whilst the comparative 
contribution of each well-being measure varies between the raw and centred data, the 
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direction of each effect consistently offers a similar perspective. The raw and centred scores 
both suggest that participants who saw themselves as attaching more importance to self-
transcendence values in the future were concurrently reporting a lower sense of well-being. 
The reverse pattern arose for self-enhancement values. 
Summary 
 The results from Study 3 replicated the patterns obtained in the first two studies. 
These patterns continue to show that people see no opposition in the pursuit of values that 
have been consistently shown to serve opposing motives. The links between value 
importance and well-being also revealed two associations of interest. Firstly, consistent with 
some past research on intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000), participants who currently 
attach more importance to self-transcendence values and less importance to self-enhancement 
values, report a greater sense of well-being across a range of measures. Secondly, participants 
who predict attaching greater importance to self-transcendence values and less importance to 
self-enhancement values in the future, report lower well-being. This is a finding that warrants 
reference to the literature on affective forecasting (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; 2005), which 
suggests that people are often poor at predicting how they may feel in response to future 
events. People could also be poor at predicting the type of values that will make them happy. 
The correlational nature of this result does of course prevent firm conclusions from being 
drawn in this regard. These correlations may reflect how happier people feel freer to act in 
alignment with their self-transcendent values. Nevertheless, the data raise some fascinating 
questions for future research. 
General Discussion 
 The three studies in this chapter provided consistent evidence that people forecast 
values changing over time. At the same time, however, people’s forecasts do not express 
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oppositional forces across time in either the self-transcendence and self-enhancement 
dimension or the openness and conservation dimension of values. These findings occurred 
both when I examined raw ratings of each type of value and value ratings that were centred 
around each participant’s mean value rating. Moreover, in both cases, the upward linear 
trends across time did not arise for conservation values, and the centred value ratings even 
showed decreases over time for conservation values. Even when I isolated directly opposing 
values (Study 1), participants still did not perceive the potential opposition over time. 
Together, this evidence indicates that a temporal perspective on values offers a very different 
outlook from existing perspectives for understanding how people use values in conjunction 
with their self-identity over the lifespan. 
Of importance, it was not the case that asking about values from a temporal 
perspective merely invoked a need for progress, almost regardless of its content, thus 
removing the potential for oppositional forces. Conservation values, despite maintaining their 
positive rating of importance, did not produce similar patterns of upward trajectory as the 
other values did. Furthermore, the centred data are necessarily relative, and these also failed 
to provide evidence of tensions between values. Additionally, it is worth noting that values 
are only very weakly correlated with social desirability (Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky & 
Sagiv, 1997), so participants were unlikely to have been affected by any concerns of self-
presentation. 
Instead, the findings are broadly consistent with evidence indicating that people’s 
mental representations of changes over time have different antecedents than actual changes 
over time. In general, it is not unusual to find that people have comparatively low insight into 
their own abilities (Zell & Krizan, 2014) or are relatively poor at assessing their likely 
emotional response to a future event (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). This difference is evident in 
both people’s representations of past events and future events. In research examining 
 Page 83 
 
recollection of past events it appears people tend to evaluate the same event more favourably 
if they perceive it as close, rather than distant, to the current time point (Ross & Wilson, 
2003). In research on predictions of future events, research on affective forecasting has found 
people underestimate how other things happening at the same time will have an impact on 
their experience of such events (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). A common factor in both sets of 
evidence is that people base their recollections or predictions on their own theories regarding 
factors that influence them. Construal level theory (Ledgerwood et al., 2010; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003, 2010) indicates that these predictions will become increasingly focused on 
abstract, emotional constructs as the mental simulations become more distant in time (i.e., 
past or future). In the present context, people’s simulations do not subsume the motivational 
conflicts between values that are encompassed in the circular structure of values (Schwartz, 
1992). Instead, people predict a general rise in values serving self-transcendence, openness, 
and self-enhancement motives, with no or (perhaps) less change in conservation values. 
Because conservation values are lower in importance than the other value types, these 
findings could be summarised as indicating that people see all but their least important values 
as rising in importance to them over time. In other words, people tend to think they can 
increasingly aspire to the values that matter for them, without any trade-offs between them. 
 The next important question to address is the extent to which the reported value 
trajectories are accurate. Without tracking values longitudinally across the lifespan it is 
impossible to be sure about the accuracy of these value trajectories. However, there are some 
clues from the introduction to suggest that the participants’ simulations do not mirror real-life 
patterns. Firstly, the evidence that suggested conservation values increase over the lifespan 
(Caprara et al., 2003) and openness values decrease with aging (Robinson, 2013). Although 
these studies rely on cross-sectional analyses and are thus potentially confounded with their 
associated cohorts (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011), this evidence suggests that the participants here 
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will not follow the change in values over time that they report. In line with the previous 
question of why value tensions do not arise, it will be interesting to research further as to why 
perceived value trajectories appear unlikely to be followed. 
Conversely, it should be noted, there was one area where extant evidence of actual 
value change and the data in my studies did converge. Sheldon (2005) found that university 
students attached more importance to “healthy” (intrinsic) positive values when they reached 
graduation, compared to the start of their degree. Relating this finding to the data I collected 
is not straightforward, as my participants were projecting much further into the future than 
the end of their university degree. But it is interesting to note that participants did predict an 
increased shift towards self-transcendent values in the future.  
 However, given participants did not report feeling tensions between values that we 
know exist in other contexts and that they probably do not follow most of the trajectories of 
values that they set themselves, it is important to consider how these perceptual inaccuracies 
map onto other psychological constructs, which was my third main aim. Study 3 offered the 
first glimpse of such a relationship by comparing the values participants reported with a range 
of well-being measures. Initial analysis showed participants who reported higher self-
transcendence values across the time points also reported higher levels of well-being, with the 
current time context unsurprisingly reflecting the strongest effects. The reverse pattern was 
found for self-enhancement values. These findings fit well with a range of existing research 
that has looked at links between values and well-being and found those who place greater 
importance on self-transcending values also declaring greater cognitive and emotional well-
being (Burr, et al., 2011; Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002). 
But importantly, a novel finding was that the discrepancies between time points also 
related to well-being. A greater distance between current and future value importance had a 
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negative relationship with well-being for self-transcendence values and the reverse pattern 
was again found for self-enhancement values. These data provide the first evidence that 
perception of a discrepancy in value importance over time and current well-being interrelate. 
Future research ideas, presented later, attempt to provide some pathways to understanding 
this issue further. 
Limitations 
There are two key related limitations to the research presented which need to be 
acknowledged. Firstly, the samples are relatively homogeneous. They consist of 
undergraduate students studying one course (Psychology), dominated by young adults at one 
university (Cardiff). Given that Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) found important differences 
across courses in value priorities in their work relating to well-being, it is important that 
future research considers broader student samples.  
The second limitation relates to the reality constraints that potentially arise 
disproportionately in certain samples. Participants’ ratings of identity relevant measures can 
be particularly different in old age (Ryff, 1991; Ryff & Heincke, 1983). Furthermore, some of 
the values, such as wealth, power and obedience may have been lower in value importance in 
the past, simply because children do not have as much opportunity to realise those values in 
their lives. Accordingly, changes in value importance in some values could be somewhat 
confounded with more situational demands. However, any such constraints are likely to be 
small in impact compared to the value patterns reported here. Additionally, initial analysis of 
the participants aged between 21 and 50 in my research suggested no clear differences in 
value trajectories (compared to those under 21). This mirrors Ryff’s (1991) comparison 
between young and middle-aged adults, where both groups report steady upward trajectories 
over time for well-being. Nevertheless, a range of more heterogeneous samples would 
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alleviate any concern that the driving force behind the patterns reported here is due primarily 
to situational factors, rather than psychological mechanisms. The value trajectories reported 
here thus need to be tested across the lifespan, before the findings can be generalised more 
widely. 
Future Research Ideas 
 Notwithstanding its limitations, this research opens up a number of avenues for future 
research. As implied in the introduction, interest in measuring psychological variables over 
time is not new, and past research thus provides a range of additional factors and mechanisms 
that could be incorporated into research evaluating values over time. For instance, people can 
show dispositional variation in their tendency to focus on different temporal parts of their 
lives (Barber et al., 2009) and it would thus be worth seeing if such tendencies moderate my 
findings by using a standardised measure of time perspective (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). For 
example, those who tend to focus more on the future might report smaller discrepancies 
between current and future value importance. 
 Similarly, the perceived distance between the current self and other time points 
matters in self-projection (Wilson et al., 2012). Future studies could thus constrain time 
points (e.g., Ryff 1991; Cozzolino, Sheldon, Schachtman & Meyers, 2009) to ensure control 
of lifespan periods. For example, people could be asked to think about specific ages in their 
past and future to maintain consistency across participants, which might be particularly 
important for samples with a greater heterogeneity of ages. There is, however, some benefit 
to allowing participants to set their own conceptions of past, present and future, as it keeps 
the task at an abstract level and away from situational demands that more specific constraints 
might encourage. It could indeed be fruitful to analyse why participants choose to vary their 
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choices in where they locate the past, present and future, when it comes to values, and control 
for the chosen time period in other analyses. 
Ross and Wilson (2003) note that it is not simply the passage of time that matters 
when it comes to perceiving the relevance of a past or future self or event. Research into 
perceived lifespan change in values and personality suggests past-current discrepancies tend 
to be larger than current-future discrepancies (Quoidbach, Gilbert & Wilson, 2013). Some of 
the quadratic trends reported above also suggest that transitions from the past to the current 
and from the current to the future are not always equal. Given suggestions that past and 
potential goals are separable constructs (Elliot et al., 2014), this distinction merits further 
consideration. However, it should be noted that the stronger effect sizes consistently found in 
the linear contrasts above, suggest that participants generally saw smooth progress across the 
three time points. 
 Aside from the ways in which the temporal manipulation can be altered, it would be 
worthwhile to investigate how a temporal values measure works in different contexts. 
Countrywide levels of development have been shown to moderate the relationship between 
values and well-being (Sortheix & Lonnqvist, 2014), so it is possible that data patterns in 
other cultures would look quite different, though value priorities are generally stable across 
most countries (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). A prediction of SCMT is that greater 
development may lead to reduced perceptions of values as stable and this could be tested to 
some extent cross-culturally. 
 The role of values as either a cause or moderator of affective and cognitive well-being 
is another area that demands attention. My initial analyses point in some new interesting 
directions. Firstly, the previously obtained null relationship between values and cognitive 
aspects of well-being (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000; Oishi et al., 1999) is challenged by my 
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results. In support of the existing literature, affective measures did reveal the strongest 
effects, but some specific temporal contrasts showed significant relationships with the SWLS 
and FS scales. The task of considering values across different temporal contexts could help 
predict different components of well-being in future research. 
Secondly, future analyses could study the moderation hypothesis further, particularly 
in regard to differences between the past, present and future. We need to understand further 
whether certain values tend to directly relate to well-being, or whether it is adherence to the 
specific values each person considers important that works as the best predictor. It would 
hence be interesting to see if temporal discrepancies in values are only relevant to well-being 
for those who place greater importance on such values. As suggested, my initial interest was 
to assess the possibility of a direct link, but future work would benefit from assessing this 
issue further. Additionally, some research has indicated that links between values and well-
being can be mostly explained via personality traits (Haslam, Whelan & Bastian, 2009). 
Individual differences in personality are thus worth integrating into analyses of values over 
time and their associations with well-being. 
Finally, another theoretical area of interest could be assessing the role of projected 
values in relation to psychologically distant behaviours, such as those tested with construal 
level theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010). It may be that the perceived gradient of 
progress is a particularly important predictor of future intentions (Liberman & Dar, 2009; 
Webb, Chang & Benn, 2013), something that a measure taken at only one time point, as is the 
norm with CLT, cannot easily capture. What people strive to achieve in the future and their 
associated forecasted happiness could thus be further informed by using a temporal measure 
of values that contains enough time points to detect gradients of change. This raises an 
additional point in terms of measuring values over time too. To some extent the change 
between current and future value importance could be seen as a prediction or as an aspiration. 
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The wording of my research encouraged participants to think about how important each value 
will be in the future. However, it is worth considering how alternative framing of temporal 
contrasts might differ in construal level, amongst other variables.  
All these suggestions are deliberately diverse and reflect the broad range of avenues 
that looking at values over time opens up. These issues are important in a practical sense 
because many studies have shown that temporal perspective can be manipulated for potential 
positive impact. Creativity, self-control and life-satisfaction have all been shown to increase 
as a result of taking a more abstract, distant perspective (Burgoon, Henderson & Markman, 
2013). Similarly, various methods of focussing on the future, including mortality salience, 
have increased long-term thinking (Liu & Aaker, 2007), academic achievement (Barber et al., 
2009), idealism (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007), pro-environmental engagement (Pahl & Bauer, 
2013) and self-transcendence values (Joireman & Duell, 2005), whilst also protecting against 
negative affective responses (Namkoong & Henderson, 2014). It is thus worth considering 
how our values, which form such a central component of our self-identity, might affect 
judgement and behaviour if combined with a mechanism that temporarily focuses people on 
values’ abstract nature by encouraging people to consider their values over time. In fact, this 
speculation is interesting in light of Study 2’s finding that simply completing the temporal 
contrast version of the SVS increased the importance attached to openness values compared 
to the control group. This increase in the perceived importance of openness values may be yet 
another consequence of a future focus on values (or at least a past-to-present-to-future focus), 
with potential ramifications for personal strivings and social behaviour. 
Values Over Time and SCMT 
Whilst it is noted that experiencing and pursuing happiness is not a universal ideal for 
every context (Gruber, Mauss & Tamir, 2011), understanding how current perceptions of 
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well-being interrelate with perceptions of the self over time remains a vital aim. Earlier in this 
chapter, and in the general introduction, I outlined how contemporary society may well 
encourage instability in value importance. It is hence crucial to understand the ramifications 
of having greater flexibility in matters of self-knowledge, of which values are a central part. 
This initial research provides two main findings in this regard. First, values are seen as 
changing over time. Second, perceived value discrepancies appear to have both costs and 
benefits when it comes to present feelings of well-being. In this regard, our increased 
willingness to see values as malleable might be a double-edged sword; one that gives us 
greater room to change who we are over time, yet one that also makes defining the self 
decidedly more problematic (Baumeister, 1987). 
Conclusion 
 The three studies reported here provide consistent and replicable evidence that people 
see values as changing over time. With the exception of conservation values, people 
generally believe that they are increasing the importance of their values over time. This 
pattern is interesting in part because people’s visions of change do not reflect the tensions 
across value dimensions that have been consistently found with standard measures, and 
because these trajectories do not fit with extant evidence of lifespan developments in value 
change. The trajectories are also important because they reveal interesting associations with 
well-being. Participants appear to show greater well-being when anticipating more 
attachment to self-enhancement values in the future, despite being currently happier when 
prioritising self-transcendence values. In this sense, participants’ views raise a number of 
questions about their awareness of how their values will change over time and how this 
change may relate to their own well-being. With further development and research, the 
method of asking participants to consider their values in the past, now and in the future may 
allow people to use their values more powerfully and in a more fulfilling manner.  
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Chapter 3: Setting the Bar High in Ethical Consumption 
Introduction 
In the general introduction, I outlined a series of societal changes that have directly 
impacted upon how people and things interact, with a particular focus on the increased levels 
of complexity in contemporary society (Baumeister, 1987; Cushman, 1990; Ehrenreich & 
English, 1979). Living in a post-industrialised and post-globalised social context can present 
difficulties with regards to consuming in alignment with pro-social values. Inherently, 
consumers are likely to be reluctant to consume products if the consequences of the 
production process conflict with their moral beliefs. However, whereas historical social 
contexts would have allowed individuals to have a greater sense of understanding of how the 
products they consumed were manufactured, modern marketplaces are replete with products 
with highly intricate production chains. Accordingly, modern consumers are accustomed to 
feeling uninformed of how such chains work and to feeling powerless as a consumer to make 
a difference (Chatzidakis, Hibbert & Smith, 2007). This context mismatch is analysed further 
in this chapter and represented by the model below (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Model of SCMT to explain the difficulty of consuming ethically. 
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In his analysis of the history of global consumerism, the historian Peter Stearns’ 
(2006, p. 159) final conclusion stated: “Managing consumerism is a challenge, for it is easy 
to be managed by it. But consumerism is a human construction, despite all the complex 
factors behind it. It should serve human ends”. A contemporary concern however, is that 
consumerism is not serving such ends. A diverse range of global figures, including the Pope 
(Weisenthal, 2013) and the US President (Roberts, 2015) have recently raised concerns that 
world markets are contributing to ever growing inequality, both within and between nations, 
and that this inequality is costing lives. Of course, inequality is often portrayed as a political 
and economic issue and the relative costs and benefits are regularly debated (Pieterse, 2002). 
Notwithstanding the broad political and economic context, however, there are issues for 
consumerism today in terms of sustainability (Jackson, 2009), consumer well-being (Bauer, 
Wilkie, Kim & Bodenhausen, 2012), and producer exploitation (Billig, 1999). Indeed, an 
increasing awareness of the link between global warming and consumerism (Newholm & 
Shaw, 2007) makes this topic one that demands urgent attention. The growing urgency of 
such issues is reflected in the increasing modern tendency to attach a moral aspect to 
consumer decisions that until very recently did not carry such a dimension (Chatzidakis, 
2015).  
This moral aspect is often reflected in attempts at ethical consumption. These attempts 
subsume a diverse range of behaviours. Research has indicated a willingness to receive lower 
returns on investments (up to $5000 over 15 years) if they avoid unethical funds (Lotz & Fix, 
2014), to pay a 10% premium for fair-trade coffee (De Pelsmacker, Driesen & Rayp, 2005) 
and a 5 % premium for eco-labelled apples (Loureiro, McCluskey & Mittelhammer, 2002). 
To be clear, the willingness to pay more for a product of equal quality but greater ethical 
standards does not appear to be a mere minority pursuit. For example, a majority of US 
participants were willing to pay an extra $5 on a $20 dollar sweater and an extra $1 per pound 
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of coffee, if the products were ethically produced (Hertel, Scruggs & Heidkamp, 2009). 
Similarly, an analysis of older UK consumers suggested people were willing to pay more for 
ethical products, as long as the quality of the product is maintained (Carrigan, Szmigin & 
Wright, 2004). So whilst ethical consumption can only be part of the solution to global 
inequality and environmental sustainability, it is also a behaviour that is relevant to people 
across the world and can act as a daily reminder of the need to consider morality in our 
habits. It is also increasingly popular. Indeed, ethical spending, personal boycotts, and ethical 
investment have all seen rapid growth in the UK over the last two decades (Webb, Long, 
Harrison & Kenyon, 2014).  
The interaction between cultural contexts and products leads to a range of attempts at 
ethical consumption that carry differing tensions between morality and consumerism. For 
example, ethical food consumption can promote conflicts of power, where consumers feel 
tension between acting as an empowered consumer (e.g. buying Fairtrade coffee) and also 
being unable to make a significant difference (“drop in the ocean” effect, see Cohen, 2000). 
Alternatively, conflicts of interest can arise, as consumers feel tension between considering 
purchases that meet their hedonistic demands (e.g. flying on holiday) whilst simultaneously 
conflicting with their concern for the environment (Pecoraro & Uusitalo, 2014). Different 
situations are likely to evoke different ethical concerns for people. 
Additionally, different relations can exist between consumption and individual 
identity across contexts, as evidenced by shifts in attitudes towards materialism since the 18th 
century (Hilton, 2004). For instance, a modern form of ethical consumption is actually 
consuming less (Shaw & Newholm, 2002). However, it is unlikely that there is a great degree 
of overlap in the specific motives behind choosing an ethical variant of a product that was 
going to be purchased anyway, compared to adopting a lifestyle of increasingly simplified or 
reduced consumption. A key role for social psychological research is thus to evaluate 
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concurrently the particular type of materialism, the underlying motives and the socio-
historical context. 
This chapter has two overarching goals. The first is to summarise extant evidence 
about why people choose to consume ethically. Examinations of the drivers behind ethical 
consumer behaviour have been relatively sparse in sociology (Adams & Raisborough, 2008). 
A similar argument can be extended for social psychology, whilst business ethics, economics 
and marketing instead contribute the most direct research. It is important to start filling this 
gap from a psychological perspective. The second goal is thus to report three studies that 
investigate how asking people to do a little, or a lot, changes how they perceive their own and 
others’ moral responsibilities when it comes to consumer decisions. 
Facilitators and Barriers in Ethical Consumption 
 The motivations underlying ethical consumption are undoubtedly numerous, multi-
levelled and even conflicting. Indeed, it has been argued that ethical consumers sometimes 
reaffirm the legitimacy of materialism and can accidentally, or deliberately, maintain social 
and financial hierarchies, by displaying an individual ability to spend resources on more 
ethical alternatives (Pecoraro & Uusitalo, 2014). Whilst materialism and hierarchies may well 
be reaffirmed or reinforced by attempts at ethical consumption, the benevolent intentions 
underlying ethical purchases still merit consideration. Oh and Yoon (2014) find a correlation 
between altruistic concern for others and ethical consumption attitudes and intentions, 
supporting previous research suggesting a link between pro-social values and ethical 
consumption (Doran, 2009; Thøgersen, 2011). Indeed, Thøgersen (2011) suggests any 
apparently selfish reasons given for green consumerism may in fact reflect a post-hoc 
rationalisation of an inherently unselfish act. It thus seems plausible to suggest that the 
balance of motives underlying ethical consumption tends towards the compassionate. 
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 Clues about the factors that facilitate ethical consumption come in part from research 
that finds various demographic factors correlate with ethical purchases, including level of 
education, income, and female gender (Starr, 2009). Similarly, higher fair-trade premiums 
were supported by younger, female, politically liberal, and highly educated individuals 
(Taylor & Boasson, 2014). However, counter to this evidence, a lack of consensus in the role 
of demographic indicators has been observed by some researchers (Bray, Johns & Kilburn, 
2011). Doran (2009) argues demographics do not directly predict fair-trade consumption, 
instead suggesting that value orientation is more important. She found those who attached 
more importance to self-transcendence values, particularly universalism values, reported 
more fair-trade purchasing, whilst those who were higher in self-enhancement values 
reported less fair-trade purchasing. At a broader level, the perception of social norms can also 
encourage shifts towards ethical consumption. For instance, individuals living in an area 
where ethical consumption was generally high were found to be more likely to shop ethically 
themselves (Starr, 2009). 
 Whilst marketing research has identified target demographics that might be more 
sympathetic to ethical purchases, there is still a need to understand why people’s willingness 
to consider ethical factors does not always translate into action. There is evidence of 
discrepancies between how much consumers purportedly care about ethical standards and 
how much they actually consume ethically (Bray et al., 2011). Much of the research on 
ethical consumption has looked at the purported sizeable gap between concern for ethical 
standards and actual action. The focus has therefore been on the barriers to ethical 
consumption (e.g. Bray et al., 2011), rather than the factors that enable it.  
Sometimes this gap is framed as showing people simply failing to act in alignment 
with their reported concerns, but another potential framing could reflect people’s worries 
with participating in ethical markets, rather than a lack of genuine intention to pay more for 
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ethical products. Established barriers to ethical consumption include a perceived lack of 
positive consequences of ethical choices (e.g. the extra money fails to reach the producer), 
the potential negative identity of ethical consumers (e.g. being seen as part of a group that 
imply others are acting unethically), and the thresholds for behaviour change being too 
difficult (e.g. needing to spend time learning how ethical products work) (Johnstone & Tan, 
2014). Uncertainty has also been identified as a broad term ethical consumers use to cover 
concerns of market complexity, competing motives and ambiguous credibility, all of which 
reduce the likelihood of positive engagement (Hassan, Shaw, Shiu, Walsh & Parry, 2013). 
 Attempts to understand decision making in ethical consumption have often used the 
theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1985) as models. These models indicate that behavioural intentions are predicted by 
attitudes, subjective norms and (in the theory of planned behaviour) perceived behavioural 
control. Intentions and perceived behavioural control can then directly predict action. 
Attitudes account for how much people feel positive towards an object. Subjective norms 
account for how much people think others around them would expect them to act in a certain 
manner. Perceived behavioural control indicates the extent to which people feel they can 
successfully perform an action. Whilst these models have been useful in providing a 
framework for predicting ethical decision-making, it is possible they conflate the ethical and 
non-ethical factors involved (Bray et al., 2011). Furthermore, self-identity and past behaviour 
(Sparks & Shepherd, 1992), universalism and self-direction values (Yamoah, Duffy, Petrovici 
& Fearne, 2014), and ethical obligation (Shaw, Shiu & Clarke, 2000) have also been found to 
be useful additional predictors when intentions to consume ethically are examined. The 
findings presented so far begin to illustrate the complex range of cognitive mechanisms 
involved in making ethical choices. 
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Aside from cognitive processes, emotion and anticipated emotion are also important 
determinants of ethical consumption. Guilt and pride can increase perceived efficacy in 
ethical consumption, which in turn affects purchase intentions (Antonetti & Maklan, 2014). 
Similarly, anticipated guilt, produced via increased salience of the consequences of unethical 
behaviour, results in increased ethical intentions towards a shop-worker (Steenhaut & Van 
Kenhove, 2006). Guilt-reducing processes such as self-affirmation have also been shown to 
increase preference for luxury items above utilitarian items (Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
Furthermore, feelings of power have been identified as producing unethical behaviour 
(Dubois, Rucker & Galinsky, 2015). It is hence clear that emotional and cognitive influences 
both play a key role in ethical decision-making. 
Fundamentally then, the less somebody cares about ethical issues and sees potential 
problems as beyond their sphere of influence, the less they will intend to and actually 
consume ethically. At the same time, however, there is a gap between concern and action. In 
the aforementioned research, attitudes were only moderate predictors of intention in most 
cases (e.g. Shaw et al., 2000). It is thus vital to better comprehend which barriers prevent 
people from participating in ethical consumption, particularly when they feel this is 
something they should be doing.  
Cost and Anchoring  
One potential key barrier to ethical consumption is cost. Price is often indicated as the 
primary concern in choosing an ethical alternative (Bray et al., 2011). A key question to 
address therefore is how much ethical products can demand as a premium, above perceptions 
of the standard price. It is clear that people often come across trade-offs between cost and 
ethical standards (Carrigan & de Pelsmacker, 2009), but it is not yet clear how they use 
available information to make their judgements. 
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There are plenty of examples showing that we do not simply use numbers 
proportionately to make ethical judgements. For example, when people were asked how 
much money they thought should be spent on saving waterfowl from environmental hazards, 
they gave the same amount for 2,000, 20,000 and 200,000 birds (Desvousges et al., 1993). In 
everyday life it is not unusual to be presented with precise thresholds about how much an 
ethical option costs (e.g. carbon offsetting a journey) or indirect information that requires 
some further elaboration (e.g. comparing standard and ethical brands of tea). People then use 
this information to make decisions about whether or not to consume ethically. A central goal 
of this research was to begin testing how different cost thresholds might influence 
perceptions of what people think they should do in ethical consumption contexts. 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) classic paper on the use of heuristics and biases 
describes how judgements can be influenced by anchors. For example, participants were 
asked to estimate how many African countries were in the United Nations and were also 
asked whether the number was higher or lower than a low anchor (10) or a high anchor (60); 
those who received the low anchor estimated the answer to be 25 and those who received the 
high anchor estimated the answer as 45. The participants had thus used the initial anchor to 
guide their personal judgement. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) outlined several other 
examples of how the anchoring process can take effect, including when the participant uses 
their own anchor as an initial baseline. Anchoring effects can also have serious consequences 
in the real world and effects have been found for perceived suitability of personal-injury 
rewards (Marti & Wissler, 2000), expert judgements regarding appropriate criminal 
sentencing (Englich, Mussweiler & Strack, 2006) and a range of forecasted behaviour 
(Critcher & Gilovich, 2008) and actual behaviour (Cheek, Coe-Odess & Schwartz, 2015).  
Arbitrary anchors have also been shown to affect judgements of everyday items’ cost 
(Ariely, Loewenstein & Prelec, 2003; Simonsen & Drolet, 2004) and marketing techniques 
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can use higher anchors to increase the quantity of purchases in a supermarket (Wansink, Kent 
& Hoch, 2000). Experts are also susceptible to anchoring effects, as car dealers reported 
anchor-directed (low vs. high) estimates for the value of a used-car, although these effects 
could be attenuated by encouraging the dealers to generate reasons why the initial anchor 
might be inappropriate (Mussweiler, Strack & Pfeiffer, 2000). Together this evidence shows 
the role of anchoring effects in a range of judgement and purchasing contexts. 
However, in their review of the anchoring effect, Furnham and Boo (2011) called for 
more academic research into how the process works in ecologically valid purchasing 
contexts. There is no research that directly tests the role of anchoring mechanisms in ethical 
purchasing decisions. Furthermore, a consensus is yet to be reached in terms of how anchors 
are processed and hence effective (Wegener, Petty, Blankenship & Detweiler-Bedell, 2010). 
Attitudinal research suggests a distinction between thoughtful and non-thoughtful processing, 
with different pathways for each (Blankenship, Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell & Macy, 
2008), whilst some judgement and decision researchers suggest that the distinction between 
thoughtful and non-thoughtful processing is unnecessary (Frederick, Kahneman & Mochon, 
2010). 
Researchers also differ in their predictions for the effects of extreme anchors. On the 
one hand, extreme anchors have been found to be less influential than moderate anchors for 
affecting judgements, suggesting a potential rebound effect (Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-
Bedell & Jarvis, 2001). On the other hand, there is evidence that extreme anchors will result 
in judgements being placed at the boundary of plausibility for each estimate (Mussweiler & 
Strack, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001a), thus proving as influential as the highest, most 
plausible, equivalent anchor. 
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There are further boundary conditions and moderators that can influence the 
anchoring heuristic. Knowledge of the context can reduce uncertainty and thus the power of 
the anchor (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000), whilst semantic similarity will influence the extent 
to which anchors can have spill-over effects (Mussweiler & Strack, 2001b). For example, an 
anchor for the height of the Brandenburg Gate did not influence judgements of its width 
(Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). 
Despite the robustness of the anchoring effect (Furnham & Boo, 2011) it is thus clear 
that further research is necessary to understand how it works in various consumption 
situations, particularly those with an ethical component. A key question for researchers 
interested in the relationship between anchoring and ethical decision-making, is whether 
asking people to do a little more, or a lot more, can promote or inhibit changes in attitudes, 
intentions and behaviour. If people are told they need to raise their game a little bit, they 
might be motivated to act because they only need to shift their current position a 
comparatively small amount; however, faced with such information, they might also simply 
assimilate the higher threshold into their perception of current behaviour and thus see no need 
to change. Additionally, if people are told they need to raise their game a lot, they might be 
motivated to act because they see how far away they are from a desired moral standard; 
however, similar to some of the evidence on rebound effects (Wegener et al., 2001), a 
demand that seems hugely distant from current behaviour might be demotivating, as it is seen 
as unattainable. 
Consumption and Hypocrisy 
As outlined earlier, ethical consumption is an activity that can elicit many types of 
tension (Pecoraro & Uusitalo, 2014). One such potential conflict is that of moral concern and 
self-interest. Such conflicts are often framed in terms of what we “should” do versus what we 
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“want” to do (Milkman, Rogers & Bazerman, 2008). Accordingly, it is a context that can 
motivate people to reflect on the potential for hypocrisy. 
The general introduction described in detail how defining the boundaries of hypocrisy 
can prove tricky (Szabados & Soifer, 1999). What some would describe as hypocrisy, others 
might describe as good intentions being overpowered by situational constraints (Batson & 
Thompson, 2001). However, similar to Polman and Ruttan (2012), I conceptualise it in two 
simple ways for this chapter. The first is intra-personal hypocrisy, where there is a 
discrepancy between what somebody thinks they should do and what they would or actually 
do. The second type of hypocrisy, inter-personal hypocrisy, arises when individuals demand 
more of others than they do of themselves. 
To measure intra-personal hypocrisy, I utilised Monteith and Voils’ (1998) 
methodology of contrasting ought behaviour with predicted behaviour in a given situation. In 
their research they asked people to complete two separate questionnaires; the first evaluated 
how they think they should feel when judging and interacting with Black people, the second 
evaluated how they think they would feel in these situations. However, I asked for “actual” 
rather than “would” responses. Monteith and Voils’ (1998) work focussed more on 
hypothetical situations, whereas I was investigating identifiable behaviours that individuals 
would have likely carried out before, so I could more closely measure their actual behaviour. 
I also deliberately contrasted the actual and should items side by side in order to measure the 
perceived level of intra-personal hypocrisy, whereas Monteith and Voils (1998) tried to avoid 
such matching. This variation simply represents different research aims. 
To measure inter-personal hypocrisy I designed the studies to assess both what people 
think they should and actually do, as well as assessing what they think people generally 
should and actually do. Research utilising a comparable design in the realm of ethical 
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consumption showed that people were less condemning of questionable labour standards 
when considering a holiday for themselves, compared to when considering the same holiday 
for their friends (Paharia, Vohs & Deshpande, 2013). The authors suggest such discrepancies 
arose because of motivated reasoning processes, which were then reduced via cognitive load. 
Importantly from a design perspective, the evaluations were made separately, with 
participants either responding to items in the context of their own holiday, or to items in the 
context of their friends’ holiday. I initially follow a similar between-participants approach, 
but have to switch to a within-participants design for the final two studies. 
The three studies that follow thus had two methods of assessing ethical consumption 
hypocrisy. Differences between what you think you should do and what you actually do (or 
what people generally should do and actually do) provided perceptions of intra-personal 
hypocrisy. These should-actual differences could then be contrasted between the self and 
people generally to test for inter-personal hypocrisy. That is, if the differences are 
comparably smaller for the self, this represents demanding more of others than one does of 
oneself. 
Present Research 
 I have outlined the increasing relevance of ethical consumption in a global 
marketplace, the factors that encourage or impede such action and how anchoring can impact 
relevant judgement processes. The aim of the present research was to bring these issues 
together, in an attempt to start understanding how setting the bar comparatively low or high 
changes people’s perceptions of how they (and/or others) should act in ethical consumption 
situations. This helps to meet a number of researchers’ calls for a greater quantitative 
methodological input into research into ethical consumption (e.g. Carrington, Neville & 
Whitwell 2014; Oh & Yoon, 2014; Papaoikonomou, Valverde & Ryan, 2012).  
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I thus sought to begin addressing a number of gaps in the literature. Aside from 
Paharia and colleagues’ (2013) work, there is an absence of research that addresses 
hypocritical attitudes in ethical consumption. Secondly, I know of no work that directly 
connects anchoring effects to hypocrisy, either inter-personal or intra-personal. Accordingly, 
I initiated a project that connects the paradigms of anchoring and hypocrisy within the 
context of ethical consumption. Given the exploratory nature of the research, I also included 
broader measures of values and identification with humanity as secondary variables of 
interest, in order to test for a range of impacts of the manipulation. 
Study 1 took the form of a 2 (ethical information video: information video / no video 
control) x 2 (intra-personal hypocrisy target: self / people generally) between-participants 
design. The results of Study 1 were then used to set suitable price anchors for the following 
studies. Owing to pragmatic constraints, both Studies 2 and 3 collapsed the intra-personal 
hypocrisy target factor into a repeated-measures variable, so participants responded with their 
personal should-actual contrasts and then with their perceptions for people generally. Study 2 
hence had three conditions (no video control / moderate anchor video / high anchor video) 
and Study 3 had four conditions (no video control / moderate anchor video / high anchor 
video / extra-high anchor video). 
Study 1 
 In line with the main areas of interest outlined in the introduction, there are four 
associated hypotheses for Study 1. Firstly, it is predicted that watching the video that makes 
ethical issues salient will lead to participants suggesting they themselves and people generally 
should pay more for their clothes, compared to those who do not see the video. 
Second, and consistent with the first effect, it is predicted that the video manipulation 
will lead to harsher moral judgements of cheap purchasing. Making the ethical concerns 
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involved in the production process salient should lead to more questioning of the morality of 
cheap purchasing, though any changes would of course depend on how the purchase is 
judged by the control groups initially. 
Thirdly, similar to the findings of Paharia et al. (2013), it is predicted that an inter-
personal hypocrisy effect will appear, with participants demanding greater change from 
others than from themselves. Seeing the video should thus elicit a greater discrepancy in the 
condition that focuses on how people generally should act, compared to how they themselves 
should act. 
The general introduction and Chapter 2 have explained in detail how Schwartz’s 
(1992) circular model of values works. The need to balance getting good value for oneself, 
alongside considering the effects of the production process on others, is one that maps onto 
the self-transcendence and self-enhancement dimension of the model. It is possible that the 
video manipulation will increase the salience of being concerned with the welfare of others. 
Accordingly, the fourth hypothesis is that participants who see the video will attach greater 
importance to self-transcendence values and attach less importance to self-enhancement 
values. 
A final area of interest relates to measures applicable to humanity in general, which as 
mentioned previously, were taken as dependent variables of secondary interest. Luke and 
Maio (2009) found that priming images of people threatening super-ordinate values led to 
lower ratings of humanity esteem. It was thus possible that seeing a video that displays 
images and text relevant to child labour will have similar effects here and also potentially 
carry over to identification. However, it is also plausible to suggest that being reminded of 
one’s role in a global marketplace could decrease the perceived distance between consumer 
and producer, leading to more positive attitudes and stronger identification with humanity. 
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Accordingly the Humanity Esteem Scale (Luke & Maio, 2009) and Identification With All 
Humanity Scale (IWAH) (McFarland et al., 2012) were measured, but no directional 
predictions were made. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 83 first-year students at Cardiff University (76 women, 9 men) who 
took part for course credit. They were between 18 and 26 years of age (M = 18). All the 
participants completed the experiment in individual sessions on a computer in a laboratory at 
the university. No participants were excluded from the analyses. 
Design and Procedure 
 A between-participants design was used. There were two independent variables: 
ethical information video (information video or no video control) and intra-personal 
hypocrisy target (self or people generally). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
four possible conditions. The dependent variables were the consumption hypocrisy items, the 
moral judgement task, the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS), the IWAH and the Humanity 
Esteem Scale. 
Participants were initially asked for their sex, age and how much they spend on 
clothes in an average month. Next, participants either saw a video that made the ethical 
consequences of cheap clothing salient, or in the control condition they simply proceeded to 
the dependent measures. These measures assessed people’s consumption hypocrisy, their 
moral judgement of cheap purchasing and the additional scales outlined in the materials 
 Page 106 
 
section. Finally, a couple of items asked for an estimation of their financial security2 and a 
view of how much a typical student tends to spend on a pair of jeans. After completing the 
study, the participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Ethical Information Video 
 Participants in the ethical information video conditions saw a two-minute presentation 
of text and images specifically prepared for these studies (Foad, 2013a). The aim of the video 
was to raise awareness of the potential ethical issues that accompany the production of 
clothes. The video presented text that asked the person watching to consider where clothes 
are bought and where they are made. These textual prompts were interspersed with relevant 
images (e.g. a shopping centre and a factory). The person watching was then informed that 
prices in the UK are often very low and that the Environmental Justice Foundation3 suggests 
there are some serious negative consequences of such low prices. Textual prompts then asked 
the person watching to consider how much we actually pay for our clothes and how much we 
should pay. The video was designed to make the issue salient and engaging for the 
participant, without eliciting a strong affective response (e.g. images used showed no workers 
in distress). Discussions with participants in the debriefing sessions suggested this aim had 
been achieved, though a small number of participants did report low levels of negative affect 
in the form of guilt or sadness. 
  
                                                          
2 Financial security was not found to moderate the effects reported and is thus not included in 
the analyses. 
3 The Environmental Justice Foundation is a real organisation that campaigns against child 
labour. 
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Dependent Measures 
 Ethical consumption hypocrisy. Participants responded to items asking how much 
they (or people generally) should and actually spend in pounds on an average pair of jeans. 
To compute a hypocrisy score, actual ratings were subtracted from should ratings. A positive 
value thus indicates that participants felt they should spend more on an item and conversely a 
negative value indicates they felt they should spend less than they actually do. Most analyses 
focused on these should-actual contrasts because the contrast was made directly by the 
participants, and I was explicitly interested in the perception of the gap between should and 
actual behaviour. Future analyses can, however, look at how the movement of the two 
original values change.  
Those participants responding about their own perceptions (rather than people 
generally) were asked to briefly describe the last time they made such a purchase; this 
allowed the identification of any participants who were atypical (e.g. bought jeans from a 
charity shop). The process was repeated for an average t-shirt, an average box of tea and 
monthly charity donations. Participants were free to leave items blank if they did not 
purchase any particular item or did not want to respond for any reason. 
 Moral judgement. Participants read a vignette describing a student who purchased a 
pair of jeans at full price (i.e. not on sale) for £8.50. Participants rated the moral acceptability 
of this purchase on a scale from 1 (morally wrong) through 6 (morally neutral) to 11 (morally 
right). 
Values. Participants also completed a 20-item version of the Schwartz (1992) value 
survey (as used and described in Chapter 2). The SVS contained five items for each of the 
four higher order domains (self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness and 
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conservation); these subscales showed adequate to good reliability (.67 < αs < .83). Each set 
of values was mean-centred to control for scale usage, as recommended by Schwartz (2009). 
Humanity measures. Participants completed the Identification With All Humanity 
Scale (IWAH) (McFarland et al., 2012; see Appendix H) and the Humanity Esteem Scale 
(Luke & Maio, 2009; see Appendix I). The IWAH contains nine items, each of which was 
asked at the level of community, country and world; these three different levels each showed 
good reliability (.83 < αs < .86). Example items include “How close do you feel to each of 
the following groups?” and “How much would you say you have in common with the 
following groups?”. The response scale varies in wording depending on the question, but 
each item is rated from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating a stronger level of identification. 
The Humanity Esteem Scale contains eleven items, five of which are reverse scored; this 
scale showed good reliability (α = .71). Example items include “I feel that human beings have 
a number of very good qualities” and “Human beings are able to prosper as well as any other 
species in the universe”. Answers were provided on a scale from -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 
(strongly agree). A higher score on the scale reflected a more positive attitude towards 
humanity in general. 
Estimate of Average Spend on Jeans 
A final question was included to ascertain a perception of the current level of 
spending of students on a pair of jeans. The item asked “Finally, could you please indicate 
how much you think the average student spends on a pair of jeans (in £)?”. This value is used 
in the later studies as a baseline for manipulating a range of thresholds. However, it was also 
worthwhile to check whether the manipulation had any effect on this perceived cost. 
  
 Page 109 
 
Ethical Issues 
 As mentioned above, despite efforts to raise the relevant issue in as neutral a manner 
as possible, the video did cause some mild discomfort for a small number of participants in 
the laboratory. However, no participant reported serious concern and the apparent response 
could be equated to seeing a contextually similar article in a standard news report. Contact 
details were provided for the experimenter and the supervisor in case of any further concern, 
but no participants made further contact4. 
Results and Discussion 
Hypocrisy in the Control Conditions 
 Before analysing the effects of the ethical information video, it was important to note 
whether hypocrisy was present in the control conditions alone. Accordingly, a mixed design 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run, with hypocrisy target (self or people generally) as 
the between-participants variable and should and actual spends as the repeated measures 
variable. This analysis revealed no main effect of hypocrisy target, F (1, 39) < 1, p = .70, 
partial η2 < .01, but a significant main effect of should vs. actual spends, F (1, 39) = 18.70, p 
< .001 partial η2 = .32. This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect, F (1, 
39) = 4.87, p = .03, partial η2 = .11. 
                                                          
4 Similarly, no participants reported further concern after the debriefing process for Study 2 
(in the laboratory) or Study 3 (online). 
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Figure 3.2: Reported should and actual spends for jeans in the two control conditions (Study 
1); error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
As the pattern of data in Figure 3.2 indicates, participants in the control (no video) 
conditions tended to have a default position of needing to spend less on jeans. In fact, only 2 
of the 41 participants in these conditions stated they should be spending more than they 
actually do on jeans and t-shirts. The vast majority of participants in this experiment had a 
default setting that they (and people generally) needed to be more frugal, rather than spend 
more. The pattern also revealed inter-personal hypocrisy. That is, participants thought people 
generally should spend less and actually spend more, when compared to participants who 
were asked about their own should-actual contrast. Thus, the gap between what the 
participants thought they should and actually do, is smaller than the gap between what the 
participants thought people generally should and actually do.  
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Purchasing Beliefs 
I conducted a 2 (ethical information video: video / control) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self 
/ people generally) between-participants ANOVA on hypocrisy scores for each consumer 
item separately. 
  
Figure 3.3: Should-actual contrasts for jeans (Study 1); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
In the analysis of hypocrisy scores for purchasing jeans, the 2 (ethical information 
video: video / control) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self / people generally) between-participants 
ANOVA indicated that there was a significant main effect of the video, F (1, 79) = 13.74, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .15. As shown in Figure 3.3, participants who saw the video shifted from 
the default position of frugality and now suggested they should spend more than they actually 
do on jeans. The main effect of hypocrisy target was non-significant, F (1, 79) = 1.84, p = 
.18, partial η2 = .02. The interaction effect was also non-significant, F (1, 79) = 2.34, p = .13, 
partial η2 = .03. Thus, the video increased how much participants thought they and people in 
general should spend. 
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Figure 3.4: Should-actual contrasts for t-shirts (Study 1); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
In the analysis of hypocrisy scores for purchases of t-shirts, there was a significant 
main effect of the video, F (1, 79) = 36.73, p < .001, partial η2 = .32. As shown in Figure 3.4, 
participants who saw the video shifted from the default position of frugality and now 
suggested they should spend more than they actually do on t-shirts. The main effect of 
hypocrisy target was non-significant, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .57, partial η2 < .01. The interaction 
effect was also non-significant, F (1, 79) = 1.10, p = .30, partial η2 = .01. These findings 
mirror the results relating to jeans purchasing, which is unsurprising given the video content 
was relevant to clothing in general.  
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Figure 3.5: Should-actual contrasts for tea (Study 1); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
In the analysis of hypocrisy scores for purchases of tea, there was a significant main 
effect of the video, F (1, 68) = 25.91, p < .001, partial η2 = .22. Figure 3.5 shows that 
participants who saw the video shifted from the default position of frugality and now 
suggested they should spend more than they actually do on tea. The main effect of hypocrisy 
target was non-significant, F (1, 68) < 1, p = .50, partial η2 = .01. The interaction effect was 
also non-significant, F (1, 68) < 1, p = .81, partial η2 < .01. This analysis shows that the 
manipulation was successful in creating spill-over effects to other products, in this case, tea. 
To summarise the findings for the three products above, it is clear that the video had a 
strong effect on the should-actual contrasts reported by the participants. The video caused 
participants to shift away from the default of frugality and towards a contrast that reflected a 
need to spend more on each item. The effect seemed to hold both when participants were 
asked about their own purchasing habits and about what people generally should and actually 
do. 
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Beliefs about Charitable Donation 
Unlike the default position for consumer items (frugality), the reverse position was 
adopted for donating to charity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 95% of participants in the control 
conditions suggested they should donate more to charity on a monthly basis. I conducted a 2 
(ethical information video: video / control) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self / people generally) 
between-participants ANOVA on hypocrisy scores for beliefs about charitable donation.  
 
Figure 3.6: Should-actual contrasts for monthly charity donations (Study 1); error bars show 
95% confidence intervals 
As reflected by Figure 3.6, there was a significant main effect of the video, F (1, 77) = 
7.35, p < .01, partial η2 = .09. Participants who saw the video suggested the gap between how 
much they, or people generally, should and actually donate to charity was larger compared to 
those who did not see the video. The main effect of hypocrisy target was non-significant, F 
(1, 77) < 1, p = .44, partial η2 = .01. The interaction effect however, was significant, F (1, 77) 
= 3.96, p = .05, partial η2 = .05. Simple effects analyses revealed that the effect of the video 
was significant for those asked about what people generally should and actually donate to 
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charity, F (1, 77) = 10.65 p < .01, Cohen’s d = .87, whereas it was non- significant for those 
asked about their own charity donations, F (1, 77) < 1, p = .61, Cohen’s d = .22. These results 
suggest a new way of looking at inter-personal hypocrisy, where the manipulation has a 
limited effect if the participants are asked how it changes their own ought levels of behaviour, 
but a stronger effect if the participants are asked about how it should change people’s 
behaviour in general. 
Moral Judgement 
It is worth restating the difference between the cells at this point, because the 
difference between “self” and “people generally” is less intuitive for the remaining analyses. 
Those in the “self” conditions were asked questions about what they themselves should and 
actually do in terms of buying jeans, t-shirts and tea, as well as donating to charity. Those in 
the “people generally” conditions were asked the same questions but from the perspective of 
what people generally should and actually do. This manipulation preceded the moral 
judgements and other dependent measures to follow, but was not directly bound up in the 
measures, as it was for the purchasing and donation judgements. As I outline later in the 
summary section, there are potentially different levels of threat to self-integrity when faced 
with answering questions about one’s own moral behaviour compared to what people 
generally do. This experience may have elicited a mindset that is relevant to the subsequent 
measures and is therefore included as a factor in these analyses. 
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Figure 3.7: Moral judgement of cheap clothing purchase (Study 1); error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals 
The 2 (ethical information video: video / control) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self / people 
generally) between-participants ANOVA on participants’ judgements of the morality of a 
student who paid £8.50 for a pair of jeans revealed a significant main effect of the video, F 
(1, 79) = 13.44, p < .001, partial η2 = .15. As shown in Figure 3.7, participants who saw the 
video were less likely to support the purchasing of cheap jeans from a moral perspective. The 
main effect of hypocrisy target was non-significant, F (1, 79) = 1.12, p = .29, partial η2 = .01. 
The interaction effect was also non-significant, F (1, 79) < 1, p = 1, partial η2 < .01. Thus, the 
video making the ethical concerns of cheap clothing salient led to an increased moral concern 
about a cheap purchase. It should be noted however, that each cell remains above the 
midpoint of the scale (morally neutral = 6). So whilst the manipulation led to a different 
evaluation of the moral question posed, it did not push those who saw the video to universally 
condemn the behaviour as morally wrong, but perhaps less morally acceptable. 
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Values 
 In the analysis of values, the ANOVA design used for the other measures was 
expanded to include a within-subjects factor for the self-transcendence and self-enhancement 
values as the repeated measures. This 2 (ethical information video: video / control) X 2 
(hypocrisy target: self / people generally) x 2 (value type: self-transcendence vs. self-
enhancement) ANOVA revealed no main effect of the video, F (1, 79) = 1.30, p = .26, partial 
η2 = .02, nor a main effect of hypocrisy target, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .93, partial η2 < .01. The 
interaction effect was also not significant, F (1, 79) = 1.65 p = .20, partial η2 = .02. The 
ethical information video thus did not have an impact upon value importance. 
Identification with Community, Country, and All Humanity (IWAH) 
 
Figure 3.8: Identification with Community; error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
A 2 (ethical information video: video / control) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self / people 
generally) between-participants ANOVA on the identification with community level of the 
IWAH measure revealed no main effect of the video, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .33, partial η2 = .01, 
nor was there a main effect of the hypocrisy target, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .45, partial η2 = .01. 
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There was, however, a marginally significant interaction effect, F (1, 79) = 3.37, p = .07, 
partial η2 = .04. Given that this study was the first in this new series of experiments, it was 
important to avoid prematurely dismissing an important result with an overreliance on a 
stringent Type 1 error rate. I therefore conducted simple effects analyses to probe this 
interaction (see Figure 3.8). Results indicated that the effect of the video was not significant 
for those asked about people generally, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .55, Cohen’s d = -.19. However, it 
was significant for those asked about their own purchasing habits, F (1, 79) = 4.02, p = .05, 
Cohen’s d = .61. Thus, those who saw the video and were asked questions about their own 
should-actual contrasts, identified more with their community, compared to those who did not 
see the video. 
 
Figure 3.9: Identification with Country; error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
As shown in Figure 3.9, the analysis of identification with one’s own country again 
revealed no main effect of the video, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .88, partial η2 < .01, nor hypocrisy 
target, F (1, 79) = 1.93, p = .17, partial η2 = .02. There was, however, another marginally 
significant interaction effect, F (1, 79) = 3.15, p = .08, partial η2 = .04. Simple effects 
analyses did not identify a significant effect of the video for those asked about people 
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generally, F (1, 79) = 1.84, p = .18, Cohen’s d = -.45, nor for those asked about their own 
purchasing habits, F (1, 79) = 1.33, p = .25, Cohen’s d = .33. The pattern of data does, 
however, trend in the same directions as the measures for community and humanity. 
 
Figure 3.10: Identification with Humanity; error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
As depicted in Figure 3.10, the analysis for identification with humanity again 
revealed no main effect of the video, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .49, partial η2 = .01, nor hypocrisy 
target, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .77, partial η2 < .01. There was however, another marginally 
significant interaction effect, F (1, 79) = 3.51, p = .07, partial η2 = .04. Simple effects 
analyses suggested a marginally significant effect of the video for those asked about people 
generally, F (1, 79) = 3.25, p = .08, Cohen’s d = -.59, but no effect for those asked about their 
own purchasing habits, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .40, Cohen’s d = .25. In other words, those who saw 
the video and were asked questions about what people generally should and actually do, 
appeared to identify somewhat less with humanity, compared to those who did not see the 
video. This pattern is similar to the data for community and country, but in this instance it is 
the “people generally” condition that appears to be the stronger influence underlying the 
interaction. 
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There are two further things worth mentioning in this subsection. Firstly there is a 
steady progression of less identification as the level moves from local to global levels, as 
expected in a student sample (McFarland et al., 2012). Secondly, those in the “people 
generally” conditions appear to have been negatively affected by the ethical information; i.e. 
watching the video led to less identification with humanity. However, those in the “self” 
conditions have shown the reverse effect. In the introduction I outlined why effects in either 
direction were plausible. It is possible that the interaction reflects this plausibility, which will 
be discussed further later. 
Humanity Esteem 
 
Figure 3.11: Humanity Esteem; error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
A 2 (ethical information video: video / control) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self / people 
generally) between-participants ANOVA on humanity esteem revealed no main effect of the 
video, F (1, 79) = 2.12, p = .15 partial η2 = .03. However, there was a main effect of the 
hypocrisy target, F (1, 79) = 5.16, p < .05, partial η2 = .06. As shown in Figure 3.11, those 
who were asked questions about themselves reported a less positive attitude towards 
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humanity than those who were asked questions about people generally. This main effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction, F (1, 79) = 4.43, p = .04, partial η2 = .05. Simple effects 
analyses showed a non-significant effect of the video for those asked about people generally, 
F (1, 79) < 1, p = .65, Cohen’s d = -.14, but a significant effect for those asked about their 
own purchasing habits, F (1, 79) = 6.42, p = .01, Cohen’s d = .82. So those who saw the 
video and were asked questions about what they themselves should and actually do, exhibited 
increased positivity towards humanity, unlike those who were asked questions about how 
people generally act. This result is consistent with the results on the IWAH measure, 
suggesting that the ethical information video, despite its potentially negative tone, has had a 
positive impact on the participants who were asked items relevant to themselves, but not for 
those who were asked questions about people generally. 
Estimate of Average Spend on Jeans 
 
Figure 3.12: Estimated student spend on jeans (Study 1); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
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A 2 (ethical information video: video / control) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self / people 
generally) between-participants ANOVA on the average student spending on jeans revealed a 
significant main effect of the video, F (1, 79) = 4.16, p < .05, partial η2 = .05. As shown in 
Figure 3.12, participants who saw the video estimated a lower average spend on jeans, 
compared to those who did not see the video. There was no main effect of the hypocrisy 
target, F (1, 79) < 1, p = .43, partial η2 = .01, nor was there a significant interaction, F (1, 79) 
< 1 p = .93, partial η2 < .01. Participants perceived the average jeans price paid by a student 
to be approximately £24, which I used in the next study for setting appropriate thresholds. 
Study 1 Summary 
The aim of this study was to establish some baseline responses for each condition and 
to check the initial effectiveness of the manipulation. The analysis of responses in the control 
condition revealed a clear default position in participants’ understanding of their consumption 
and charity donations. There was a consistent desire to be more frugal on products from jeans 
to tea. During debriefing, some participants suggested the frugality was driven by a feeling 
that one should give in less to tempting, hedonistic urges to consume. This type of response 
fits with research that finds associations between feelings of guilt and consumption (Dahl, 
Honea & Manchanda, 2003). Guilt may also be relevant to the second default position in the 
control condition: the tendency to feel one should give more to charity. 
The frugality belief was significantly influenced by the ethical information video. The 
data provide clear evidence that making the social justice issues of manufacturing cheap 
clothing salient, led to a significant shift in how participants believed they should spend, 
relative to how much they actually spend. After viewing the video, participants thought they 
should spend more than they actually do. The video focused on clothes but this effect spilt 
over into an unrelated product (tea). Furthermore, the manipulation caused participants to 
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give less positive moral judgements towards the purchasing of cheap jeans. These judgements 
were less positive in that the means for the video conditions hovered around the midpoint of 
the scale. This suggests participants were not simply responding in a socially desirable 
manner by condemning the behaviour, but instead recognising the potential tension between 
individual frugality and ethical choices. This finding is noteworthy because the vignette 
suggested that the jeans were purchased at full price (i.e. not on sale), so participants were 
presumably aware that this was not an opportunity to meet the demands of both frugality and 
avoiding the ethical costs of cheaply produced goods. 
In addition, the results revealed evidence of inter-personal hypocrisy. This effect first 
appeared in the control conditions, where people generally were seen to have a larger should-
actual gap compared to the participants’ view of their own should-actual contrast, in the 
context of purchasing jeans. Interestingly, the effect of inter-personal hypocrisy appeared 
again when it came to charity donations. In this context, the video had no significant effect on 
increasing how much participants felt they should donate to charity, yet the video did 
increase how much participants felt people generally should donate to charity. This type of 
interaction hints at a new way of measuring hypocrisy in relation to potential interventions, 
where participants suggest that a manipulation should change others’ behaviour but not their 
own. Combined, these findings reveal a difference in expectations for self vs. people 
generally and this relates neatly back to Paharia et al.’s (2013) research into sweatshop 
labour, as in separate evaluations participants here suggested different standards for 
themselves compared to others. 
Unexpectedly, the video did not shift the importance that participants attached to self-
transcendence and self-enhancement values, although there was a nonsignificant trend in the 
predicted direction (i.e., with more importance to self-transcendence values and less to self-
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enhancement values). It may be the case that greater power is needed to detect such an effect. 
Similar to the reasons outlined in Chapter 2, an alternative explanation is that the apparent 
changes in should-actual contrasts may be driven by the instantiation of these values, rather 
than via a shift in associated importance (Maio, Hahn, et al., 2009). Study 2 thus includes 
measures of value instantiations to test whether this mechanism is more suitable for 
understanding the effects of the manipulation. 
Finally, identification with, and attitudes towards, humanity were marginally lower 
when the participants saw the ethical information video and were asked questions about what 
people generally should do. However, a series of significant or marginally significant 
interaction effects suggested the converse effect for participants who were asked questions 
about their own behaviour. After viewing the video and then considering their own 
behaviour, it would appear the video allowed participants to identify more strongly with 
humanity and have more positive attitudes towards humanity. I had no specific directional 
hypotheses for how the manipulation might affect the humanity measures and these results 
suggest the ethical information can have oppositional effects. 
One possible explanation for these interactions is that those in the “control & self” 
condition simply had their own inability to resist temptation in terms of spending and giving 
to charity made salient, which led them to decrease their attitudes towards, and identification 
with, humanity. In contrast, those in the “video & self” condition were given a logical outlet 
for their should-actual discrepancy, as the video made ethical consumption a complex issue 
that is relevant to society in general. The comparative lower positive relations towards 
humanity in the “control & self” condition hence represent a personally relevant dissonant 
experience; whilst the “video & self” condition could evoke a similar process to dissonance 
misattribution (Fried & Aronson, 1995). Those asked about what people generally should do 
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did not receive a threat to self-identity. If anything, for these participants, seeing the ethical 
information video simply reminded them of the problems that face humanity, hence why it 
had an opposite effect compared to those in the “self” conditions. Overall, the apparent 
interaction between the target of the original items and the manipulation is one that is worth 
pursuing further, although it is not the focus of this research. 
An additional result of note is that participants who saw the video estimated the 
current spend by students on jeans as lower than those who did not. Although this did not 
relate to any specific hypothesis, it is evidence that any manipulation of the contrast between 
should and actual behaviour can affect both sides of the equation. This is one of the reasons 
why caution should be applied if focus is ever to be placed only upon changes in what 
participants think they should do, as a measure of changing intention or moral judgement. 
Manipulations can affect the perception of current actual personal behaviour, as well as wider 
social norms. 
Study 2 
 Having identified various baseline levels of intra-personal and inter-personal 
hypocrisy, as well as assessing their susceptibility to manipulation via making ethical issues 
salient, the next planned step was to introduce different thresholds into the design. As 
outlined earlier in the chapter, research on anchoring and thresholds suggests people respond 
differently depending on the context of the situation and the extremity of the anchor. My 
basic aim was to set a price anchor for ethical consumption just above, or considerably above, 
current price estimates. In this way, I could test whether, in the realm of ethical consumption, 
moderate or higher price thresholds were more effective in increasing intentions to spend 
more ethically.  
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Using the data from Study 1, I thus set the moderate threshold as £31 for a pair of 
jeans, as this was a reasonable increase on the perceived normal price found in Study 1 (£24). 
The high threshold was set as approximately double the moderate threshold (£61), as this was 
considered to be a realistic scenario but a large deviation from current norms. Previous 
anchoring research has found random two digit numbers led participants to value the same 
product by a factor of two to three times higher (Ariely et al., 2003; Simonsen & Drolet, 
2004), so the thresholds I used fall comfortably within these ranges. In line with these studies, 
it is plausible to suggest that the high threshold will be more effective than the moderate 
threshold at changing perceptions of what is an acceptable price to pay for a product. The key 
difference for my research is that the anchor is not presented as random or arbitrary. Instead, 
the value provided directly addresses how much one should spend on jeans. 
The addition of the anchoring manipulation meant participant numbers became more 
problematic, as a greater number of cells were required. Pragmatic constraints prevented the 
recruitment of enough participants to run a full between-participants 3 (ethical information 
video: no video control / moderate threshold / high threshold) x 2 (hypocrisy target: self / 
people generally) design. The consumption items relating to self and people generally were 
thus now presented to every participant. Priority was given to items representing the self, so 
the should-actual contrasts assessing what participants thought they should do always 
preceded the should-actual contrasts assessing what participants thought people generally 
should do. 
My hypotheses for Study 2 are thus as follows. Firstly, I expect a replication of 
default frugality and the inversion of this position by raising ethical issues in the video. 
Secondly, I expect a high threshold to elicit more intra-personal ethical consumption 
hypocrisy, compared to the moderate threshold. Thirdly, I expect the previously found inter-
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personal hypocrisy effects to disappear. The hypocrisy target contrasts are now within-
participants and people do not tend to like appearing hypocritical if they feel their judgements 
are being observed (Lonnqvist et al., 2014). Additionally, impression management processes 
that exist both generally and in the laboratory (Tedeschi, 1981) would likely attenuate the 
previously found effects of demanding more from others than one does of oneself, given the 
contrasts were to be made consecutively by each participant. 
Fourthly, I expect both versions of the video to encourage more concern regarding the 
moral judgement tasks, as both thresholds (£31 and £61) are set considerably above the price 
stated in the vignette (£8.50). Intuitively, the high anchor might be expected to elicit greater 
moral concern at cheap purchasing. However, it could equally make the threshold for ethical 
behaviour appear so far away that a student could not be expected to make such a purchase, 
making them less morally responsible for buying cheap items. Accordingly, there is no 
reason to think either threshold will be comparatively more powerful in this domain. Instead, 
it is likely that the ethical information in the video will simply make cheap purchasing less 
acceptable in general. 
In line with earlier discussions, value instantiation items were also added, to assess 
whether the manipulation had an impact on values through instantiation rather than personal 
importance. Accordingly, given the results of Study 1, the fifth hypothesis predicted that the 
videos would not affect value importance, but would elicit greater self-transcendent value 
instantiations, particularly those relating to purchasing decisions, given the context of the 
study. 
Finally, I did not predict any effects would arise on the scales that measure 
identification with humanity and humanity esteem. The findings from Study 1 suggest an 
interactive effect between responding to a particular hypocrisy target and the manipulation, 
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but by making the hypocrisy target a within-participants variable, any such effects cannot 
arise in this design. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 90 undergraduate students at Cardiff University (76 women, 14 
men) who took part for course credit. They were between 18 and 22 years of age (M = 19). 
As before, all the participants completed the experiment in one sitting at a computer in a 
laboratory at the university. Three participants were excluded from the analyses, as they 
reported recent purchases from charity shops. These participants hence did not naturally 
construct the standard tension between personal costs and ethical costs, as required for these 
research questions. 
Design 
 A mixed-participants design was used. The between-participants independent variable 
had three levels: ethical information video (no video control / moderate threshold video / high 
threshold video). The within-participants independent variable was hypocrisy target (self / 
people generally). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. As 
mentioned earlier, my primary interest was the effect of different thresholds on self-relevant 
behaviour so I prioritised this self-relevant behaviour by always presenting it before the items 
about people in general. The dependent variables were the consumption hypocrisy items, the 
moral judgement tasks, the SVS, the IWAH and the Humanity Esteem Scale. 
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Procedure 
Participants received the same initial demographic and anchor items as in Study 1 and 
then saw the moderate threshold video, the high threshold video or no video. Next they 
completed the should-actual contrasts for each item regarding their own behaviour and the 
moral judgement tasks. Finally, they completed the should-actual contrasts for people 
generally, the SVS, the value instantiation measures, the IWAH, the Humanity Esteem Scale 
and the same two final items from Study 1, assessing personal financial security5 and their 
perception of an average jeans purchase. Having completed the study, the participants were 
probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Experimental Manipulation 
 Participants in the relevant video conditions saw the same two-minute video as 
presented in Study 1, with two additional slides. These slides contained the price threshold 
information. Participants in the moderate threshold condition saw information purporting to 
be from a non-governmental organisation that had calculated £31 as the minimum price jeans 
could be ethically produced (Foad, 2013b). Participants in the high threshold condition saw 
the same slides, but the threshold was set as £61 (Foad, 2013c). Participants in the control 
condition again simply proceeded to the dependent measures. 
  
                                                          
5 As with Study 1, analyses revealed financial security did not moderate the effects found and 
is thus not reported hereon in. 
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Dependent Measures 
 The items to assess ethical consumption hypocrisy were the same as in Study 1. 
However, as noted in the design section, this time participants responded to the items for 
themselves and people generally. 
 To assess moral judgement, the same vignette from Study 1 was used. In addition, a 
similar vignette describing a student who purchased a box of tea for £0.27, was presented. 
This allowed testing of whether the spill-over effects found for the should-actual contrasts in 
Study 1 extended to moral judgement. Answers for both vignettes were provided on a scale 
from 1 (morally wrong) through 6 (morally neutral) to 11 (morally right). 
Participants again completed a 20-item version of the Schwartz (1992) value survey 
(SVS). To assess potential changes in value instantiations, the same items described in 
Chapter 1 were employed (Appendix D). The IWAH (McFarland et al., 2012) and the 
Humanity Esteem Scale (Luke & Maio, 2009) were again measured. The SVS subscales for 
each set of values again showed adequate to good reliability (.69 < αs < .87). Each level of 
the IWAH exhibited good reliability (.83 < αs < .87), as did the Humanity Esteem Scale (α = 
.75). 
Results and Discussion 
Hypocrisy in the Control Conditions 
As before, it was important to test whether hypocrisy was present in the control 
conditions alone. In line with the first and third hypotheses outlined above, I expected to find 
intra-personal hypocrisy represented by default frugality; however, the collapsing of the self 
and people generally factor into a within-participants variable meant I did not expect inter-
personal hypocrisy to appear. Accordingly, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was run, 
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with hypocrisy target (self or people generally) and should and actual spends on the primary 
item of interest (jeans) as the repeated measures variables. This analysis revealed the 
predicted main effect of frugality, represented by lower values for should than actual spends, 
F (1, 27) = 10.33, p < .01, partial η2 = .28. This main effect was somewhat qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction effect, F (1, 27) = 4.87, p = .09, partial η2 = .10. 
 
Figure 3.13: Reported should and actual spends for jeans in the two control conditions 
(Study 2); error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
As the pattern of data in Figure 3.13 indicates, participants in the no video control 
conditions tended to present default frugality for buying jeans, replicating the findings from 
Study 1 and supporting the first hypothesis. The pattern also revealed marginal support for 
inter-personal hypocrisy. Similar to Study 1, the marginal interaction effect reflects that 
participants appeared to demand greater should-actual differences from people generally than 
from themselves. The third hypothesis suggested inter-personal hypocrisy effects should not 
be present, as impression management processes (Tedeschi, 1981) took effect. However, the 
data provide some evidence that despite switching to making the judgements for the self and 
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people generally a within-participants variable, people were still somewhat willing to demand 
more from others than they do of themselves. 
Purchasing Beliefs 
I conducted a 3 (ethical information video: no video control / moderate threshold 
video / high threshold video) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self / people generally) mixed design 
ANOVA on hypocrisy scores for each consumer item separately. As a reminder, the 
moderate threshold video stated £31 was the minimum amount needed for jeans to be 
produced ethically, whilst the high threshold stated £61 as the minimum necessary spend. 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Should-actual contrasts for jeans (Study 2); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
For jeans, the analysis revealed a main effect of the ethical information video, F (2, 
82) = 19.32, p < .001, partial η2 = .32, but this main effect was qualified by a significant 
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interaction between video condition and hypocrisy target, F (2, 82) = 3.78, p = .03, partial η2 
= .08. This suggests that participants in each condition provided different responses for 
people generally than they did for themselves. To understand this interaction further, separate 
one way ANOVAs were run for both levels of hypocrisy target. For the self, there was a main 
effect of condition, F (2, 82) = 17.67, p < .001, partial η2 = .30. Post-hoc analyses 
(controlling for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni) support the confidence intervals 
displayed in Figure 3.14, as the high threshold group significantly differed from both the 
moderate threshold group (p < .001) and the control group (p < .001), whilst the moderate 
threshold group did not differ from the control group (p = 1)6. For people generally there was 
also a main effect of condition, F (2, 82) = 12.77, p < .001, partial η2 = .24. Post-hoc analyses 
again support the confidence intervals displayed in Figure 3.14, as the control group 
significantly differed from both the moderate threshold group (p < .01) and the high threshold 
group (p < .001), whilst the moderate threshold group did not differ from the high threshold 
group (p = .15). 
In summary, these data suggest the high threshold video has mimicked the effect of 
the video in Study 1, whilst the moderate threshold video has had a smaller effect. This 
evidence thus supports the second hypothesis, which predicted that the high threshold would 
elicit more ethical consumption hypocrisy than the moderate threshold. However, the 
different effects of the thresholds are moderated by the hypocrisy target. It appears the 
moderate threshold is sufficient to shift beliefs compared to the control group for what people 
generally should and actually do, yet a high threshold is required to shift what people think 
they themselves should and actually do. In essence, this reflects a willingness of the 
participants to make different demands of people generally; that is, the moderate threshold 
video does not change the perception of personal gaps in should-actual behaviour, but it does 
                                                          
6 The quoted p-values reflect Bonferroni’s adjustment and are thus capped at 1. 
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change the perception of how people generally should act. Essentially, this reflects an inter-
personal hypocrisy effect, despite the within-participants nature of the design, which 
contradicts the third hypothesis. It is very interesting to see participants openly able to 
demand more of others than of themselves. 
 Although the videos presented the same information as in Study 1, the addition of 
thresholds made the should-actual contrasts specifically relevant to jeans, rather than clothing 
in general. The next item, t-shirts, was thus now less contextually overlapping. 
  
Figure 3.15: Should-actual contrasts for t-shirts (Study 2); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
Nonetheless, a mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of the ethical information 
video, F (2, 82) = 10.13, p < .001, partial η2 = .20 and a marginally significant interaction 
between video condition and hypocrisy target, F (2, 82) = 3.05, p = .05, partial η2 = .07. 
Separate one way ANOVAs were again run for both levels of hypocrisy target. For the self, 
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there was a main effect of condition, F (2, 82) = 4.36, p = .02, partial η2 = .10. Post-hoc 
analyses reflect the confidence intervals displayed in Figure 3.15, as the high threshold group 
significantly differs from the control group (p = .01), but does not differ from the moderate 
threshold group (p = .51). The moderate threshold group also does not differ from the control 
group (p = .34). For people generally there was also a main effect of condition, F (2, 82) = 
10.79, p < .001, partial η2 = .21. Post-hoc analyses showed the control group marginally 
significantly differed from the moderate threshold group (p = .06) and differed further from 
the high threshold group (p < .001), whilst the moderate threshold group marginally differed 
from the high threshold group (p = .07). These results reproduce the findings relating to 
jeans: the moderate threshold attenuated the effect of the video, but more so for contrasts 
relating to the self. 
 
Figure 3.16: Should-actual contrasts for tea (Study 2); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Control £31 Video £61 Video
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
 in
 £
 (
Sh
o
u
ld
 -
A
ct
u
al
)
Self
People generally
 Page 136 
 
For tea, a mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of the ethical information video, F 
(2, 54) =5.75, p < .01, partial η2 = .18, but no significant interaction between video condition 
and hypocrisy target, F (2, 54) < 1, p = .95, partial η2 < .01 (see Figure 3.16). The main 
effect of the video suggests the videos still had a spill-over effect outside of their specific 
context. The lack of interaction here seems driven in part by the lack of a frugality default in 
the control group for people generally. This is the only instance in my research where 
participants in the control group suggested people should spend more than they actually do. 
Interestingly, this shows the importance of using a control group as a comparison for each 
product, as some items may be more likely to provoke automatic motivations, such as 
frugality or ethics, than others. 
Beliefs about Charitable Donation 
 
Figure 3.17: Should-actual contrasts for charity (Study 2); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
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 No significant interactions or main effects were found for charity (all ps > .12). The 
data do however, trend similarly to the effects found in Study 1, as the high threshold video 
produces the greatest contrast between should and actual beliefs, particularly for people 
generally (see Figure 3.17). 
Moral Judgement 
 A one way ANOVA revealed a main effect of video condition on the moral 
judgement of buying cheap jeans, F (2, 84) = 8.98, p < .001, partial η2 < .18. Further 
analysis7 revealed participants thought the act was significantly more morally wrong after 
seeing the moderate threshold video (M = 5.73; 95% CI [4.96, 6.51]) and the high threshold 
video (M = 5.93; [5.15, 6.71]), compared to the control group (M = 7.89; [7.09, 8.69]). 
Similar results were found for the cheap tea purchase, F (2, 83) = 7.64 p < .01, partial η2 < 
.16. Participants again thought the act was significantly more morally wrong after seeing the 
moderate threshold video (M = 6.03; [5.17, 6.89]) and the high threshold video (M = 5.79; 
[4.89, 6.68]), compared to the control group (M = 8.04; [7.14, 8.93]). 
The spill-over effects found previously for ethical consumption hypocrisy can thus be 
extended to moral judgement. These results support the fourth hypothesis and replicate the 
findings of Study 1, in that making salient the ethical considerations of consumption elicits 
lower positivity in moral judgements of cheap purchasing. As predicted, whilst the moderate 
and high thresholds produce different effects for judgements of how much people should and 
actually spend, they do not produce different effects for related moral judgements. 
These results suggest that judging the morality of an action of another person fits 
closely with the perceptions of what people generally should and actually do, rather than 
                                                          
7 Post-hoc analyses used the Bonferroni method to adjust for multiple comparisons and all 
significant results are reported at the .05 level of significance. 
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what the self should and actually does. That is, the moderate and high thresholds were both 
sufficient to change purchasing beliefs for people generally, whereas for purchasing beliefs 
about the self, only the high threshold had a consistent effect. For moral judgements, both 
thresholds had a similar effect on the perceived acceptability of cheap purchasing of jeans 
and tea. This also fits with previous evidence showing that moral judgements of others can 
activate different moral mechanisms compared to assessing self-oriented standards (Barkan, 
Ayal, Gino & Ariely, 2013).  
Values 
 A 3 (ethical information video: no video control / moderate threshold video / high 
threshold video) X 2 (values: self-transcendence / self-enhancement) mixed design ANOVA 
was run on the self-transcendence and self-enhancement values dimension. As with Study 1, 
values were again mean-centred. 
 
Figure 3.18: Self-transcendence and self-enhancement values (Study 2); error bars show 
95% confidence intervals 
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Self_Transcendence Self_Enhancement
Control
31 Video
61 Video
 Page 139 
 
 There was no significant interaction between values and video condition, F (2, 84) = 
1.20, p = .31, partial η2 = .03 (see Figure 3.18). Similar to Study 1, the data did, however, 
trend in the same direction, as those who saw the high threshold video attached the greatest 
importance to self-transcendence values and the least importance to self-enhancement values. 
Value Instantiations 
 After the apparent lack of impact of the video on value importance in this study and in 
Study 1, I decided to test whether the videos may instead affect how the values were being 
instantiated. As with Chapter 2, the ten instantiation examples were reduced to three factors: 
purchasing, personal development and other self-transcendent actions8. A one way ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of video condition on the value instantiation of purchasing, 
F (2, 84) = 3.10, p = .05, partial η2 = .07. Post-hoc analyses revealed that participants thought 
significantly more about others when perceiving making purchasing decisions having seen 
the high threshold video (M = 3.05; [2.65, 3.45]), compared to the moderate threshold video 
(M = 2.36; [1.96, 2.75]). There were no significant differences compared to the control group 
(M = 2.58; [2.18, 2.99]). This suggests the moderate threshold was not sufficient to change 
value instantiations from the control group, as participants only thought their purchasing 
decisions should take others’ interests into account more having seen the high threshold 
video. No effects of condition were found on the personal work choices factor, F (2, 84) < 1, 
p = .73, partial η2 = .01, nor on the other-focussed actions factor, F (2, 84) < 1, p = .53, 
partial η2 = .02. The specific context of making ethical consumption salient may explain why 
these value instantiations shifted, whilst the other factors did not. However, it may also be 
that these instantiations are generally more malleable, given it was this factor that also 
                                                          
8See Chapter 2 for a description of the three factor structure. 
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increased after the temporal contrast values measure in Chapter 2. There was hence some 
tentative support for the fifth hypothesis. 
IWAH and Humanity Esteem 
 As predicted, no effects of video condition were found on the IWAH and humanity 
esteem measures (all Fs < 1.05, all ps > .35). In Study 1 I outlined how any ethical 
information video that contains threats to super-ordinate values could lower humanity 
identification or esteem. However, the video also offers a solution to the problem presented 
and as such may well rebalance any such effects. More importantly, the interaction effects 
from Study 1 suggest a potentially complex relationship between the target of the moral 
judgements (being questioned about the self or people generally) and the presentation of 
ethical information. Putting the judgements for the self and people generally as a within-
participants variable removed the possibility of replicating the effects from Study 1. Future 
research could directly test whether information relevant to the issues of globalised 
production processes does indeed reduce positive attachment to constructs of humanity. 
Estimate of Average Jeans Spend 
 As with Study 1, the final item asked participants to estimate the price students would 
normally pay for an average pair of jeans. A one way ANOVA revealed a marginally 
significant main effect of video condition on this estimate, F (2, 84) = 2.73, p = .07, partial η2 
= .06. Post-hoc analyses revealed participants thought students spent significantly less having 
seen the moderate threshold video (M = 21.13; [17.77, 24.50]), compared to the control group 
(M = 26.54; [23.06, 30.02]). The difference between the moderate threshold and the high 
threshold video (M = 25.28; [21.86, 28.70]) was marginal. This somewhat replicates the 
effect in Study 1, where the video suppressed estimated spending on jeans.  
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Study 2 Summary 
 Two main findings arose from the results described above. Firstly, the basic effects 
found in Study 1 were replicated. The default position was again one of frugality, and the 
ethical information video again tended to invert this position to one of ethical concern. 
Secondly, the moderate and high thresholds were shown to moderate this inversion. The high 
threshold was effective in changing should-actual perceptions for each consumer item. The 
moderate threshold also changed these perceptions, but only when participants were asked 
about people generally (and only for jeans and t-shirts). This represents an interesting type of 
inter-personal hypocrisy which has been willingly self-reported in a within-participants 
design. Essentially, participants have indicated that being aware of ethical issues changes 
their views of what people generally should do, but not necessarily what they themselves do. 
Interestingly, this is not a simple effect of feeling that others are in a stronger financial 
position to act ethically, as a general glance at the actual and should group means shows there 
are no consistent differences across hypocrisy target. That is, participants do not think people 
generally actually do, or should, spend more than them. Furthermore, perceptions of financial 
security did not moderate any of the effects reported. These results support the first three 
hypotheses. 
The findings also supported the final two hypotheses. For moral judgement, both 
versions of the video encouraged participants to consider cheap purchasing as less morally 
acceptable. Value importance was again unaffected by the manipulation; however, there was 
some evidence to suggest that the manipulation affected value instantiations, as purchasing 
decisions carried a greater element of concern for others after participants saw the high 
threshold video. Overall, the data across both studies show consistent patterns. 
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One other point to note was that the trend in the charity donation data was similar, but 
nonsignificant, as participants slightly increased the should-actual gap for giving, again more 
so for people generally. The lack of significant inter-personal hypocrisy in beliefs regarding 
charitable donations might be a result of such effects being susceptible to impression 
management, which were thus particularly affected by moving the hypocrisy target to a 
within-participants variable. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the novel introduction of a manipulation of 
thresholds was informative. In this study, the higher threshold had a greater impact compared 
to the moderate threshold. This is interesting in light of past evidence about assimilation and 
contrasts of target judgements to primes or anchors in spending contexts (Ariely et al., 2003; 
Furnham & Boo, 2011; Simonsen & Drolet, 2004). As outlined in the introduction, it was 
conceivable that the judgements would more easily move toward the moderate threshold than 
the higher threshold, because the extreme nature of the higher threshold might be rejected as 
being unachievable. Through dissonance related processes, people might therefore have 
rejected the premise that paying more is morally desirable. Instead, it turned out the higher 
threshold was more persuasive. This effect may have occurred because the threshold was not 
out of reach for participants, allowing it simply to motivate more change instead of rejecting 
the possibility of change. 
Study 3 
 In light of the above findings, I wanted to carry out two additional tests to further test 
the robustness of the effects being found. Firstly, I wanted to extend the research to a more 
generalizable population than a wholly student sample, as students have their own particular 
lifestyle and financial concerns. Accordingly, this study uses a general US (American) 
sample. Secondly, I wanted to test an extra-high threshold, to see if the type of effects found 
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with extreme thresholds in other contexts (Mussweiler & Strack, 2001) also produced 
potential ceiling or rebound effects here. 
Because it is important to keep online data collection as brief as possible (Goodman, 
Cryder & Cheema, 2013) only the items relating to consumption, charity and moral 
judgement were used. The measures concerning value importance, value instantiations, 
identification with humanity and humanity esteem were thus excluded. 
In line with the previous two studies and the goals for this study, I have four main 
hypotheses. Firstly, the findings of default frugality and an inversion of this position via the 
ethical information video will be replicated. Secondly, higher thresholds should elicit a 
willingness to pay higher prices for goods, though it is likely that the extra-high threshold 
will not produce equivalently stronger effects as it reaches the boundary of plausibility 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). The third hypothesis is a reversal of the equivalent hypothesis 
from Study 2, as the evidence described above suggested participants were sometimes willing 
to report inter-personal hypocrisy, even when the hypocrisy target (self / people generally) 
was a within-participants variable. Accordingly, I now expect participants to show a 
willingness to demand more from people generally than they do themselves. Fourthly, the 
moral judgement of cheap purchases will be seen as less acceptable, regardless of the 
threshold presented. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 183 people recruited using Mechanical Turk and all were based in 
the US (79 women, 102 men, 2 preferred not to say). They were between 18 and 72 years of 
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age (M = 34). Each participant was paid $0.75. Incomplete entries were automatically 
rejected by the survey software. 
 We used exclusion criteria to eliminate participants who may have completed the 
survey multiple times or were not paying sufficient attention to the study, as is the norm in 
online data collection (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, & Musch, 2012). Seven participants (4%) 
used the same IP address, 13 (7%) failed a simple video knowledge check, 6 (3%) failed a 
basic knowledge check and 18 (10%) provided rare answers that suggested a lack of attention 
(e.g., I should give less to charity than I actually do). In total, 38 participants were excluded, 
and because some (n = 6) failed on more than one of these basic checks, this left a final 
sample for analysis of 145. The low failure rate for each check indicates the comparatively 
liberal nature of these criteria. 
Experimental Manipulation 
 Participants in the relevant video conditions saw the same two minute videos as 
presented in Study 2, again with minor adjustments to reflect the US setting. Participants in 
the moderate threshold condition saw the threshold for the ethical production of jeans as $44 
(Foad, 2013d), participants in the high threshold condition saw the threshold as $88 (Foad, 
2013e) and participants in the extra-high threshold saw the threshold as $133 (Foad, 2013f). 
This extra-high threshold appeared effective as a very high, but perhaps not entirely 
implausible anchor, as a couple of participants in this condition questioned the credibility of 
this price when giving feedback. Participants in the control condition again simply proceeded 
to the dependent measures. 
Design 
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 A mixed participants design was used. The between-participants independent variable 
now had four levels: ethical information video (no video control / moderate threshold / high 
threshold / extra-high threshold). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions. The within-participants dependent variable was again hypocrisy target (self / 
people generally). As with Study 2, I prioritised the hypocrisy target of the self by ordering 
these items first. The dependent variables were the consumption hypocrisy items and the 
moral judgement tasks. 
Procedure 
Participants received the same initial demographic and anchor items as before and 
then saw the relevant video or no video. If they saw a video (i.e., all participants in the 
experimental conditions), a simple knowledge check asked them to select the threshold they 
had seen from a list of options. Next, they completed the should-actual contrasts for each 
item regarding their own behaviour and the moral judgement tasks. Finally, they completed 
the should-actual contrasts for people generally, items assessing personal financial security,9 
and their perception of an average jeans purchase. For participants in the video conditions, as 
part of the knowledge check, an additional question asked them to select the type of music 
they heard during the video. Having completed the study, the participants were debriefed via 
an information page and thanked for their time. Contact details of the researcher and 
supervisor were also provided, but no participants made further contact. 
Dependent Measures 
 The items to assess consumption hypocrisy were the same as in the previous studies 
except for changes made to reflect the US culture. For example, pounds were switched for 
                                                          
9 As with Study 2, analyses revealed financial security did not moderate the effects found and 
is thus not discussed further. 
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dollars and tea was switched for coffee. Similar changes were made to the vignettes for moral 
judgement, and the cost in each scenario was increased to approximately match the currency 
rate of pounds to dollars. 
Results and Discussion 
Hypocrisy in the Control Conditions 
As before, it was important to test whether hypocrisy was present in the control 
conditions alone. Accordingly, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was run, with 
hypocrisy target (self or people generally) and should and actual spends on jeans as the 
repeated measures variables. This analysis revealed the predicted main effect of frugality, 
represented by lower values for should than actual spends, F (1, 40) = 49.41, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .55. This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect, F (1, 40) = 7.61, p 
= .01, partial η2 = .16. 
 
Figure 3.19: Reported should and actual spends for jeans in the two control conditions 
(Study 3); error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Should Spend Actual Spend
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 in
 d
o
lla
rs
 (
$
) Self (control
condition)
People generally
(control condition)
 Page 147 
 
 These results support the first and third hypotheses. The findings of the previous two 
studies relating to default frugality were replicated, as participants again suggested they (and 
people generally) should spend less than they actually do on jeans (see Figure 3.19). 
Furthermore, the interaction effect also supports the findings of the previous two studies, as it 
would appear participants were willing to demand more frugality from people generally than 
they were willing to demand from themselves. In general, before considering the ethical 
manipulation, it would appear people are willing to act hypocritically, both in a between-
participants and a within-participants design. 
Purchasing Beliefs 
I conducted a 4 (ethical information video: no video control / moderate threshold 
video / high threshold video / extra-high threshold video ) X 2 (hypocrisy target: self / people 
generally) mixed design ANOVA on hypocrisy scores for each consumer item separately. As 
with Study 2, one way ANOVAs were then run on each level of the hypocrisy target if a 
significant interaction was found. As a reminder, the moderate threshold video stated $44 was 
the minimum amount needed for jeans to be produced ethically, the high threshold stated $88 
as the minimum necessary spend and the extra-high threshold stated $133 as the minimum 
necessary spend. 
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Figure 3.20: Should-actual contrasts for jeans (Study 3); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
 For jeans, the mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of the ethical information video, 
F (3, 134) = 15.96, p < .001, partial η2 = .26 and a main effect of the hypocrisy target, F (1, 
134) = 6.11, p = .02, partial η2 = .04. These effects were somewhat qualified by a marginally 
significant interaction between video condition and hypocrisy target, F (3, 134) = 2.26, p = 
.09, partial η2 = .05. As before, to understand this interaction further, separate analyses were 
run for both levels of hypocrisy target. For the self, there was a main effect of condition, F (3, 
134) = 10.84, p < .001, partial η2 = .20. Post-hoc analyses (controlling for multiple 
comparisons using Bonferroni) support the confidence intervals displayed in Figure 3.20, as 
the control group marginally significantly differed from the moderate threshold condition (p 
= .09), but differed further from the high threshold (p < .001) and the extra-high threshold (p 
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< .001). For people generally, there was also a main effect of condition, F (3, 134) = 14.44, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .24. Post-hoc analyses again support the confidence intervals displayed in 
Figure 24, as the control group significantly differed from every video condition (all ps < 
.001), whilst none of the video conditions differed from one another (all ps = 1). 
 These results replicate the findings from Study 2 and lend support to the first two 
hypotheses. Default frugality was reported in the control group and this position was inverted 
by the video conditions. This inversion appears somewhat stronger when people generally are 
the hypocrisy target, as the moderate threshold has a notably greater effect compared to how 
it affects the self. However, it is worth mentioning that the group means suggest this effect is 
driven particularly by the initially stronger demand for frugality in the control group. This 
stronger demand for frugality, and the marginal interaction, together provides evidence that 
participants again demanded more of people generally than they did themselves, despite 
having already acknowledged their own should-actual discrepancies. There also appears to be 
a levelling off when comparing the high and extra-high thresholds, suggesting a potential 
ceiling effect. 
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Figure 3.21: Should-actual contrasts for t-shirts (Study 3); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
 For t-shirts, the mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of the ethical information 
video, F (3, 138) = 12.30, p < .001, partial η2 = .21 and a main effect of the hypocrisy target, 
F (1, 134) = 6.88, p = .01, partial η2 = .05 (see Figure 3.21). However, there was no 
significant interaction between video condition and hypocrisy target, F (3, 138) = 1.83, p = 
.15, partial η2 = .04. Pairwise comparisons revealed the control group significantly differed 
from each video condition (all ps < .01), but there were no differences between the video 
conditions (all ps > .90). This suggests the information in the video has inverted the initial 
frugality default, but the different thresholds have not had an impact upon participants’ 
perception of should-actual contrasts for either the self or people generally. 
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Figure 3.22: Should-actual contrasts for coffee (Study 3); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
 For coffee, the mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of the ethical information 
video, F (3, 93) = 6.25, p = .001, partial η2 = .17 but no main effect of the hypocrisy target, F 
(1, 93) < 1, p = .61, partial η2 < .01. The main effect of video condition was qualified by a 
significant interaction between video condition and hypocrisy target, F (3, 93) = 4.26, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .12. Separate one way ANOVAs were again run for both levels of hypocrisy 
target. For the self, there was a main effect of condition, F (3, 93) = 4.00, p = .01, partial η2 = 
.11. Post-hoc analyses support the confidence intervals displayed in Figure 3.22, as the 
control group differed from the extra-high threshold (p < .01) but not from the other video 
conditions (both ps > .15). For people generally there was also a main effect of condition, F 
(3, 93) = 7.24, p < .001, partial η2 = .19. Post-hoc analyses again support the confidence 
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intervals displayed in Figure 3.22, as the control group significantly differed from the 
moderate threshold (p < .01) and the high threshold (p < .001), but not the extra-high 
threshold (p = .17), whilst none of the video conditions differed from one another (all ps = 
.37). 
 These results again suggest that the videos differ in their impact upon what people 
think they themselves should do compared to what people generally should do. For 
purchasing coffee, the extra-high threshold was required to significantly shift should-actual 
perceptions for the self. However, for people generally, the moderate and high thresholds 
were effective. Interestingly, the extra-high threshold did not work for people generally. This 
supports the notion of a potential rebound effect being present in this context. 
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Beliefs about Charity Donation 
 
Figure 3.23: Should-actual contrasts for charity (Study 3); error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals 
 
No significant interactions or main effects were found for charity (all ps > .15). As 
with Study 2, the means suggest that the video may have had some impact for people 
generally, but if so, the effects are not strong enough to be detected here (see Figure 3.23). 
Moral Judgement 
A one way ANOVA revealed a main effect of video condition on the moral 
judgement of buying cheap jeans, F (3, 141) = 9.51, p < .001, partial η2 = .17. Further 
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analysis revealed participants thought the act was significantly less morally acceptable after 
seeing the moderate threshold video (M = 5.69; 95% CI [4.87, 6.50]), the high threshold 
video (M = 6.65; [5.86 7.44]) and the extra-high threshold (M = 6.54; [5.78, 7.30]), compared 
to the control group (M = 8.45; [7.74, 9.16]). Similar results were found for the cheap tea 
purchase, F (3, 141) = 6.47 p < .001, partial η2 = .12. Participants again thought the act was 
significantly more morally questionable after seeing the moderate threshold video (M = 5.81; 
[4.99, 6.64]), the high threshold video (M = 6.68; [5.87, 7.48]) and the extra-high threshold 
(M = 6.68; [5.91, 7.45]), compared to the control group (M = 8.17; [7.44, 8.89]). Similar to 
the previous two studies, the control group participants rated the behaviour as morally 
acceptable, whilst those who saw any of the ethical information videos moved close to the 
midpoint (neutral) of the scale. 
These data directly support the fourth hypothesis. Interestingly, as with Study 2, the 
moderate threshold carried the strongest impact. In contrast to shifting perceptions of should-
actual behaviour, it is possible that lower-moderate thresholds make the possibility of acting 
ethically more attainable and thus the action of acting in an ethically questionable manner as 
more wrong. Nonetheless, the present data offer only partial support for this speculation; this 
issue is hence an interesting avenue for future consideration. 
Estimate of Average Jeans Spend 
A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of video condition on the estimated purchase 
price of an average pair of jeans, F (3, 141) < 1, p = .63, partial η2 = .01. Unlike the previous 
studies, there was no indication that the manipulation had changed the perceived average 
spending on jeans. 
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Study 3 Summary 
 The results supported the four hypotheses. Default frugality was again the norm and 
once more inverted by making ethical issues of production salient. The effect of thresholds 
suggests that this inversion required a lower threshold to be effective for changing 
participants’ perceptions of what people generally should do, compared to changing what 
they should do themselves, although the pattern for coffee was notably different from the 
other findings in this and the previous two studies. Furthermore, within each purchasing 
decision, the control groups also demanded greater frugality from people generally than they 
did themselves. These effects suggest consistent findings of inter-personal hypocrisy, 
including when the items are part of a within-participants design. A ceiling effect of ethical 
demands seems present, given the high and extra-high thresholds almost always carried the 
same effect. However, evidence for a rebound effect is limited, as the extra-high threshold 
did not significantly differ from the high threshold in any of the analyses. Cheap purchasing 
was seen as more acceptable in the control group compared to each of the video conditions. 
General Discussion 
 Across three studies, I have demonstrated several reliable effects that represent an 
interesting first foray into the relationship between anchoring, hypocrisy and ethical 
consumption. An initially surprising finding that consistently prevailed was the default 
frugality shown by participants in each control group. This default position was reliably 
inverted by videos that made ethical issues salient. However, there were two particularly 
important moderating influences. Firstly, effects of frugality and ethical concern were 
stronger for people generally than for the self. Secondly, the inversion towards ethical 
concern was stronger when a higher anchor was used. Additionally, the anchors did not 
moderate the harsher moral judgements provided by participants who saw any of the videos. 
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These findings were produced in a student sample (Studies 1 & 2) and then replicated in a 
community sample (Study 3). Discoveries of secondary interest included the shift to more 
self-transcendent value instantiations (Study 2) and the interaction between hypocrisy target 
and video manipulation on identification with, and attitudes towards, humanity (Study 1). 
 This research thus offers a number of novel findings. Firstly, people have a default 
position of frugality if asked to contrast ought and actual behaviour in consumption. With 
hindsight, it is plausible to suggest that these participants saw the should-actual contrasts as a 
test of hedonistic urges, fitting with research linking guilt and consumption (Dahl et al., 
2003). However, there was no a priori reason to think the majority of participants would 
frame the should-actual contrast in this way. This default position neatly represents one side 
of the tension that people often feel when it comes to ethical consumption: the need to 
minimise spending (Bray et al., 2011). 
The frugality position also showed both forms of hypocrisy at play. Firstly the 
unexpected should-actual gap represented an initial acceptance of intra-personal hypocrisy. 
Secondly, the suggestion that the gap is bigger for people generally, compared to the self, 
revealed inter-personal hypocrisy. Before even considering the ethical component of 
consumption, or anchoring, it is therefore clear that hypocrisy is prevalent in consumption 
attitudes. Also of interest, a positive attitude to frugality could prove effective in promoting 
pro-environmental behaviour (Fujii, 2006), so this concept alone is worthy of further 
attention. 
 The videos that made ethical issues of cheap clothing salient consistently inverted this 
position. After viewing these videos, participants tended to indicate that they should spend 
more on consumer items. The effects spilled over from clothing to tea and coffee, but to a 
much lesser extent to charity donations (only Study 1). This suggests a boundary condition of 
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the manipulation, reflected by the decrease in semantic similarity (Mussweiler & Strack, 
2001b) between the video information and the topic of charitable donations. Although 
poverty and social justice themes were present, the video was more about considering the 
ethics of consumption, rather than about directly helping others. Intra-personal hypocrisy in 
the video conditions usually represented a desire to devote more resources to avoid unethical 
production processes, rather than a desire to be frugal. Inter-personal hypocrisy was also 
present, as the effects throughout the studies were stronger for “people generally”, even when 
the items were collapsed into a repeated measures design (Studies 2 & 3). Put simply, the 
participants’ response to the ethical information was to adjust their own actions, but demand 
even greater change from others. 
 With regard to the anchoring effects, a higher plausible anchor was more effective 
than a moderate anchor and these effects spread from jeans to tea and coffee. In Study 3, the 
extra-high anchor appeared to mainly mimic the effects of the high anchor, thus suggesting 
participants were adjusting in a way that moved them to the boundary of plausibility (e.g., 
Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). Wegener and colleagues (2010) might predict that the extra-
high anchor would be less effective than the high or moderate anchors, consistent with their 
argument that extreme anchors will, upon elaboration, be seen as less persuasive than more 
moderate equivalents. The lack of an effect suggests instead that very high thresholds in 
ethical consumption are as likely to work as more plausible alternatives, notwithstanding 
some limitations discussed below. 
Inter-personal hypocrisy was also related to anchoring, as lower anchors were more 
effective for people generally, compared to the self. For instance, in both Studies 2 and 3, 
participants exposed to the ethical information and a moderate anchor did not differ from the 
control group in how much they thought they themselves should and actually spend on jeans, 
yet they did differ from the control group in how they thought people generally should and 
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actually act. It took a higher anchor to shift perceptions of what was required for the self. 
This provides the first evidence to illustrate an interaction between anchoring effects and 
hypocrisy. 
 The moral judgement vignettes showed one consistent effect. Those in the control 
conditions saw cheap purchasing as morally right, whereas those who saw any of the videos 
estimated cheap purchasing as roughly morally neutral. The size of the price anchors 
therefore did not influence the moral judgement of others. This finding could suggest the 
anchoring only affected the judgements that were matched in terms of metric compared to a 
moral judgement scale. That is, the anchors affected judgements of the pounds or dollars that 
participants would spend but not of the moral acceptability of another person’s behaviour. 
This result could also signify that only a low threshold for ethical purchases is sufficient to 
elicit moral concerns about purchase behaviour. At the same time, however, the general lack 
of moral condemnation suggests that participants were aware of the tensions people face 
between consuming ethically and acting in a financially prudent manner. 
 To summarise, it is clear that the tension between needs to be frugal and needs to act 
morally can be accessed via intra-personal hypocrisy measures. Furthermore, people 
demonstrate inter-personal hypocrisy both as a default position and as a position after social 
justice issues are made salient, even in a within-participants design.  
Limitations 
This set of novel studies ambitiously addressed a range of interrelated mechanisms, 
which inevitably means a number of limitations need to be considered alongside the initial 
findings. However, such caveats also open up many further questions of interest. 
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The first limitation to consider is the suitability of comparing the control and video 
conditions for the purchasing beliefs. Although participants were answering the same 
questions, the manipulation could encourage them to approach the items from qualitatively 
different perspectives. For example, those in the control groups appeared to see the should-
actual contrast as representative of frugality. Those who saw any of the ethical information 
videos were instead likely to see the should-actual contrast as representative of an ethical 
issue. It is thus important to consider whether it is appropriate to make the comparisons 
between the groups. An alternative is to compare the video condition to a zero baseline, 
instead of the control groups. By this I mean compare the effects of the manipulation to a 
should-actual contrast of zero, rather than using the should-actual contrast reported by the 
participants in the control groups. However, a zero baseline represents an artificial starting 
point for each variable which does not represent people’s actual psychological position. 
Furthermore, such a baseline measure cannot allow the initial differences between self and 
people generally to be accounted for. 
There are a number of further reasons to support the chosen method of analyses 
reported in my research. Firstly, some participants in the control conditions did appear to 
initially frame the contrast as one of ethical concern, as they suggested they should spend 
more than they actually do, even in the absence of any ethical information being made 
salient. Similarly, many participants did not shift to a position that they should spend more 
having seen the ethical information. So whilst the group means represent the overall patterns, 
they do not represent uniformity in direction of response. Essentially, default frugality and an 
inversion to ethical concerns are not represented across every condition and item, so any such 
reframing effects are far from universal. Secondly, as reflected by the moral judgement tasks, 
even in the ethical information video conditions participants still recognised competing 
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demands of frugality and morality. In combination with the reasons given in earlier 
discussion sections it thus seems valid to contrast the video conditions to the control groups. 
A second concern is the lack of an arbitrary anchor, as is the norm in a standard 
anchoring study. That is, previous anchoring research often describes the anchor as random 
and/or irrelevant to the judgement being made, so it is theoretically illogical for the 
participants to use it. However, the fundamental interest of this research was to see how 
people respond when challenged to do a little or a lot in a pro-social context. It was thus not 
theoretically useful to present the anchor as random or arbitrary. However, this means that 
effects relating to the jeans item could be due in part to participants recalling the “correct” 
answer for how much they themselves should spend. A quick analysis shows only 24 of 155 
(15%) participants used this strategy and, in each condition, apart from the extra-high anchor, 
some participants reported a figure even higher than the threshold provided. This suggests the 
majority of the participants used the anchor simply as a guide, as I intended. There is also no 
reason to suggest those who did use the anchor provided were making an incoherent estimate 
for their situation. Additionally, the reason I assessed a range of items with different prices 
was to ensure the effects I reported were not simply due to specific use of the provided price 
anchors for jeans. 
A related point is the use of the extra-high anchor in Study 3. It was the only 
condition in either of the anchoring studies where participants did not suggest a “should” 
value beyond the given threshold. In combination with the qualitative feedback mentioned 
earlier, this result suggests that the extra-high anchor was indeed at the edge of plausibility. 
However, it was certainly not completely implausible, so I cannot use the data here to suggest 
what would happen if a completely implausible anchor (e.g. £10,000 for a pair of jeans) was 
used in this study design. It may be that this would undermine the credibility of the entire 
video and potentially the study itself. Such effects could produce the attenuation response that 
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attitudinal research predicts for extreme anchors (Wegener et al., 2010), but perhaps more 
worryingly may even stop the participants taking the research seriously. 
Future Research Ideas 
The confluence of anchoring, hypocrisy and ethical consumption has produced some 
fascinating first findings, but more research is required before robust conclusions can be 
drawn. The links between anchoring, hypocrisy and morality open up wider areas of interest. 
For example, uncertainty (Milkman, 2012), product attributes (Luchs, Naylor, Irwin & 
Ranghunathan, 2010), knowledge (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000), thresholds for action 
(MacCoun, 2012), perceived agency (Antonetti & Maklan, 2014), emotional state (Polman & 
Ruttan, 2013; Ruedy, Moore, Gino & Schweitzer, 2013), concern for sustainability 
(Balderjahn et al., 2013), group identity (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007) and ethical identity 
(Sparks & Shepherd, 1992; Oh & Yoon, 2014) are all highly relevant constructs that have 
been shown to relate directly to ethical intentions. Integration of these variables into research 
on anchors and hypocrisy would therefore add to our understanding of how anchoring, 
hypocrisy and ethical behaviour interact. 
Given this diversity of potential research paths, I therefore present the following ideas 
as a mere subset of future directions that are worth pursuing. Firstly, it would be worth 
evaluating the effects of anchoring and hypocrisy in a between-participants design. Although 
my findings indicate a remarkable willingness to report inter-personal hypocrisy in a within-
participants design, it is likely that such effects will be stronger when participants respond to 
questions about themselves or people in general in separate conditions. The between-
participants design may also be more ecologically valid, as people are rarely asked to 
explicitly consider should-actual contrasts for the self and others concurrently, though 
perhaps such comparisons do take place more implicitly, in a normative sense. 
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 Future work could also analyse similar datasets in combination with other potentially 
explanatory factors. For example, noting how thresholds work in relation to individual 
differences. Advice tends to be used when it is already close to current perceptions (Yaniv, 
2004), so baseline measures of existing beliefs and knowledge relating to ethical situations 
could help explain when different thresholds are more effective. Gender analyses are also of 
interest, given the potential perception of ethical consumption as a more feminine activity 
(Shang & Peloza, 2015). Although no effects of gender were found in my research, it is 
possible an individual’s attitudes towards ethical consumption in general could be a useful 
additional predictor. Finally, should and actual responses could be evaluated separately, to 
note which measure is more prone to movement. However, this might be more appropriate if 
the data are collected in a manner that makes the contrast less explicit. 
 Existing research suggests a range of other mechanisms that could illuminate the 
anchoring effects further. For example, a construal level approach (Trope & Liberman, 2010) 
could increase the perceived temporal distance of the ethical commitment to see if this 
increases the impact of the higher anchors, as more distant future choices tend to carry a 
greater attachment to “should” over “want” responses (Rogers & Bazerman, 2008). A power 
manipulation could be used to see if this reduces the impact of the higher anchors, given 
higher feelings of power have been shown to produce less ethical decision making (Dubois et 
al., 2015). Cognitive load has been shown to impact upon anchoring judgements in several, 
sometimes opposing, ways (Wegener et al., 2010), and manipulating this factor could show 
the extent to which anchors in an ethical domain are susceptible to such effects. This is 
particularly important, given how often ethical information is presented in a context of 
competing distractions. 
Finally, national contexts drive different perceptions of ethical consumption (e.g. 
Ariztía et al., 2014; Varul, 2009), so the relationships studied here need validation in a wider 
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range of cultural settings. It is important to acknowledge that ethical concerns are also 
affected by their social context (Starr, 2009) and psychological mechanisms relating to 
concerns regarding sustainability therefore need to be understood at a group level and not just 
with a focus on individual moral responsibility (Akenji, 2014; Low & Davenport, 2007; 
Markowitz, Grasso & Jamieson, 2015; Moisander, 2007; Papaoikonomou et al., 2012). This 
socially focused approach fits with Bandura’s (1999) suggestion that moral safeguards need 
to be considered at the level of social systems. 
I have suggested a variety of future research ideas because this exploratory line of 
work opens up many avenues of interest. The issue of ethical consumption is an area that has 
attracted a lot of research outside of psychology, yet the need for further psychological 
explanations of how ethical information is perceived, elaborated upon and acted upon is 
clear. The combination of established socio-cognitive findings relating to anchoring and 
hypocrisy, and the associated experiments reported above, have shown one potential pathway 
for pursuing a greater psychological understanding of how people try to act pro-socially in a 
globalised and complex marketplace. Additionally, it is worth noting that life satisfaction and 
pro-environmental consumption have been shown to correlate, even controlling for 
demographic factors and environmental attitudes (Welsch & Kuhling, 2010). If we can thus 
understand further how hypocrisy works in the realm of consumption, there are potential 
benefits for producers, consumers and the wider world. 
Conclusion 
  Ethical consumption is an important representation of pro-social behaviour, as it can 
act as a daily reminder of how our actions have an impact on the environment and the people 
involved in production. My research suggests that setting the bar comparatively high can lead 
to a greater perceived gap between should and actual behaviour, which in part reflects a 
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greater concern for others. Alongside this core finding, the higher thresholds for ethical 
consumption work differently in judgements of how the self should behave, in contrast to 
how others should behave. These are tentative findings and much further work needs to be 
done if we are to guide policy in this area. However, given that price is often reported as the 
primary concern for those considering an ethical purchase (Bray et al., 2011) and that money 
is such a psychologically powerful concept (Zhou, Vohs & Baumeister, 2009), there is much 
merit in using monetary thresholds and ethical consumption as an ecologically valid research 
model for testing further the tensions between self and other concern. This is important 
research to push forward if we are to ensure consumption is working for, rather than against, 
human needs, as Stearns (2006), and I, would encourage. 
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Chapter 4: Complexity and Moral Judgement 
Introduction 
  When Alan Perlis (1982), the acclaimed computer scientist and inaugural winner of 
the Alan Turing award, was asked for a series of epigrams reflecting his experiences in 
developing programming languages, he came up with several relating to complexity, 
including: “Fools ignore complexity. Pragmatists suffer it. Some can avoid it. Geniuses 
remove it.” (p. 10). The general introduction outlined how changing social contexts can lead 
to radically diverse and increasingly complex challenges for humanity. This chapter 
investigates the extent to which we need to understand complexity and its relationship with 
moral judgement further. 
Baumeister (1987) and Cushman (1990) contrasted different historical periods from 
within the last ten centuries, but both made the point that comparatively rapid industrial, 
technological and social change has presented problems for self-identity. It is important to 
consider how such problems for the self may also point towards problems for moral 
judgement, particularly given the potential for strong links between self-definition and moral 
identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Part of the problematisation described in historical 
treatments of self-identity relate to the diffusion of social impact. Essentially, we now live 
within social structures where our thoughts and actions are broader in scope than ever before. 
We no longer live in small and isolated communities, where our own and others’ actions and 
consequences were easier to comprehend. From the perspective of SCMT, there is thus a 
potential mismatch between our desire to understand moral responsibility in social contexts, 
and our current social structures, which contain levels of complexity that prevent simple 
analyses of how people can have an impact on the world. Figure 4.1 below, models this issue 
in relation to this chapter. 
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Figure 4.1: Model of SCMT to explain how complexity can problematise moral judgement. 
There is an important potential philosophical debate about whether societal 
complexity is reliant on moral complexity. Edwards (1975) suggests a relativistic approach, 
whereby different Kohlbergian moral stages are suitable for face-to-face communities, 
compared to nation states. The oft-used contrast in academic literature between developing 
and developed societies clearly implies one group is the finished product, whilst the other 
group is heading towards the same destination but is yet to complete its journey. This 
assumption may well be problematic. For instance, Edwards’ analysis of the historical 
evidence is notably less absolute, with the emphasis placed on different ways of moral 
thinking being more or less appropriate for different types of social system. Regardless of 
which perspective is taken, there still remains the question as to the extent to which there is 
an identifiable relationship between the complexity of a social system and judgements of 
morality. 
 This issue is also relevant to how people conceptualise challenges that face societies. 
Narvaez (2010) outlined both the massive scale and complexity of the challenges that face 
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humanity today. Whilst history can offer some examples of how collective action and public 
policy have been utilised effectively to overcome relatively complex issues, such as 
infectious diseases and sanitation infrastructure in Victorian Britain (Gill, 2000), the need for 
international cooperation on contemporary issues such as climate change, financial regulation 
and extreme poverty appears to require an unprecedented scale of coordination. The sheer 
temporal and psychological distance between cause and effect may well hinder individual and 
collective action on such issues, driven alongside the lack of urgent moral intuition that issues 
such as climate change appear to generate (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). However, an even 
bigger factor that may make such problems appear difficult to solve, is the high level of 
perceived complexity that accompanies them. 
This complexity is important because it has been argued collective issues can be 
addressed only when people recognise their part in how the problems arise. Ostrom (2014) 
suggested that shared resource dilemmas can often be solved by giving control to the users of 
the resource, rather than allowing them to be simply managed by national government 
agencies or private companies. Furthermore, she suggested a similar approach could work for 
large-scale issues such as climate change, with responsibility being spread across local, 
regional and national levels, though she recognised the greater difficulty such an approach 
has at a truly global level (Ostrom, 2009). A core part of her approach, however, requires that 
participants recognise that they are part of the complex resource system, making it vital to 
understand further how complexity affects our moral judgement processes. 
 To tackle this question about complexity and moral judgement, this chapter will 
summarise research concerning moral judgement and causation, as well as considering the 
specific domain of blame. It will also address the relevant dispositional construct of 
attributional complexity (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson & Reeder, 1986). The 
focus will reside at a broader level of analysis compared to the majority of theoretical 
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approaches in this domain. This will allow me to outline how a greater understanding of 
perceptions of complexity might help contribute to explanations concerning many of the 
more specific findings relating to moral decision-making. The principal hypothesis is that the 
more a process is perceived as complex, the more lenient people will be in their moral 
judgements of that process. 
The literatures on causality and cognition, attribution of responsibility, intentionality, 
moral judgement and blame are all hence relevant. However, their theoretical perspectives 
often have different foci and are thus not easily integrated. Fortunately, my aim is simply to 
outline how a broader understanding of the relationship between complexity and morality can 
inform each of these literatures. Cushman (2008) noted how he used “moral judgement” as an 
umbrella term to capture evaluations that refer to each of the concepts described above, 
whilst also acknowledging how such concepts notably differ. I use a similar approach to 
consider moral judgement in the present research. 
Moral Judgement and Causation 
 Humans naturally construct directional relationships from cause to effect in order to 
understand real-world processes (Sloman & Lagnado, 2015). The central aspect of the 
research described in this chapter is to consider whether causal chains that are perceived as 
more complex lead to changes in moral judgements, which in turn produce differences in 
willingness to act.  
 Haidt’s (2001) seminal research initially challenged the traditionally rationalist 
approaches to moral judgement by highlighting the role of intuition and social influence, 
while acknowledging the role of reasoning processes (Greene & Haidt, 2002). The 
importance of both intuition and reasoning was later reflected in Greene’s (2007) dual-
process theory of moral judgement, which portrays a representation of moral decision-making 
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that has been prominent in recent research. This theory suggests that moral judgements can 
be made via deliberative cognitive appraisals or via more intuitive gut instincts. The extent to 
which the dual processes concerned are in conflict or may coexist continues to be debated 
today (Cushman, 2013). However, there does appear to be a relationship between both 
processes and utilitarian vs. deontological decision making. Utilitarian decision-making tends 
to focus on the outcome of the act, whereas deontological decision-making tends to focus on 
the moral facets of the act itself. There is evidence that deliberative thinking facilitates 
utilitarian responding, whilst deontological responses are more likely following the activation 
of intuitive and automatic processes (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen, 2008). 
Importantly, recent evidence suggests deontological and utilitarian judgements are not in 
opposition, as many experimental studies necessarily placed them, and are instead 
independent from one another (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). 
This independence is a factor in the present research. Whereas most of the scenarios 
created in moral psychology utilise the distinction between utilitarian and deontological 
judgements, the present research was aimed at utilising a judgement scenario wherein both 
deontological and utilitarian judgements could support either position in the scenario. This is 
also useful, given the tendency for much psychological research to conflate optimal moral 
behaviour and utilitarianism (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). As shown below, I focused on a non-
hypothetical context (investment banking) wherein utilitarian and deontological perspectives 
could argue for the same decisions. The key issue in these scenarios was the perceived 
complexity of the connections between actions and consequences.  
 If increasing complexity does discourage deliberation, then increased cognitive load 
should decrease utilitarian responding (Greene et al., 2008). However, there are current 
disagreements as to whether cognitive load also affects deontological judgements (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013). Related to this, indirect and direct relationships between cause and effect 
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are likely to be judged differently, in part because indirect situations often also require more 
cognitive elaboration. For instance, installing deviance in the causal chain of hypothetical 
immoral actions has been shown to reduce assigned moral responsibility to the individual 
agent (Pizarro, Uhlmann & Bloom, 2003). Similar effects of directness on agency can be 
found when participants evaluate situations involving harmful actions at a group level. 
Participants assigned less responsibility to an organisation that caused a rise in drug prices by 
selling them to another company, than one that imposed the price rises directly themselves 
(Paharia, Kassam, Greene & Bazerman, 2009). Additionally, coherence between the agent 
and the action, such as heroes committing positive acts and villains committing negative acts, 
encourages greater attribution of intention (Hughes & Trafimow, 2014). Again, such 
coherence is likely to be correlated with less elaboration and cognitive load. 
An important limitation of the past research is that it does not address the concern that 
direct and coherent scenarios were simpler to digest than the indirect and incoherent 
scenarios. Hence any finding of reduced perceptions in moral responsibility may actually be 
due in part to the perceived complexity of the process involved, rather than actual differences 
in moral judgement. The indirect causal paths that attracted lower ratings of agency and 
moral responsibility described above might thus have done so because of the increased 
complexity of the situations involved. For example, a scenario that involves a second 
intermediary pharmaceutical company in the raising of a drug price is more complicated than 
one that involves just one company raising the price (Paharia et al., 2009). Similarly, a 
deliberate act of stabbing someone with a knife is much simpler to process than one in which 
the murderer is knocked by an on-coming jogger and yet still ends up stabbing his enemy 
(Pizarro et al., 2003). An interesting issue is therefore whether these effects could be 
explained, at least in part, via perceived complexity per se. Are people more willing to assign 
moral responsibility when the scenarios are seen as less complex? 
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 In order for responsibility for an outcome to be assigned, people need to perceive 
some element of causation between the agent or cause and the consequence. People will 
make assessments of probabilities of each part of a causal chain, which then result in an 
overall calculation of responsibility (Spellman, 1997). Manipulations that affect the causal 
chain will thus change attributions of responsibility. For example, perceptions of moral 
responsibility can be attenuated for an agent who commits immoral acts under situational 
constraints brought about by a third party (Phillips & Shaw, 2014). As with the previous 
research concerning directness however, the issue of complexity is again raised. The 
inclusion of a third party introduces a higher degree of complexity which could explain some 
of the reduction in attributed responsibility. 
 A final relevant area of research examines the side effects of actions. In an influential 
study, Knobe (2003) found that participants were willing to assign greater intentionality to a 
chief executive who implemented a new program that had the inadvertent side-effect of 
causing harm to the environment than when it inadvertently helped the environment. This 
finding suggested the valence of the side effect could alter the initial intentionality 
judgement, even when the statement of intention was identical. Recent research suggests the 
effect is actually generated because the idiosyncratic nature of the scenarios effectively shifts 
the focus of the participants between the initial action and the side effect (Laurent, Clark & 
Schweitzer, 2015). Laurent and colleagues (2015) point out how some scenarios are 
inherently more intuitive than others and such differences can confound explanations of 
altered intentionality judgements. This argument fits with the hypothesis that perceived 
complexity of a process can impact upon several different components that contribute to a 
moral judgement. In real-world situations, unintended and often unforeseen side effects 
nearly always accompany everyday decision-making. Indeed it is difficult to think of a 
realistic moral scenario where such effects do not arise. Accordingly, the present research 
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probed whether moral judgements of agents causing side effects could be influenced via 
perceived complexity, regardless of the valence of the side effect, which was held consistent 
across conditions. 
Blame 
 Since Heider’s (1958) initial work outlined several factors relevant to attribution of 
responsibility, a number of models of blame have been suggested (e.g. Alicke, 2000; 
Cushman, 2008; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Mikula, 2003; Shaver, 1985). 
According to Malle et al. (2014) blame is a concept that carries both a social element of 
expression, as well as a cognitive element of judgement, and it is distinguishable from the 
broader notion of moral judgement. For instance, Malle and colleagues’ (2014) recent theory 
of blame explicitly outlined the need to consider blame as a construct separable from anger, 
judgements of wrongness and attributions of responsibility. 
Each of the models noted above present evidence describing conditions that are 
necessary for blame to occur, relating to aspects such as intentionality, causality, 
foreseeability, obligation, character, outcome and norms (for a review, see Malle et al., 2014). 
The differences are not relevant here, but there are some elements of the models that are 
pertinent to the core hypothesis tested in this chapter. For example, Cushman (2008) suggests 
wrongness judgements arise via an assessment of intentions, whereas judgements of blame 
require both intention and causality to be considered present. He also delineated between 
belief and desire in intentionality. He suggested that belief an outcome may occur is more 
important than the desire that it does, when it comes to assigning blameworthiness. 
Additionally, he provided evidence to show that people were judged more leniently when 
they tried, but failed, to cause harm, if the victim happened to suffer from an independent 
source (compared to if they simply tried and failed). He suggested this showed evidence of 
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“blame blocking”, whereby individuals look for alternative causes of the harmful outcome 
and thus reduce attributions relating to the agent’s intentions. However, similar to the 
research regarding moral judgement, these scenarios of blameworthiness differ in complexity. 
The situation where a perpetrator intends to cause harm directly, but fails, is simpler to 
understand than a situation where the perpetrator intends to cause harm, fails, but the victim 
then hurts themselves by some alternative means. Again, this shows the need to consider the 
complexity of the scenarios being presented to participants as a potential factor of 
importance. 
Additionally, none of the prior research has manipulated perceived complexity by 
altering causal chains without changing the information presented. Perhaps the closest 
methodological match is research that found participants assigned greater blame to actions 
that occurred later in a causal chain than earlier, by simply switching the location of events in 
the chain (Lagnado & Channon, 2008), again keeping the actual information presented 
consistent. However, it is also feasible to keep the information and order consistent, which I 
aimed to do in this series of studies. 
Attributional Complexity 
 Given my interest in manipulating the perceived complexity of a causal chain, I 
wanted to check whether any effects would be moderated by individual differences relating to 
attributional preferences. The Attributional Complexity (AC) scale (Fletcher et al., 1986) 
measures the extent to which people report a preference for simple or complex explanations 
for human behaviour. Related studies have found that AC is somewhat lower as people age, 
but higher among people who are higher in trait openness (Hess, Osowski & Leclerc, 2005). 
Young adolescents who scored highly on the scale have demonstrated greater social 
competence (Sultan & Hagger, 2014) and students with higher scores also scored more highly 
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on components of emotional intelligence (Fitness & Curtis, 2005), showed greater positive 
social skills (Fast, Reimer & Funder, 2008) and used a more postconventional style of moral 
judgement (Derryberry, Wilson, Snyder, Norman & Barger 2005). Professionals with higher 
levels of AC also demonstrated greater transformational leadership skills (Sun & Anderson, 
2012). AC is therefore associated with a diverse range of factors relevant to morality and 
decision making.  
Another individual differences measure relevant to AC is Need for Cognition (NFC; 
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). This construct reflects the tendency to seek out and enjoy effortful 
cognitive tasks. AC and NFC are moderately positively correlated (Fletcher et al., 1986). 
Accordingly, NFC was also included in the first study, in case it offered greater explanatory 
power. 
Present Research 
Models of blame and evidence regarding moral judgement and causation have thus 
advanced our knowledge greatly in terms of why people are motivated to attribute 
responsibility for actions. However, the question of how perceived complexity plays a role in 
these findings remains unanswered. People have a general preference for logical, coherent 
and intuitive explanations (Hughes & Traifmow, 2014), which could arguably be represented 
in part by greater simplicity. The previous sections have explicated how different models 
suggest a range of processes as potentially responsible for moral decision making, and how 
complexity might add to the explanatory power of many of these theoretical positions. 
Methodologically I also sought to use the novel approach of keeping the information and 
order of the cause-effect chain consistent in my manipulation and I wanted to offer a more 
ecologically valid context within which to embed the research. 
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Much of the research cited above follows a common methodology of presenting 
hypothetical moral scenarios that manipulate factors such as coherence, utilitarian or 
deontological framing and agent status (e.g. Amit & Greene, 2012; Conway & Gawronski, 
2013; Greene et al., 2008). The most well-known example of these is the trolley dilemma. In 
this scenario, participants must choose between doing nothing and thus allowing a trolley to 
continue its path to kill multiple people, or intervening in one of various ways to save the 
group, but sacrificing an innocent victim as a result. These scenarios are useful in the 
experimental control they offer. For example, they have helped to isolate the role of 
embodied cognition in moral judgement by showing the specific impermissibility of 
intervening with personal force (Greene et al., 2009). Similarly, such dilemmas have shown 
the comparative acceptability of intervening at the point of the agent (trolley), but not at the 
patient (innocent victim) (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). However, the price of this control is 
ecological validity. Researchers within the field now call for researchers to consider methods 
that do not rely on simple written scenarios but rather address more realistic situations that 
people might face (Hughes & Trafimow, 2014). Furthermore, the wording of scenarios is 
crucial and contrasts that initially appear academically well-defined may actually represent 
radically different interpretations by participants (Laurent et al., 2015). Thus for several 
reasons, the present research aimed to use a video presentation of a real-world issue to test 
broad moral judgements, keeping the relevant causal chain of information consistent across 
conditions. Using a video, rather than text, to convey the manipulation also helped to reflect 
the likely consumption of such information in the real world and enhance participant interest. 
Accordingly I chose the topic of financial speculation in food markets (for an 
overview of the issue see Wahl, 2009). Ethical finances are an area of ethical consumerism 
that is vastly understudied at present (Lotz & Fix, 2014). Financial speculation in the food 
markets is morally debatable because it causes volatility in food prices, which can then 
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increase starvation in poorer countries (Spratt, 2013). Moreover, financial speculation is a 
context that is useful in a number of ways. Firstly, financial speculation in food markets is a 
contemporary real world issue that carries enough controversy to be morally stimulating. 
Secondly, it has ambiguous intentional elements throughout the causal chain, which are more 
realistic than standard scenario-based studies (e.g., trolley paradigm). Thirdly, financial 
speculation in food markets was likely to be a novel topic to most participants, thereby 
helping to avoid effects of knowledge and identity (Kahan, 2015). Fourthly, the topic made it 
possible to explain simple and complex alternatives within a short manipulation.  
 The principal hypothesis of this research was that increased perceptions of complexity 
would lead to greater lenience in moral judgements. Of secondary interest, was whether any 
such shifts in moral judgement would then impact on a willingness to act. As with my 
conceptualisation of moral judgement, the exploratory nature of this research necessarily 
placed my interest in people’s intentions at a broad level. Alongside the measures of moral 
judgement and responsibility, I thus also took measures relating to self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1977), collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000), personal action and collective action tendencies 
(van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach, 2004). 
Study 1 
  To explore the ideas outlined above, the first hypothesis to test was whether 
increased perceptions of complexity would lead to greater ratings of the acceptability of food 
speculation. Secondly, I wanted to test whether any such increases in complexity would 
directly or indirectly (via moral judgement) lower participants’ willingness to take relevant 
personal action. Additionally, I wanted to test the role of AC (Fletcher et al., 1986) and NFC 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) as potentially influential dispositional measures. I did not have a 
specific hypothesis in terms of how the individual differences measures might interact with 
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the relationship between perceived complexity and moral judgement, but I wanted to capture 
them as part of this initial exploratory analysis. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 40 individuals (31 women, 9 men) known to the researcher who 
took part for entry into a prize draw. They were between 18 and 55 years of age (M = 24). 
Participants completed the study on a laptop computer in a location that was convenient for 
them. The data were collected by a research assistant. 
Excluded Participants 
 Two participants were excluded for reporting high levels of previous knowledge 
about food speculation. I set the cut-off point as 9 or higher on the 1-11 scale described in the 
procedure section. One participant was excluded for being a notable outlier on the two 
manipulation check measures10. 
Design 
 A 2-level between-participants design was used. Participants were randomly allocated 
to either the simple or complex condition and then completed the dependent measures.  
Procedure 
 Following an instructions page, participants saw either the simple or complex version 
of the video. They were then asked to confirm they were able to see and hear the video. The 
                                                          
10 A linear regression assessing perceived model complexity and understanding of the video 
identified this individual case as an outlier with a Cook’s distance of greater than 1 (see Field, 
2013). 
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manipulation check items and dependent variables were then presented. Next, participants 
were given the knowledge check and they then completed the AC and NFC scales. 
Participants then completed an item asking them how much they knew about food 
speculation prior to the study and demographic items assessing their age and gender. Having 
completed the study, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked for their 
time.  
Manipulation Checks 
 Two manipulation checks were used. The primary check asked participants to rate the 
complexity of the model they saw; answers were provided on a scale from 1 (very simple) 
through 6 (neutral) to 11 (very complex). The secondary check asked them to rate how easy it 
was to understand the video in general; answers were provided on a scale from 1 (very 
difficult) through 6 (neutral) to 11 (very easy). 
Experimental Manipulation 
 Participants saw a two-minute presentation of text and images specifically prepared 
for these studies. The first half of the video provided a brief summary of the process of food 
speculation, mentioning the positive economic effects and potential ethical issues involved. 
The second half of the video presented a flowchart style model of the process (see Appendix 
J). The model contained the following six pieces of information in sequential order: “Person 
A works for an investment bank; their job is to guess whether the price of a foodstuff (e.g. 
wheat) will go up or down; this speculation makes the price of the foodstuff more volatile; 
i.e. it goes up and down more than it would without this action; more volatile prices make 
food unaffordable for millions of people; this leads to increased hunger for millions of people 
in the developing world”.  
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In the simple condition (Foad, 2013g), participants were told the model was “quite 
simple” and the presented model included three steps. In the complex condition (Foad, 
2013h) participants were told the model was “quite complicated” and the presented model 
included six steps. Importantly, the information in the causal chain of the two models was 
always identical, because the six steps (complex model) simply disaggregated information 
presented in the three steps (simple model). To be precise, the simple model added the first 
and second, third and fourth, and fifth and sixth pieces of information outlined above, into 
individual steps. Additional boxes in the complex model (represented by dashed lines in 
Appendix J) were added in the last few seconds of the video. These boxes were introduced as 
being other factors that are relevant to the model, however, they were not described further 
and the video did not encourage attention to be paid to their content. Their role was thus 
simply to increase the perception of complexity of the model. Both models were on screen for 
the same amount of time and used exactly the same voiceover.  
Dependent Measures 
 Moral judgement of food speculation was assessed with two items. The first asked 
participants to rate the action of speculating on food markets and the second asked them to 
rate the morality of “Person A” from the video they had seen. Answers were provided on a 
scale from 1 (morally wrong) through 6 (morally neutral) to 11 (morally right). Two further 
items tested how acceptable participants thought it was for financial institutions to influence 
the price of food and to make money from speculating on food markets. These items were 
designed to assess how participants perceived the role of the organisation in such processes. 
Answers were again provided on a scale from 1 (completely unacceptable) through 6 
(neutral) to 11 (completely acceptable). A final item asked participants the extent to which 
they would be interested in moving their bank account to a financial institution that chooses 
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not to make money from food speculation. Answers were provided on a scale from 1 (not at 
all interested) through 6 (somewhat interested) to 11 (definitely interested). 
Knowledge Check 
Participants were given a multiple choice question regarding an amount of money 
mentioned in the video. Participants were asked “How many pounds did the video suggest 
Barclays made on average per year from speculating on food markets?”. They were asked to 
select from eight options ranging from £1 million to £423 million. The correct answer was 
£340 million. 
Individual Differences 
 Two individual differences measures were used to assess participants’ Attributional 
Complexity (AC; see Appendix K), using the 28-item scale (Fletcher et al., 1986), and Need 
for Cognition (NFC; see Appendix L), using the 45 item scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The 
AC scale includes items such as “I think a lot about the influence that society has on my 
behaviour and personality” and “I really enjoy analysing the reasons or causes for people’s 
behaviour”. There are 14 reverse-coded items. The scale forms a single factor and displayed 
good reliability (α = .91). Answers were provided on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). The NFC scale includes item such as “I really enjoy a task that involves 
coming up with new solutions to problems” and “I believe that if I think hard enough, I will 
be able to achieve my goals in life”. There are 23 reverse-coded items. The scale forms a 
single factor and displayed good reliability (α = .91). 
Knowledge about Food Speculation 
Participants rated their knowledge about food speculation prior to the study, using a 
scale from 1 (none) through 6 (a little) to 11 (a lot). 
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Results and Discussion 
Only 23 of the 37 participants passed (62%) passed the knowledge check question. 
This suggests the item difficulty was too high to use as a basic check and instead represents 
an indicator of level of attention and involvement with regards to the manipulation. The 
success rates were similar in future studies and the two groups show some interesting 
discrepancies. Accordingly, for consistency of presentation, I present results both for the 
whole sample and for the subset who passed the knowledge check in each study. The 
differing performance in relation to the knowledge check will be revisited in the general 
discussion.  
A series of preliminary regression analyses showed neither of the individual 
difference measures (AC and NFC) interacted with the manipulation for either the 
manipulation checks or the moral judgement items, with the exception of one interaction with 
attributional complexity in Study 2. For this reason and for the sake of brevity, these 
individual differences are not included in the analyses described below. 
Manipulation Checks 
As expected, the two manipulation check items were negatively correlated (r = -.61, 
95% BCa CI [-.79, -.38], p < .001). This shows a strong relationship between the perceived 
complexity of the model presented and a broader measure capturing how well participants 
felt they understood the whole video. Despite the strong correlation, I analysed the impact of 
the manipulation on each item separately to provide the most thorough test of the 
effectiveness of the manipulation. 
For the whole sample, the model in the complex video was seen as significantly more 
complex (M = 5.74, SE = 0.63) than the simple model (M = 2.28, SE = 0.39), mean difference 
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= 3.46, BCa 95% CI [1.93, 4.99], t(35) = 4.60, p < .001, d = 1.55. Similarly, for participants 
who passed the knowledge check, the complex video was seen as significantly more complex 
(M = 4.82, SE = 0.84) than the simple model (M = 1.75, SE = 0.35), mean difference = 3.07, 
[1.23, 4.90], t(21) = 3.48, p < .01, d = 1.52. In both samples, the means in each condition 
were below the mid-point of the scale, so neither the complex nor the simple models were 
rated as particularly complex. 
 For the whole sample, the complex video was seen as significantly less easy to 
understand (M = 7.42, SE = 0.49) than the simple model (M = 9.17, SE = 0.36), mean 
difference = -1.75, [-2.99, -0.50], t(35) = -2.85, p = .01, d = -0.96. Similarly, for participants 
who passed the knowledge check, the complex video was seen as marginally significantly 
less easy to understand (M = 7.64, SE = 0.68) than the simple model (M = 9.33, SE = 0.50), 
mean difference = -1.70, [-3.43, 0.03], t(35) = -2.04, p = .05, d = -0.89. In both samples, the 
means in each condition were above the mid-point of the scale. This suggests the video was 
relatively easy to understand in general and that the manipulation simply attenuated the 
strength of understanding in the complex condition. 
Together, these results confirm the effectiveness of the manipulation. The effect sizes 
all appear large and thus suggest a substantial impact of the manipulation.  
Moral Judgement 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition tended to rate speculation 
on food markets as more morally right (M = 4.95, SE = 0.35) than participants in the simple 
condition (M = 4.17, SE = 0.38), but this difference was not statistically significant, mean 
difference = 0.78, [-0.28, 1.84], t(35) = 1.50, p = .14, though the effect was of a medium size, 
d = 0.51. Similarly, for those who passed the knowledge check, participants in the complex 
condition tended to rate speculation on food markets as more morally right (M = 4.91, SE = 
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0.42) than participants in the simple condition (M = 4.50, SE = 0.49), but this difference was 
not statistically significant, mean difference = 0.41, [-0.93, 1.75], t(21) = 0.64, p = .53, and 
here the effect was small, d = 0.28. Each of the means was below the mid-point of the scale, 
suggesting a general condemnation of the process. 
With regard to judgements of the morality of Person A, the whole sample tended to 
rate the person as more morally right in the complex condition (M = 6.11, SE = 0.35) than in 
the simple condition (M = 5.11, SE = 0.40), although this difference did not quite reach the 
conventional threshold for reliability, mean difference = 0.99, [-0.09, 2.07], t(35) = 1.87, p = 
.07 and the effect was of a medium size, d = 0.63. For participants who passed the knowledge 
check, Person A was seen as more morally right in the complex condition (M = 6.36, SE = 
0.49) than in the simple condition (M = 4.75, SE = 0.48), and this difference was statistically 
significant, mean difference = 1.61, [0.19, 3.04], t(21) = 2.35, p = .03; the effect size was 
large, d = 1.03.  
Taken together, these results suggest that the manipulation of complexity had some 
impact on moral judgements, as predicted, although the effects are only significant when the 
question relates to Person A. It is conceivable that there are potentially different effects of 
manipulating complexity for the judgement of person and process, a point I revisit in the 
general discussion. 
Organisational Acceptability 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition tended to think it was 
more acceptable for financial institutions to influence the price of basic foodstuffs (M = 4.21, 
SE = 0.44), compared to participants in the simple condition (M = 3.67, SE = 0.41), but this 
difference was not statistically significant, mean difference = 0.54, [-0.69, 1.78], t(35) = 1.50, 
p = .38 and the effect size was small, d = 0.30. Similarly, for participants who passed the 
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knowledge check, those in the complex condition tended to think such behaviour was more 
acceptable (M = 4.36, SE = 0.45), compared to those in the simple condition (M = 3.75, SE = 
0.62), but again this difference was not statistically significant, mean difference = 0.61, [-
1.00, 2.23], t(21) = 0.79, p = .44 and the effect size was small, d = 0.34. 
 The same pattern of results presented itself for the reported acceptability of financial 
institutions making money from food speculation. For the whole sample, those in the 
complex condition tended to think food speculation was more acceptable (M = 4.53, SE = 
0.50), compared to those in the simple condition (M = 4.06, SE = 0.45), but this difference 
was not statistically significant, mean difference = 0.47, [-0.90, 1.84], t(35) = 0.70, p = .49, d 
= 0.24. For participants who passed the knowledge check, those in the complex condition 
tended to think it was more acceptable (M = 4.73, SE = 0.78), compared to those in the 
simple condition (M = 4.08, SE = 0.69), but this difference was also not statistically 
significant, mean difference = 0.64, [-1.48, 2.23], t(21) = 0.63, p = .53, d = 0.28. 
 Each of these trends are in line with the moral judgement items: participants in the 
complex condition reported higher levels of organisational acceptability when it comes to 
food speculation. However, none of the results are statistically significant and cannot thus 
conclusively support the principal hypothesis. 
Personal Action 
 As with the moral acceptability items, the items tapping interest in taking direct 
personal action were in the direction expected but are not statistically significant. For the 
whole sample, participants in the complex condition were somewhat less likely to report 
interest in taking direct personal action relating to food speculation (M = 5.53, SE = 0.66) 
than those in the simple condition (M = 5.67, SE = 0.59), but the difference was not 
statistically significant, mean difference = -0.14, [-1.94, 1.66], t(35) = -0.16, p = .88 and the 
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effect size was very small, d = -.05. Similarly, for participants who passed the knowledge 
check, those in the complex condition tended to be less interested in taking action (M = 4.73, 
SE = 0.80) than those in the simple condition (M = 5.92, SE = 0.71), but again this difference 
was not statistically significant, mean difference = -1.19, [-3.41, 1.03], t(21) = -1.12, p = .28, 
though the effect was of a medium size, d = -0.49.  
Mediation Analyses 
 The evidence above suggested an impact of manipulating complexity on moral 
judgements of Person A, but no direct effect on interest in taking personal action. Ordinarily, 
it is preferable to use existing theory to guide the selection of a mediating variable. However, 
given the novel nature of the independent and dependent variables, as well as the exploratory 
nature of the research and the fact that both the indirect and direct pathways reported are 
theoretically relevant to the construct being tested, it was considered important to conduct the 
mediation analyses in this and the following studies. To test for potential indirect effects, I 
hence ran analyses to test whether moral judgements of Person A might mediate the 
relationship between condition and personal action. 
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Figure 4.2: Mediation model (Study 1) of complexity as a predictor of personal action, 
mediated by moral judgement of Person A. Bootstrapped CIs based on 1000 samples. 
The indirect effect was not significant for the whole sample. However, for participants 
who passed the knowledge check, there was a significant indirect effect of the manipulation 
on interest in taking action through moral judgement of Person A, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
This result indicates the potential for moral judgement to act as a mediator between perceived 
complexity and an individual’s interest in taking action in that context. That is, participants 
who saw the more complex version of the video were less likely to judge Person A harshly, 
which in turn marginally lowered their willingness to take action in relation to food 
speculation. 
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Attributional Complexity and Need for Cognition 
Table 4.1 
     
Correlations between Attributional Complexity, Need for Cognition and dependent variables 
  
Whole sample 
(N = 37) 
  
Knowledge check pass 
 (n = 23) 
 
Attributional 
Complexity 
Need for 
Cognition  
Attributional 
Complexity 
Need for 
Cognition 
Model complexity 
.37* .32† 
 
.21 .25 
[.08, .61] [.02, .58]  [-.16, .52] [-.18, .60] 
Video understanding 
-.28† -.18 
 
-.18 -.12 
[-.59, .08] [-.52, .23]  [-.54, .23] [-.59, .34] 
Food speculation 
judgement 
-.26 -.26 
 
-.53** -.28 
[-.53, .05] [-.54, .05]  [-.74, -.29] [-.62, .15] 
Person A judgement 
-.31† -.26 
 
-.43* -.13 
[-.53, -.07] [-.55, .04]  [-.68, -.14] [-.54, .30] 
Influencing price 
acceptable 
-.22 -.30† 
 
-.30 -.21 
[-.49, .05] [-.55, -.01]  [-.63, .03] [-.59, .23] 
Making money acceptable 
-.31† -.12 
 
-.42* -.11 
[-.61, .01] [-.52, .22]  [-.42, -.03] [-.62, .43] 
Personal action 
.26 .08 
 
.20 .05 
[-.05, .56] [-.28, .45]  [-.21, .59] [-.43, .53] 
Note: †p < .10; *p < .05, **p < .01. BCa bootstrap 95% CIs reported in brackets. 
 
Although Attributional Complexity (AC; Fletcher et al., 1986) and Need for 
Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) did not moderate the effects of the manipulation, it 
was important to explore their potential direct relations with moral judgements. Similar to 
Fletcher and colleagues’ initial work (1986), my analysis showed that the two scales 
correlated to a moderate extent, r = .37, [.01, .66], p = .02. Participants higher in AC were 
more likely to judge the issue of food speculation more harshly. However, as Table 4.1 
shows, only AC showed significant relationships with the manipulation checks and dependent 
variables. Accordingly, NFC was not used in future studies. 
 Page 188 
 
Study 2 
 Study 1 provided some interesting first insights into how complexity might impact 
upon moral judgement and how this in turn could also affect interest in taking action relating 
to food speculation. Study 2 further probed these effects by including four amendments to the 
previous design. Firstly, the sample size in Study 1 was quite small, particularly once the 
knowledge check had been taken into account, so I aimed for a larger sample. Secondly, 
given their relevance to processes of attribution, the study included some additional measures 
relating to individual and organisational responsibility, as well as individual and collective 
efficacy and collective action, all in the context of financial ethics. Thirdly, I wanted to 
simplify the manipulation to see if a more subtle difference could still have an impact. 
Finally, for pragmatic reasons, the voiceover to the video was changed, as the researcher for 
Study 2 was to be the same person who had provided the voiceover for Study 1.  
The principal hypothesis for this research is that increased perceptions of complexity 
will lead to greater moral leniency. Accordingly, I predicted that the complex model, 
compared to the simple model, would lead to less harsh moral judgements of food 
speculation and a reduced willingness to take action. In line with this hypothesis, I also 
expected the complex model to lead to an increase in agreement with additional dependent 
variables regarding responsibility, self-efficacy, collective efficacy and collective action. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 71 undergraduate students at Cardiff University (68 women, 3 men) 
who took part for course credit. They were between 18 and 21 years of age (M = 19). 
Participants completed the study in individual sessions in the laboratory. 
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Excluded Participants 
 One participant was excluded for routinely selecting the same score on the dependent 
variables. No other participants required exclusion. 
Design 
 As with Study 1, a between-participants design was used. Participants were randomly 
allocated to either the simple or complex condition and then proceeded to the dependent 
measures. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was essentially identical to Study 1, with the only amendments being 
the extra dependent variables outlined below and the removal of the Need for Cognition 
scale. Having completed the study, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed and 
thanked for their time.  
Experimental Manipulation 
 There were two differences from the manipulations used in Study 1. A female 
voiceover was used for both videos, as the male from Study 1 was collecting the data for this 
study. More importantly, the simple condition remained as in Study 1, but the complex 
condition was made simpler by removing the extra boxes that did not relate to the causal 
chain (i.e., the dashed lines in Appendix J). 
Dependent Measures 
 The same items from Study 1 were used as manipulation checks and as measures for 
moral judgement, organisational acceptability and personal action. In addition to the previous 
dependent variables, I included two measures of responsibility as well as measures of self-
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efficacy, collective efficacy and collective action. Answers to these new items were all given 
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) through 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). The responsibility items asked participants to rate the extent to which they thought 
financial institutions should be socially responsible and not simply use the law as a guide to 
judge what is acceptable, and the extent to which they thought people should be responsible 
for the actions of the financial institutions they use. The self-efficacy item asked participants 
to rate the extent to which they thought their own actions could contribute to encouraging 
moral standards (negative or positive) in financial institutions. The collective efficacy item 
asked participants to rate the extent to which they thought people could work together to hold 
financial institutions to account when it came to controversial business practices. The 
collective action item asked participants to rate the extent to which they would be interested 
in signing an existing customer charter that insists on strict ethical standards for every 
financial institution. 
Knowledge Check 
Participants were given the same multiple choice question regarding an amount of 
money mentioned in the video, as described in Study 1. 
Individual Differences 
 The Attributional Complexity Scale (AC; Fletcher et al., 1986) was administered as 
before and again showed good reliability (α = .91). 
Knowledge about Food Speculation 
Participants again rated their knowledge about food speculation prior to the study, 
using the same scale as described in Study 1. 
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Results and Discussion 
Similar to Study 1, only 42 of the 70 participants (60%) passed the knowledge check 
question. As before, the results are presented for both the whole sample and the subset that 
passed the knowledge check. 
Manipulation Checks 
 For the whole sample, the model in the complex video was seen as significantly more 
complex (M = 4.43, SE = 0.36) than the simple model (M = 3.37, SE = 0.36), mean difference 
= 1.06, [0.04, 2.08], t(68) = 2.07, p = .04, d = 0.50. For participants who passed the 
knowledge check, the complex video tended to be seen as more complex (M = 4.20, SE = 
0.43) than the simple model (M = 3.32, SE = 0.39), but here the difference was not 
significant, mean difference = 0.88, [-0.31, 2.08], t(40) = 1.49, p = .14, d = 0.47. The subtler 
manipulation (compared to Study 1) thus appears to have had an effect on the whole sample, 
but this effect was no longer significant when I analysed the subset that passed the knowledge 
check. As with Study 1, all the means are below the midpoint of the scale, suggesting that 
both models were seen as relatively simple. 
 For the whole sample, the complex video was seen as somewhat less easy to 
understand (M = 7.77, SE = 0.28) than the simple model (M = 8.49, SE = 0.39), but this 
difference was not statistically significant, mean difference = -0.71, [-1.70, 0.27], t(68) = -
1.45, p = .15, d = -0.35. Similarly, for participants who passed the knowledge check, the 
complex video was seen as less easy to understand (M = 8.00, SE = 0.30) than the simple 
model (M = 8.18, SE = 0.50), but not significantly so, mean difference = -0.18, [-1.40, 1.03], 
t(40) = -0.30, p = .76, d = -0.10. Again, the means were above the mid-point of the scale, 
suggesting that the video was not difficult to understand in either condition. 
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These results provide mixed support for the effectiveness of the manipulation. The 
more subtle complex model does appear to have been rated as more complex, although this 
effect was not significant for participants who passed the knowledge check. The effects of the 
manipulation on understanding of the video from Study 1 trend in the same direction here, 
but were not significant. It appears that the more subtle manipulation could be close to the 
boundary of what is required to produce significant differences in perceived complexity. 
Moral Judgement 
 For the whole sample, those in the complex condition rated speculation on food 
markets as somewhat more morally right (M = 4.80, SE = 0.24) than those in the simple 
condition (M = 4.57, SE = 0.26) but this difference was not statistically significant, mean 
difference = 0.23, [-0.49, 0.95], t(68) = 0.63, p = .53, d = 0.15. Similarly, for participants who 
passed the knowledge check, those in the complex condition rated speculation on food 
markets as somewhat more morally right (M = 5.10, SE = 0.35) than those in the simple 
condition (M = 4.50, SE = 0.36). However, this difference was also not statistically 
significant, mean difference = 0.60, [-0.44, 1.64], t(40) = 1.16, p = .25, d = 0.37. As with 
Study 1, each of the means were below the mid-point of the scale, suggesting general 
condemnation of the process. 
In terms of judging the morality of Person A, the whole sample rated them as 
somewhat more morally right in the complex condition (M = 5.37, SE = 0.28) than those in 
the simple condition (M = 5.31, SE = 0.31), but this difference was not significant, mean 
difference = 0.06, [-0.80, 0.92], t(68) = 0.13, p = .90, d = 0.03. For participants who passed 
the knowledge check, Person A was seen as more morally right in the complex condition (M 
= 6.15, SE = 0.35) than those in the simple condition (M = 5.05, SE = 0.38). This difference 
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was statistically significant, mean difference = 1.11, [0.06, 2.15], t(40) = 2.14, p = .04, and 
the effect was of a medium size, d = 0.68.  
The comparatively weaker manipulation of complexity used in this study revealed the 
same trends as in the prior study. However, as with Study 1, the only significant effect 
occurred for the judgement of Person A, rather than with the judgement of the process of 
food speculation. The mean differences on this item vary notably between the whole sample 
and participants who passed the knowledge check, indicating a possible interaction between 
the manipulation and the level of information processing by the participants. 
Organisational Acceptability 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition thought it was 
significantly more acceptable for financial institutions to influence the price of basic 
foodstuffs (M = 4.66, SE = 0.33), than did participants in the simple condition (M = 3.54, SE 
= 0.32), mean difference = 1.11, [0.18, 2.05], t(68) = 2.38, p = .02, d = 0.58. Similarly, for 
participants who passed the knowledge check, those in the complex condition thought this 
behaviour was significantly more acceptable (M = 5.30, SE = 0.48), compared to those in the 
simple condition (M = 3.64, SE = 0.43), mean difference = 1.66, [0.33, 2.99], t(40) = 2.53, p 
= .02, d = 0.80. 
 For the whole sample, those in the complex condition thought it was somewhat more 
acceptable for financial institutions to make money from food speculation (M = 4.46, SE = 
0.37), compared to those in the simple condition (M = 4.14, SE = 0.41), but this difference 
was not significant, mean difference = 0.31, [-0.80, 1.43], t(68) = 0.56, p = .58, d = 0.14. 
Similarly, for participants who passed the knowledge check, those in the complex condition 
thought this behaviour was somewhat more acceptable (M = 5.20, SE = 0.50), compared to 
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those in the simple condition (M = 4.27, SE = 0.53), but again this difference was not 
significant, mean difference = 0.93, [-0.61, 2.47], t(40) = 1.22, p = .23, d = 0.38. 
 Both of these trends are in line with the moral judgement items: participants in the 
complex condition reported higher levels of organisational acceptability when it comes to 
food speculation. Furthermore, the effects of the manipulation are significant with regards to 
the acceptability of influencing prices.  
Personal Action 
 For the whole sample, those in the complex condition were somewhat less likely to 
report interest in taking direct personal action relating to food speculation (M = 5.40, SE = 
0.30), compared to those in the simple condition (M = 5.60, SE = 0.38), but this difference 
was not statistically significant, mean difference = -0.20, [-1.20, 0.80], t(68) = -0.40, p = .69, 
d = -.10. Similarly, for participants who passed the knowledge check, those in the complex 
condition were somewhat less interested in taking action (M = 4.85, SE = 0.45), compared to 
those in the simple condition (M = 5.73, SE = 0.54), but again, this difference was not 
statistically significant, mean difference = -0.88, [-2.29, 0.54], t(40) = -1.26, p = .22, d = -
0.40. 
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Secondary Dependent Variables 
 
 Table 4.2 shows how the manipulation affected each of the secondary dependent 
variables. There were no significant effects of the manipulation on perceptions of 
responsibility for either financial institutions or people generally. Participants in the simple 
condition did, however, report a greater sense of self-efficacy and collective efficacy for both 
the whole sample and those who passed the knowledge check. Additionally, for the whole 
sample, the simple condition encouraged greater intention to take collective action, however, 
this effect was not significant in the subset of participants who passed the knowledge check. 
Together, these results suggest participants who were presented with a simpler model were 
more likely to think their own actions could have an impact, to think that people could work 
together to hold institutions to account and to intend to take part in collective action. 
Mediation Analyses 
 As with Study 1, the evidence above suggested an impact of manipulating complexity 
on moral judgements of Person A, but no direct effect on interest in taking personal action. 
To test for the indirect effect that represented this path in Study 1, I ran the same mediation 
Table 4.2
Means for secondary dependent variables (Study 2)
Complex Simple Complex Simple
M (SE ) M (SE ) t d M  (SE ) M  (SE ) t d
Institution responsible 5.60(0.15) 5.57(0.13) 0.14 0.03 5.55(0.22) 5.50(0.20) 0.17 0.05
People responsible 4.11(0.26) 4.40(0.26) -0.78 -0.19 4.00(0.34) 4.23(0.32) -0.49 -0.15
Self efficacy 3.83(0.25) 4.57(0.19) -2.36* -0.57 3.75(0.37) 4.64(0.24) -2.04* -0.65
Collective efficacy 4.74(0.21) 5.40(0.15) -2.52* -0.61 4.55(0.28) 5.55(0.16) -3.21** -1.01
Collective action 4.46(0.19) 5.03(0.19) -2.13* -0.52 4.40(0.26) 4.91(0.27) -1.36 -0.43
Note: †p < .10; *p < .05, **p  < .01. Higher means represent greater agreement.
  Whole sample (N  = 70)   Knowledge check pass (n = 42)
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analyses as before. Again, the indirect effect was not significant for the whole sample. 
However, the significant indirect effect was again found for participants who passed the 
knowledge check, as shown in Figure 4.3. This result provides further support for the 
argument that increasing perceptions of complexity can lead to a less harsh moral judgement, 
which in turn can lead to a reduced interest in taking relevant action. 
 
Figure 4.3: Mediation model (Study 2) of complexity as a predictor of personal action, 
mediated by moral judgement of Person A. Bootstrapped CIs based on 1000 samples. 
 The results from the secondary dependent variables suggested direct effects of the 
manipulation on self-efficacy, collective efficacy and collective action. Although the 
additional five items were not designed as a single scale, they were all positively correlated 
and formed a potentially reliable factor (Cronbach’s α = .75), representing a broad measure of 
interest in recognising the issue and belief in tackling the problem. To avoid having to report 
lengthy mediation analyses on every item, these items were combined together as part of an 
exploratory investigation. I therefore created an aggregate score by taking the mean of the 
five items, such that higher scores indicated greater support for the merits of holding financial 
institutions to account in general. The pattern of results was similar to that found for personal 
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action, as the mediation was not significant for the whole sample, but was significant for 
participants who passed the knowledge check (see Figure 4.4). The results suggest further 
support for the mediating role of moral judgement in encouraging action relating to food 
speculation. 
 
Figure 4.4: Mediation model (Study 2) of complexity as a predictor of the secondary 
dependent variables, mediated by moral judgement of Person A. Bootstrapped CIs based on 
1000 samples. 
Attributional Complexity 
 The general pattern of correlations mimicked those of Study 1, as Attributional 
Complexity (AC) tended to correlate positively with personal action and the secondary 
dependent variables, whilst correlating somewhat negatively with items relating to moral 
judgement and organisational acceptability. However, only one of the correlations was 
statistically significant; for the whole sample, participants with higher AC indicated lower 
acceptability of financial institutions making money from food speculation, r = -.25, [-.43, -
.10], p = .03. 
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Study 3 
 Study 2 provided further evidence for the role of complexity in moral judgement and 
willingness to take action, even with a subtler manipulation. However, the manipulation 
check data were noticeably weaker compared to Study 1. The three main methodological 
differences were the purely student sample, the different gendered voiceover and the 
weakened manipulation. To ensure it was the weaker manipulation that produced the weaker 
effects, and not the other two alterations, the experiment was re-run, but returning to the 
complex version of the video used in Study 1.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 85 undergraduate students at Cardiff University (73 women, 12 
men) who took part for course credit. They were between 17 and 24 years of age (M = 19). 
Participants completed the study in individual sessions in the laboratory. 
Excluded Participants 
 Eleven participants moved on from the video before it had finished, two participants 
were excluded for routinely selecting the same score on the dependent variables and one 
participant reported having a high level of previous knowledge about food speculation. Due 
to an overlap of issues in one case, this resulted in 13 participants being excluded. 
Materials, Procedure and Design 
 The materials were identical to Study 2 apart from the change to the manipulation. 
The video thus used the same female voiceover as before but now used the more complex 
flowchart from Study 1. The procedure and design were the same as Study 2. 
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Results and Discussion 
Similar to the other studies, only 52 of the 72 participants (72%) passed the 
knowledge check question. As before, the results are presented for both the whole sample and 
the subset that passed the knowledge check. 
Manipulation Checks 
 For the whole sample, the model in the complex video was seen as significantly more 
complex (M = 4.82, SE = 0.32) than the simple model (M = 3.05, SE = 0.26), mean difference 
= 1.77, [0.96, 2.58], t(70) = 4.36, p < .001, d = 1.04. For participants who passed the 
knowledge check, the complex video was also seen as significantly more complex (M = 4.88, 
SE = 0.41) than the simple model (M = 2.93, SE = 0.28), mean difference = 1.95, [0.96, 2.94], 
t(50) = 3.96, p < .001, d = 1.12. The stronger manipulation has thus reproduced the larger 
effect sizes seen in Study 1. 
 For the whole sample, the complex video was seen as somewhat less easy to 
understand (M = 8.03, SE = 0.32) than the simple model (M = 8.32, SE = 0.32), but this 
difference was not significant, mean difference = -0.29, [-1.20, 0.63], t(70) = -0.63, p = .53, d 
= -0.15. Similarly, for participants who passed the knowledge check, there was only a 
nonsignificant trend to see the complex video as less easy to understand (M = 7.75, SE = 
0.37) than the simple model (M = 8.54, SE = 0.40), mean difference = -0.79, [-1.91, 0.34], 
t(50) = -1.41, p = .17, d = -0.40. 
These results provide mixed support for the manipulation. The stronger manipulation 
reproduced large effects relating to model complexity. However, in terms of understanding 
the video, whilst the trends continued to point in the same direction as previous studies, they 
were not significant here. 
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Moral Judgement 
 For the whole sample, those in the complex condition rated speculation on food 
markets as less morally right (M = 3.62, SE = 0.26) than those in the simple condition (M = 
4.21, SE = 0.19). This difference was marginally significant, mean difference = -0.59, [-1.24, 
0.05], t(70) = -1.84, p = .07, d = -0.44. For participants who passed the knowledge check, 
those in the complex condition rated speculation on food markets as significantly less morally 
right (M = 3.46, SE = 0.26) than those in the simple condition (M = 4.25, SE = 0.23), mean 
difference = -0.79, [-1.50, -0.09], t(50) = -2.26, p = .03, d = -0.64. These results are in the 
reverse direction to my principal hypothesis and suggest that the manipulation of complexity 
has not affected moral judgement in this sample in the same way as it did in the previous 
studies. 
In terms of judging the morality of Person A, the whole sample did not rate them as 
significantly more morally right in the complex condition (M = 5.26, SE = 0.23), compared to 
the simple condition (M = 5.16, SE = 0.30), mean difference = 0.11, [-0.66, 0.87], t(70) = 
0.28, p = .78, d = 0.07. Similarly, for participants who passed the knowledge check, Person A 
was not seen as significantly more morally right in the complex condition (M = 5.13, SE = 
0.29), compared to the simple condition (M = 5.04, SE = 0.36), mean difference = 0.09, [-
0.88, 1.06], t(50) = 0.19, p = .85, d = 0.05. 
The lack of effects relating to Person A and the reversed direction of the effects 
relating to the process of food speculation do not conform to the findings of the first two 
studies and thus represent a challenge for the principal hypothesis. Given that the design of 
this study was a virtual replication of Study 1, the different results may be a result of a 
change in the sample. This issue will be considered in the general discussion, after the results 
from all four studies have been reported. 
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Organisational Acceptability 
 For the whole sample, those in the complex condition thought it was marginally less 
acceptable for financial institutions to influence the price of basic foodstuffs (M = 3.24, SE = 
0.31), compared to those in the simple condition (M = 4.00, SE = 0.33), mean difference = -
0.77, [-1.69, 0.16], t(70) = -1.65, p = .10, d = -0.39. For participants who passed the 
knowledge check, those in the complex condition thought this behaviour was significantly 
less acceptable (M = 3.25, SE = 0.40), compared to those in the simple condition (M = 4.32, 
SE = 0.32), mean difference = -1.07, [-2.13, -0.01], t(50) = -2.03, p = .05, d = -0.57. 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition did not report that it was 
less acceptable for financial institutions to make money from food speculation (M = 3.44, SE 
= 0.32), compared to participants in the simple condition (M = 3.76, SE = 0.35), mean 
difference = -0.32, [-1.32, 0.67], t(68) = -0.65, p = .52, d = -0.15. Similarly, for participants 
who passed the knowledge check, those in the complex condition did not report that this 
behaviour was less acceptable (M = 3.54, SE = 0.40), compared to those in the simple 
condition (M = 4.04, SE = 0.43), mean difference = -0.49, [-1.70, 0.71], t(50) = -0.82, p = .41, 
d = -0.23. As with the moral judgement items, the effects for both the organisational 
acceptability items did not support the principal hypothesis. 
Personal Action 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition were no more likely to 
report interest in taking direct personal action relating to food speculation (M = 5.65, SE = 
0.39), compared to those in the simple condition (M = 5.63, SE = 0.33), mean difference = 
0.02, [-1.02, 1.05], t(70) = 0.03, p = .98, d = 0.01. For participants who passed the knowledge 
check, those in the complex condition were also no more likely to report interest in taking 
action (M = 5.58, SE = 0.48), compared to those in the simple condition (M = 5.68, SE = 
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0.42), mean difference = -0.10, [-1.38, 1.19], t(50) = -0.15, p = .88, d = -0.04. As with the 
previous two studies, the manipulation has not had a direct impact on willingness to take 
personal action. 
Secondary Dependent Variables 
 
There were no significant effects of the manipulation on the secondary dependent 
variables, as shown in Table 4.3. As with the other dependent variables in this study, these 
results do not align with the data from Study 2, and do not offer support for the hypothesis 
that greater complexity would lead to less willingness to recognise the issue and intentions to 
act. 
Mediation Analyses 
 Unlike the first two studies, there was no evidence of an impact of the manipulation 
on moral judgement. Accordingly, the mediation pathways evidenced as present in the 
previous studies were not replicated here, in either the whole sample or the subset that passed 
the knowledge check. 
Table 4.3
Means for secondary dependent variables (Study 3)
Complex Simple Complex Simple
M (SE ) M (SE ) t d M  (SE ) M  (SE ) t d
Institution responsible 5.65(0.15) 5.21(0.17) 1.88† 0.45 5.63(0.16) 5.14(0.19) 1.87† 0.53
People responsible 3.91(0.20) 3.95(0.24) -0.11 -0.03 3.83(0.24) 3.68(0.26) 0.42 0.12
Self efficacy 3.97(0.22) 4.32(0.19) -1.16 -0.28 3.88(0.29) 4.21(0.22) -0.93 -0.26
Collective efficacy 4.82(0.22) 4.74(0.19) 0.30 0.07 4.75(0.27) 4.71(0.22) 0.10 0.03
Collective action 5.00(0.21) 4.58(0.19) 1.47 0.35 5.00(0.29) 4.54(0.21) 1.36 0.39
  Whole sample (N  = 72)   Knowledge check pass (n = 52)
Note: †p < .10; *p < .05, **p  < .01. Higher means represent greater agreement.
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Attributional Complexity 
Unlike the dependent measures, the general pattern of results relating to Attributional 
Complexity (AC) did fit with the two previous studies, as AC correlated somewhat positively 
with personal action and the secondary dependent variables, whilst generally correlating 
somewhat negatively with items relating to moral judgement and organisational acceptability 
(Person A was the only exception to this trend in this study). However, only one of the 
correlations was statistically significant; for the whole sample, AC was positively correlated 
with the collective efficacy measure (r = .24, [0.01, 0.45], p = .04), suggesting those higher in 
AC more strongly agreed with the notion that it was possible to hold financial institutions to 
account by working together. 
Study 4 
 Study 3 failed to replicate the findings of the first two studies. The manipulation 
check relating to complexity indicated the stronger version of the independent variable had 
been seen as more complex. However, the link between the manipulation and moral 
judgement had not arisen as expected. Given the surprising results of Study 3, I decided to 
run a final study to ascertain whether the effects found in the first two studies could be 
replicated in an appropriately powered public sample, while attempting to rule out the gender 
of the voiceover as influencing the relationship between complexity and moral judgement.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 234 members of the public, recruited via an online research 
company (122 women, 109 men, 3 preferred not to say), who took part for small financial 
credit. They were between 19 and 76 years of age (M = 49). 
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Excluded Participants 
 Forty-seven participants failed to watch the 130-second video for an appropriate 
length of time, either moving on before it had finished or staying on the page for a 
particularly long time (i.e., more than 30 seconds). These participants were thus excluded 
from the analyses, because the video viewing times suggested they were not watching the 
video and then moving straight on to the dependent measures, as requested. In addition, 41 
participants routinely selected the same score on the dependent variables, fifteen participants 
reported having a high level of previous knowledge about food speculation, and one 
participant stated they had problems hearing the video. Due to an overlap of some of these 
issues, 79 participants were excluded in total, leaving a final sample of 155. 
Design 
 A 2 x 2 between-participants design was used. Participants were randomly allocated 
to either the simple or complex condition and heard either a male or female voiceover. The 
dependent measures were the same as in Studies 1 and 2. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was essentially identical to the previous studies, except that it was run 
online. Participants who did not consent to taking part were thanked for their time; those who 
did consent proceeded to the study. An initial video check ensured participants could see the 
image of an animal and hear the noise of a different animal, thus ensuring they were able to 
see and hear the video in the study. Upon completion, all participants were given a debrief 
page which outlined the purposes of the study, provided with the researchers’ contact details 
and thanked for their participation. 
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Experimental Manipulation 
 As indicated in the design, both female and male voiceovers were used in the 
manipulation, to test whether any previous differences between studies may have arisen 
because of this difference. Aside from this factor, the same complex model used in Study 1 
and Study 3 was employed again here. Again, the simple model did not change. 
Dependent Variables and Other Measures 
 The study included the same manipulation checks, dependent variables and AC scale 
from the previous two studies. 
Results and Discussion 
Ninety-seven of the 155 participants (63%) passed the knowledge check question. 
This proportion is in line with the success rates of the previous three studies. Once more, the 
results are presented for the whole sample and the subset that passed the knowledge check. 
Gender 
 Preliminary analyses revealed no consistent effects of participant gender, nor 
voiceover gender. There were also no significant interactions between these factors and the 
manipulation. This data suggests the gender of the voiceover can be ruled out as explaining 
any of the differences between the studies above. It also makes it possible to collapse across 
these factors and maintain focus on the effect of condition. 
Manipulation Checks 
 For the whole sample, the model in the complex video was seen as significantly more 
complex (M = 5.60, SE = 0.27) than the simple model (M = 4.42, SE = 0.30), mean difference 
= 1.19, [0.35, 2.02], t(153) = 2.81, p < .01, d = 0.45. Similarly, for participants who passed 
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the knowledge check, the complex video was seen as significantly more complex (M = 4.91, 
SE = 0.37) than the simple model (M = 3.60, SE = 0.40), mean difference = 1.30, [0.23, 2.38], 
t(94) = 2.41, p = .02, d = 0.50. These effects thus continue to show the complex model 
successfully manipulating participants’ perception of complexity. 
 For the whole sample, the complex video was seen as marginally less easy to 
understand (M = 7.48, SE = 0.24) than the simple model (M = 8.13, SE = 0.28), mean 
difference = -0.64, [-1.37, 0.08], t(153) = -1.75, p = .08, d = -0.28. For participants who 
passed the knowledge check, the complex video was seen as significantly less easy to 
understand (M = 7.92, SE = 0.29) than the simple model (M = 8.84, SE = 0.34), mean 
difference = -0.91, [-1.81, -0.02], t(94) = -2.02, p = .05, d = -0.42. As with the other three 
studies, the video containing the more complex model has been reported as harder to 
understand. In tandem, these results provide good support for the reliability of the effects of 
the manipulation on perceptions of complexity. 
Moral Judgement 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition rated speculation on food 
markets as somewhat less morally right (M = 4.07, SE = 0.23) than participants in the simple 
condition (M = 4.25, SE = 0.28), but this difference was not statistically significant, mean 
difference = -0.18, [-0.90, 0.55], t(153) = -0.49, p = .63, d = -0.08. For participants who 
passed the knowledge check, those in the complex condition rated speculation on food 
markets as somewhat more morally right (M = 4.00, SE = 0.28) than those in the simple 
condition (M = 3.51, SE = 0.32). This difference was also not statistically significant, mean 
difference = 0.49, [-0.37, 1.35], t(94) = 1.13, p = .26, d = 0.23. 
In terms of judging the morality of Person A, the whole sample tended to rate the 
person as more morally right in the complex condition (M = 4.93, SE = 0.21) than in the 
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simple condition (M = 4.60, SE = 0.27), but this difference was not significant, mean 
difference = 0.33, [-0.35, 1.01], t(153) = 0.96, p = .34, d = 0.16. For participants who passed 
the knowledge check, Person A was seen as significantly more morally right in the complex 
condition (M = 5.02, SE = 0.27) than in the simple condition (M = 3.84, SE = 0.30), mean 
difference = 1.18, [0.35, 2.01], t(153) = 2.83, p = .01, d = 0.58. 
These results replicate the findings from the first two studies. No significant effects 
occurred for judgements of food speculation, but judgements of Person A were less negative 
after being given the complex model of food speculation, compared to the simple model. As 
in the first two studies, this difference was significant only in the subset that passed the 
knowledge check, an issue that will be discussed further later. 
Organisational Acceptability 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition tended to indicate that it 
was more acceptable for financial institutions to influence the price of basic foodstuffs (M = 
3.54, SE = 0.29), than did participants in the simple condition (M = 3.10, SE = 0.28), but this 
difference was not significant, mean difference = 0.45, [-0.36, 1.25], t(153) = 1.09, p = .28, d 
= 0.58. For participants who passed the knowledge check, those in the complex condition 
thought this behaviour was marginally significantly more acceptable (M = 3.81, SE = 0.39), 
compared to those in the simple condition (M = 2.77, SE = 0.32), mean difference = 1.05, 
 [-0.04, 2.13], t(94) = 1.92, p = .06, d = 0.40. 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition thought it was somewhat 
more acceptable for financial institutions to make money from food speculation (M = 3.59, 
SE = 0.30), compared to participants in the simple condition (M = 3.39, SE = 0.32), but this 
difference was not significant, mean difference = 0.20, [-0.67, 1.07], t(153) = 0.46, p = .65, d 
= 0.07. Similarly, for participants who passed the knowledge check, those in the complex 
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condition thought this behaviour was somewhat more acceptable (M = 3.81, SE = 0.41), 
compared to those in the simple condition (M = 3.21, SE = 0.39), but again this difference 
was not significant, mean difference = 0.60, [-0.53, 1.73], t(94) = 1.06, p = .29, d = 0.22.  
Personal Action 
 For the whole sample, participants in the complex condition tended to report less 
interest in taking direct personal action relating to food speculation (M = 5.25, SE = 0.33), 
compared to those in the simple condition (M = 6.00, SE = 0.31), but this difference was not 
statistically significant, mean difference = -0.75, [-1.66, 0.16], t(153) = -1.62, p = .11, d =  
-.26. For participants who passed the knowledge check, those in the complex condition were 
significantly less interested in taking action (M = 5.04, SE = 0.37) than those in the simple 
condition (M = 6.33, SE = 0.37), mean difference = -1.29, [-2.36, -0.22], t(94) = -2.39, p = 
.02, d = -0.49. These results suggest the manipulation has had some direct impact upon 
participants’ willingness to engage in action to tackle food speculation, as predicted. 
Secondary Dependent Variables 
 
Table 4.4
Means for secondary dependent variables (Study 4)
Complex Simple Complex Simple
M (SE ) M (SE ) t d M  (SE ) M  (SE ) t d
Institution responsible 5.28(0.15) 5.86(0.14) -2.84** -0.46 5.21(0.20) 5.95(0.14) -2.93** -0.60
People responsible 4.46(0.14) 4.86(0.14) -2.06* -0.33 4.34(0.18) 4.91(0.16) -2.30* -0.47
Self efficacy 4.30(0.13) 4.72(0.13) -2.20* -0.36 4.23(0.17) 4.77(0.17) -2.25* -0.46
Collective efficacy 4.76(0.14) 5.22(0.14) -2.23* -0.36 4.62(0.20) 5.40(0.17) -2.92** -0.60
Collective action 4.29(0.19) 4.93(0.14) -2.67** -0.43 4.36(0.24) 5.09(0.15) -2.59* -0.53
  Whole sample (N  = 155)   Knowledge check pass (n = 94)
Note: †p < .10; *p < .05, **p  < .01. Higher means represent greater agreement.
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 Each of the secondary dependent variables was significantly affected by the 
manipulation, as shown in Table 4.4. Participants in the whole sample and those who passed 
the knowledge check showed greater agreement with items relating to institutional 
responsibility, personal responsibility and the measures of efficacy and collective action, 
when they had seen the simple model in the video than the complex video. This evidence 
provides strong support for the relationship between perceived complexity and a broad 
measure of interest in working towards better ethical positions in finance. 
Mediation Analyses 
In the first two studies, the evidence suggested an impact of manipulating complexity 
on moral judgements of Person A, but no direct effect on interest in taking personal action. In 
this study, the manipulation did affect interest in taking personal action directly, as those who 
passed the knowledge check and saw the simple video were comparatively more likely to 
support switching bank accounts to an ethical alternative. To test whether the indirect path 
found in the previous studies was still significant, I ran the same mediation analyses as 
described previously. Again, the indirect effect was not significant for the whole sample. 
However, for participants who passed the knowledge check, the same indirect path was 
present, as shown in Figure 4.5. This result continues the line of evidence which suggests that 
increasing perceptions of complexity can lead to a less harsh moral judgement, which in turn 
can lead to less interest in taking action. 
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Figure 4.5: Mediation model (Study 4) of complexity as a predictor of personal action, 
mediated by moral judgement of Person A. Bootstrapped CIs based on 1000 samples. 
 The results from the secondary dependent variables suggested direct effects of the 
manipulation on every item. As with Study 2, these items were all positively correlated and 
formed a potentially reliable factor (α = .77), hence the mean of the five items was used. The 
pattern of results for this variable was similar to that found for personal action, as the 
mediation was not significant for the whole sample, but was significant for participants who 
passed the knowledge check (see Figure 4.6). The results suggest further support for the 
mediating role of moral judgement in encouraging action relating to food speculation, 
although in this case the direct effect remains significant, indicating partial rather than 
complete mediation in this sample. 
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Figure 4.6: Mediation model (Study 4) of complexity as a predictor of the secondary 
dependent variables, mediated by moral judgement of Person A. Bootstrapped CIs based on 
1000 samples. 
Attributional Complexity 
The general pattern of correlations was in line with the three previous studies, as AC 
correlated positively with personal action and the secondary dependent variables, whilst 
correlating negatively with items relating to moral judgement and organisational 
acceptability. Each item was in the predicted direction. For the whole sample, eight of the ten 
correlations were significant, one was marginally significant and one was non-significant. 
The correlations ranged in size from .08 to .39. For participants who passed the knowledge 
check, six of the ten correlations were significant and the other four were marginally 
significant. The correlations ranged in size from .16 to .38. These data provide consistent 
evidence that AC is a useful individual differences measure to further our understanding of 
how people respond when faced with items regarding moral judgement, accountability, 
efficacy and intention to act. In this context, participants higher in AC were harsher in their 
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moral judgements of food speculation in general and accordingly were also more willing to 
see action against it as possible and worthwhile. 
General Discussion 
 The manipulation checks showed that the complex model of causal chains increased 
participants’ perception of complexity of food speculation in comparison to the simple 
model. In the public samples (Studies 1 & 4), the complex causal chains also reduced the 
general understanding of the video. Although the evidence for the effect on self-reported 
understanding was weaker and less consistent than the effect on perceptions of complexity, 
the results in combination support the efficacy of the manipulation for shaping perceptions of 
the complexity of the processes in food speculation. 
The critical question was whether these increased perceptions of complexity would 
lead to less harsh moral judgements of food speculation. Studies 1, 2 and 4 all offered some 
support to this principal hypothesis. Although there were no consistent effects of the 
manipulation on responses to the item examining beliefs about food speculation per se, there 
were consistent effects on how people perceived the morality of the agent in the model 
(Person A). Other items relevant to moral judgement also exhibited the expected pattern 
(Studies 2 & 4). For instance, the complex model led participants to see individuals and 
institutions as less morally culpable than the simple model. Additionally, the complex model 
led participants to be less willing to participate in collective action designed to address 
unethical behaviour. 
The studies also measured Attributional Complexity (AC; Fletcher et al., 1986) as a 
relevant individual differences measure of potential importance, but had no specific 
hypothesis as to its specific role as a moderating influence. All four studies showed no 
moderating role for AC. Nevertheless they also showed that participants who scored more 
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highly in AC were more likely to judge the process of food speculation harshly and act 
accordingly. In short, those who tend to prefer more complex attributions for behaviour were 
prepared to see a potentially intricate process as morally concerning. This may be because 
those who are higher in attributional complexity are more used to recognising processes as 
complex and are thus more willing to attribute responsibility to a relevant agent in a complex 
chain, whereas those who prefer simpler explanations for behaviour are more likely to see 
complicated situations as carrying less responsibility for those involved. 
Given the manipulation did not interact with AC, the manipulation and the measure of 
the individual differences appear to exert independent additive effects on moral judgement. 
This pattern fits the assumption that both the manipulation and the individual difference may 
be tapping the same construct, perceptions of complexity of food speculation, albeit in 
different ways. 
The mediation analyses in studies 1, 2 and 4 also provide support for the relationships 
between perceived complexity, moral judgement and a willingness to engage with food 
speculation as an ethical concern. Whilst these analyses were exploratory in nature, they 
outlined the potential role of moral judgement as a mediator between perceived complexity 
and interest in tackling ethical issues. 
Together this evidence provides good support for the principal hypothesis that 
increased perceptions of complexity lead to less harsh moral judgements. In this research, 
these judgements were particularly sensitive to complexity when the agent of the causal 
pathway was considered. Additionally, such evaluations can in turn lead to less willingness to 
assign responsibility to individuals and organisations, reduce people’s sense of self-efficacy 
and collective efficacy, as well as reducing their intentions to act against unethical behaviour. 
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Knowledge Check 
 An unexpected part of the research was the comparatively low success rate of the 
knowledge check, which varied across the studies from 60-72%. For this reason, the chapter 
presented the results for individuals who passed this check and those who did not. The 
differences between participants who passed and the whole sample were minimal across the 
studies for the manipulation checks and the secondary dependent variables. That is, of the 21 
potential effects across studies 2, 3 and 4, there were only two occasions where the whole 
sample produced a significant effect where the subset of those who passed the knowledge 
check did not. There were differences, however, for the significant effects of complexity on 
the moral judgement of Person A. In studies 1, 2 and 4 the effects were significant for the 
subset that passed the knowledge check, but not for the whole sample. Also, judgements of 
Person A mediated the effect of complexity on personal action and the secondary dependent 
variables in the group that passed the knowledge check, but not in the whole sample. It is 
possible therefore that a certain level of information elaboration is required if complexity is to 
influence moral judgements of relevant individuals and willingness to act. The upcoming 
section on why Study 3 failed to replicate the other studies is also relevant to this point. 
Related to this idea, increased cognitive load has been shown to reduce utilitarian 
responding (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene et al., 2008). Perhaps participants who 
failed the knowledge check were devoting less cognitive resources to the video and in turn 
were less likely to use a utilitarian mode of thinking. If so, it may be the case that this mode 
of thinking is a prerequisite for an effect of complexity on moral judgement. However, the 
effects on the secondary dependent variables in Studies 2 and 4 occurred irrespective of 
whether the knowledge check was passed. These differences reveal the potential for different 
psychological pathways to be involved. Some psychological paths from complexity to 
judgement and action may require higher levels of attention to causal information than others. 
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Study 3 
 The one set of results that did not conform to my hypotheses came from Study 3. 
Despite a successful manipulation check in relation to perceived complexity, no significant 
findings were reported in the whole sample, and participants who passed the knowledge 
check exhibited two effects in reverse of the predicted direction. Whilst the other studies 
provided trends and significant effects consistently in line with the principal hypothesis, 
Study 3 makes salient that there may be important factors that augment or attenuate the moral 
judgement processes being examined.  
Two main findings came to light in further analysis of this issue. Firstly, despite being 
asked explicitly not to do so, 11 of the participants in this sample (13%) failed the timing 
check as they moved on to the next screen before the video had finished; no participants did 
this in the other student sample (Study 2). The difference in failure rates between these 
samples is significantly different, χ2 (1) = 9.89, p = .001. This difference suggests that 
participants in this sample were notably different in their approach to the study. Study 3 was 
carried out at the start of the academic year, whereas Study 2 was carried out towards the end 
of the second semester. It may well be that the Study 3 sample thus contained participants 
who were particularly keenly motivated by gaining the required credit for passing the course 
and hence aimed to complete the research successfully, but with a quicker and less 
intrinsically motived approach to the experiment. Alternatively, a minority of students at the 
very early stages of the year may have been less used to research practices and were thus less 
likely to follow basic instructions. 
Both of these interpretations are also congruent with a second finding. Specifically, 
Studies 1, 2 and 4 had large correlations between responses to the two items assessing 
judgements of food speculation as a process and judgements of Person A, rs ranging from .66 
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to .77, as expected. In contrast, this correlation dropped to .38 for the whole sample and .31 
for participants who passed the knowledge check in Study 3. This discrepancy suggests a 
notable reduction in the validity of the structure of the data for Study 3.  
Nevertheless, Study 3 presented the highest rate of participants passing the knowledge 
check (72%, compared to 60-63% in the other studies). It may therefore be the case that 
participants paid more attention to the earlier portion of the video, but less attention 
afterward. Participants might have also attempted to satisfice their participation by searching 
for the socially desirable attitude quickly and then providing the “correct” moral 
condemnation of food speculation consistently. Although any interpretation of the cause for 
this change is speculative, it is clear that there are comparatively more issues with the validity 
of the supplied data among the sample in Study 3. For this reason, I suggest that the other 
studies, particularly participants drawn from public samples, provide a more convincing 
reflection of the generalised psychological mechanisms of interest in this research. 
Person A vs. Process 
 Despite the previously noted strong correlation between participants’ moral 
judgement of the process of food speculation and their judgement of Person A, the predicted 
effects of the manipulation only appeared for Person A. As outlined in the introduction to the 
chapter, people tend to give primary importance to human agency when it comes to assigning 
causation in a chain of events (Hilton, McClure & Sutton, 2010). It is possible therefore that 
the effect of perceived complexity is stronger when human agents are involved, as their 
involvement augments perceptions of causality. Additionally, the ratings of moral culpability 
for Person A were always higher (less harsh) than those for the process of food speculation. 
This may be because Person A was only seen as relevant to part of the causal chain, whereas 
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the overarching judgement related to every part of the process. This difference is relevant to 
one of the potential future research directions considered below. 
A Construal Level Theory Approach 
The manipulation of perceived complexity could be seen in some ways as a 
manipulation relevant to psychological distance, similar to construal level theory (CLT; 
Trope & Liberman, 2010). Amit and Greene (2012) recommended integrating construal level 
theory and the dual-process theory of moral judgement, as their research indicated a link 
between concrete construals and deontological judgements, whilst abstract construals related 
to utilitarian judgements. Similarly, agents with distal intent, which broadly relates to 
utilitarian judgement, are assigned greater moral responsibility by participants using a high-
level (abstract) construal, compared to a low-level (concrete) construal (Plaks, McNichols & 
Fortune, 2009). These findings present conflicting hypotheses for my interest in how a moral 
judgement could be affected by seeing a process as simple or complex. If increased 
complexity does increase psychological distance, then the construal of the process could be 
seen at a more abstract level, leading to greater deliberative and utilitarian outcomes. 
Alternatively, the perception of complexity could also be used as a heuristic whereby people 
deliberate less when complexity is high and instead make their moral judgement using more 
intuitive and social inputs. A third possibility is that higher complexity encourages a different 
heuristic pathway, where a default position, such as moral neutrality, is relied upon. The 
results favour the final two explanations, though each one is undoubtedly worthy of further 
consideration in the future. 
Implications and Future Directions 
 In the introduction, I outlined particular findings in moral dilemmas that could 
potentially be confounded with perceptions of complexity, such as causal deviance (Pizarro et 
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al., 2003), locus of the intervention (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007) and third party 
involvement (Phillips & Shaw, 2014). Given the previously reported links between cognitive 
load and moral judgement (Greene et al., 2008; Conway & Gawronski, 2013) and the 
relationship between agent coherence and attributed intention (Hughes & Trafimow, 2014), it 
is important to consider further whether these findings may in part be explained by 
differences in perceived complexity of the situations participants were judging. Research 
could thus examine whether the manipulations in the aforementioned research do produce 
different perceptions of complexity and, if they do, seek ways to minimise this issue. For 
example, it is important to consider how third parties can be included in moral dilemmas 
(Phillips & Shaw, 2014) whilst keeping the perceived complexity of the process constant. 
This will provide greater scope for testing real-world moral dilemmas, which often have more 
contributory factors than the simplified hypothetical scenarios used in much moral 
psychology. 
There may also be interesting interactions or additive effects involving the previously 
manipulated factors and perceived complexity. For example, manipulating the severity of 
consequences can alter the confidence participants report in moral judgements (Wiegmann & 
Waldmann, 2014) and it would be interesting to see if increased severity of consequences, in 
combination with lower perceptions of causal complexity, leads to greater moral 
condemnation. Additionally, it would be worth investigating if the valence of a side effect 
(Knobe, 2003) interacted with perceptions of complexity. For example, does a greater sense 
of complexity lead to a general increase in the moral rating for both positive and negative 
consequences? Or does complexity encourage a general shift to a more neutral position, 
driven perhaps by confidence in the evaluations being made? These questions could also fit 
with the CLT approach outlined above. 
Commented [CF29]: Garonski to Gawronski (also three other 
places). 
 Page 219 
 
 As previously stated, the primary aim was to test for a broad relationship between 
perceived complexity and moral judgement. Given the provocative evidence in this chapter, it 
is now important to consider how this relationship may relate to more specific factors that are 
relevant to moral judgement. For example, we need to understand further how perceived 
complexity could interfere with processes of moral judgement that occur as a result of 
differing intentions (Cushman, 2008). If wrongness judgements rely principally on the 
intentions of the agent, but blame requires an element of causality (Cushman, 2008), then 
might perceived complexity play a role in one or both of these processes? Similarly, if blame 
needs an agent to target, but wrongness judgements can work on broader notions of 
generalised behaviour (Malle et al., 2014), might perceived complexity be more effective in a 
blame context, given the differing findings for judgements of food speculation versus 
judgements of Person A? Manipulations of complexity thus need to be integrated with 
existing theoretical positions such as these, in order to isolate both the extent to which 
perceived complexity can influence decision making within each aspect of morality and the 
contexts within which it does not have an influence. 
Outside of the specifics of the decision-making process, broader identification 
measures also need to be pursued concurrently with complexity, as they can be strong 
motivators underpinning the extremity of judgement (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). For 
instance, a simple explanation might increase moral responsibility towards a controversial act 
in a low identification context, but not in a high identification context, as people might use 
the closeness in identity to justify the initial moral action. Conversely, a complex explanation 
might reduce moral responsibility in a low identification context, as people might feel 
uncertain about judging an identity to which they have little attachment. Identity and 
perceived complexity are thus worthy of further integrative approaches. 
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Furthermore, the role of moral emotions in attributing responsibility for events is 
critical (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014) and it is important to test how perceptions of 
complexity might enhance or subdue each emotion in a decision-making environment. For 
example, perceived complexity could dampen down emotional responses in general, if the 
earlier stated hypothesis of complexity as a heuristic is accurate. Similarly, seeing a process 
as more simple might heighten emotional responses and lead to greater motivation to act 
accordingly. 
Models of blame have described several further factors that could share variance with 
perceived complexity. For example, greater foreseeability leads to increased attributions of 
causality and blame (Lagnado & Channon, 2008); however, if participants perceive greater 
foreseeability on behalf of an agent, they may also be perceiving a comparatively simpler 
process from cause to effect. Future research could test the role of perceived complexity in 
other factors that are known to influence blameworthiness, such as indirectness of the causal 
chain (Paharia et al., 2009), prototypicality of the moral act (Malle et al., 2014) and the 
perception of free will in the agent (Clark et al., 2015). Each of these factors could easily 
relate to explanations via complexity. For example, more direct and prototypical acts are 
simpler processes to understand compared to their counterparts and thus people are likely to 
be more willing to assign responsibility in these contexts. Additionally, such changes in 
perceived responsibility also appear to extend to behaviour, as intermediaries in resource 
allocation games can reduce perceptions of responsibility and thus allow individuals to 
increase self-interested actions (Hamman, Loewenstein & Weber, 2010). 
 Two further methodological approaches are worth mentioning. Firstly, reaction time 
data has been used to show that time spent deliberating on a moral dilemma was influenced 
by a tendency to provide a utilitarian response (Baron, Gürçay, Moore & Starcke, 2012). It 
would be worthwhile to gather reaction time data for simple and complex versions of the 
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same causal chain, in order to begin understanding how perceived complexity might relate to 
cognitive processing and other relevant factors, such as cognitive load. Secondly, economic 
game theory has been used to show how the Knobe effect can be present or absent in contexts 
that do not rely on language but instead present actions and side effects in monetary 
allocations between two players (Utikal & Fischbacher, 2014). For instance, they showed 
how the usual effects of attribution by an observer only arose if the agent had a comparatively 
stronger economic status (higher starting allocation of the two players) rather than a lower 
status. As outlined earlier, the language in moral dilemmas can appear initially consistent, yet 
actually represent important differences in the complexity of the information. It would thus 
be interesting to pursue this economic methodology (Utikal & Fischbacher, 2014) to assess 
whether manipulating levels of complexity (e.g. different calculation processes) results in 
interactions with the findings they report relating to the relative status of the agent and their 
choices. 
Aside from identifying factors and methodological techniques of interest, it is also 
important to take the broader context into account. The ability to identify processes of 
causation has been found in children as early as 15 months of age (Cohen, Rundell, Spellman 
& Cashon, 1999), and the ability to use intentionality to make moral judgements exists from 
6 years of age (Berg-Cross, 1975). Importantly, Berg-Cross argues that tasks that are greater 
in complexity push young children to use heuristics, such as level of harm done, to make 
moral judgements. Complexity in moral dilemmas can thus encourage simplifying strategies 
from an early stage in life, and linking this research to developmental approaches could be 
fruitful in ascertaining how such heuristics might change across the lifespan. 
There are also additional factors that could have a broad main effect, such as people’s 
general inclination for human agency (Hilton et al., 2010; McClure, Hilton & Sutton, 2007) 
and narrative structures (Sloman & Lagnado, 2015). Research could thus be helpful in 
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identifying how complexity might relate to these basic judgement preferences, that are 
potentially underpinned by processes relevant to universal moral grammar (Mikhail, 2007) 
and moral evolution (Descioli & Kurzban, 2013). 
If there is a relatively basic tendency to use perceived complexity as a heuristic for 
judgement, then it may well be moderated by social and cultural experience. Although I used 
general public samples in two of my studies, it is important to test these preliminary effects in 
a diverse range of samples. Increases in social experience can lead to more sophistication in 
social cognition (Hess et al., 2005) and different cultural contexts can encourage different 
moral norms (Edwards, 1975). For example, external attributions about surviving the war 
were made more by Holocaust survivors than an age-matched Jewish control group 
(Suedfeld, 2004), and South Koreans tended to consider information in a more holistic style 
and make more external attributions compared to Americans (Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto & 
Park, 2003). Testing with diverse cultural samples can help to ascertain whether the processes 
examined here depend on social and cultural experience. 
Understanding the impact of perceived complexity on moral judgement could also 
help with designing interventions to encourage pro-social actions or behaviour change. For 
example, recent theoretical integration of social identity, collective action and moral 
convictions, offered several different pathways for moral judgement to inspire collective 
action (van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2012; van 
Zomeren, Postmes, Spears & Bettache, 2011). Future studies could investigate whether 
perceived complexity has an impact even in areas of strong moral conviction where 
politicised identities are powerful (van Zomeren et al., 2012). It is possible that simplifying 
the perception of a process could lead to more people adopting stronger moral stances or help 
those with already existing strong positions to feel able to take action. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Finally, it is worth noting a few future directions that specifically arise as a result of 
this research design. The broad examination of moral judgement has been a useful first step 
in testing the potential role of perceived complexity, but it also invites further questions 
regarding where this process has an impact. This issue is relevant to the design of the video 
manipulation, which included three points of difference. Firstly, there was the verbal prime 
that presented each model as either simple or quite complicated. Secondly, there was the 
number of steps in the causal chain, which varied between three and six. Thirdly, there was 
the use of additional boxes that were irrelevant to the causal chain, but designed to increase 
perceptions of complexity. Study 2 omitted these additional boxes and still showed effects 
that supported the principal hypothesis, but the other two factors were always present. It 
would thus be interesting to see if both factors were necessary to shift perceptions of 
complexity. However, it is also reasonable to argue that perceptions of complexity in the real 
world are inevitably multi-faceted, and the present manipulation accurately represents this 
situation. 
In addition, the two moral judgement measures were aimed at different foci of the 
causal chain. Whilst the role of Person A is clearly present throughout the causal chain, it is 
possible that the item relating to Person A particularly encouraged judgement towards the 
start of the chain, whereas the item relating to the process of food speculation encouraged 
participants towards a more holistic overview. This may also partly explain why the 
manipulation had much stronger effects for Person A, as it encouraged participants to think 
about the causal model specifically, rather than the whole video. Future measures should thus 
consider this issue of focus, as it has been shown to be important in side-effect dilemmas 
(Laurent et al., 2015). Additionally, a CLT approach could help in understanding whether 
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representing information in a greater number of stages affects the perceived concreteness of 
the process and thus the associated moral judgements (Amit & Greene, 2012). 
A notable issue specific to using moral contexts which participants have little or no 
previous experience of is the contrasts it allows to be drawn. The items in this research would 
not have been conducive to a pure baseline control group who received no information about 
the process of food speculation. However, this does mean the contrasts between the simple 
and complex conditions cannot yet reveal exactly which mechanisms are at work. It could be 
that increased complexity leads to greater lenience, but it could also be that increased 
simplicity leads to more confident evaluations. Tapping into more familiar contexts, as 
outlined below, could help to address this issue. 
Lastly, the principal hypothesis was that increased perceptions of complexity would 
lead to a decreased willingness to morally condemn the behaviour, and the evidence supports 
this position. However, conceptualising moral judgement with such breadth inevitably 
involves some sacrifice in specificity. It would require further research to show how this 
effect works in different moral constructs and scenarios. For example, I deliberately used a 
real-world moral dilemma that was relatively unknown and tended to attract condemnation. 
The dual-process model suggests greater use of intuitive processes leads to increased 
deontological judgements (Greene, 2007), however, it is not clear whether a novel situation 
inhibits reliance on intuitive or deliberative processes. It would be worthwhile to test future 
contexts where the dilemma is well-known (e.g., climate change) or where the person 
involved is carrying out a positively regarded action (e.g. ethical consumption) and measure 
how complexity encourages different judgement processes in these scenarios. It would also 
be worth evaluating different types of scenario that addressed more specific concepts of 
moral decision-making, such as intentionality, wrongness and blame. For example, scenarios 
relating to acts of commission attract much greater blame than those of omission (Malle et 
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al., 2014), and an interesting issue is whether complex vs. simple models therefore operate 
differently for acts of commission vs. omission, both in the realms of moral judgement and 
blameworthiness. 
Conclusion 
 This research has used a novel methodology to show how increased perceptions of 
complexity can lead to more lenient moral judgements, even when the causal chain of events 
is identical. This lenience creates less willingness to feel able and willing to make a 
difference in a global ethical issue. As the world continues to grow in societal complexity, it 
is vital to understand how such changes affect our moral concerns, as we need solutions to 
the paradox that massive international problems do not easily stimulate moral intuitions 
(Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). It is possible that the basic cognitive perceptual processes 
surrounding cause and effect that we have relied on to understand the world actually prevent 
us from acting in ways that fit with our moral concerns. In a complex world, using perceived 
complexity as a heuristic for avoiding moral judgement might well be a strategy that costs 
lives. We thus need to take seriously how our more instinctive moral intuitions are able to 
function in the interests of everyone in modern society. Perhaps, rather than consistently 
accepting narratives of complexity, we need to follow Perlis’s (1982) recommendations and 
find ways of removing it, if we are to communicate and negotiate the huge global issues we 
face today. 
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Chapter 5: Social Context Mismatch Theory: Evidence and Future Directions 
This thesis began by outlining social context mismatch theory (SCMT) and its 
connections to social psychology. The next three chapters examined specific issues relevant 
to different parts of SCMT. The three core chapters produced a diverse array of results, each 
of which have their own specific implications, as well as a more general link to SCMT. The 
more specific implications have been dealt with in the associated discussion sections for each 
core chapter. The aim of this final chapter is to provide a broader context for discussion, 
where the conclusions of the four chapters can be summarised, related back to SCMT and the 
implications of the research can be explored further. 
Results Summary 
 Chapter 1 outlined how SCMT can be a useful framework for integrating research in 
an interdisciplinary manner. A core part of the theory is the need to maintain a proportionate 
focus on the impact of context on behaviour. The dangers of not doing so are that theoretical 
positions do not cohere (Bevan, 1991), that human motives become incorrectly seen as 
inevitable (Miller, 1999) and that we mistakenly focus on dispositional rather than situational 
factors to tackle immoral conduct (Zimbardo, 2007).  
Nonetheless, whilst the argument for greater contextual consideration is important, it 
is not a new debate. Classic social psychological papers describing the fundamental 
attribution error (Ross, 1977), conformity via group pressure (Asch, 1956), obedience to 
authority (Milgram, 1963) and tyrannical behaviour (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973) have 
all inspired contextual explanations for behaviour. However, SCMT goes further by asserting 
the need to consider multiple contexts and the transition between contexts. People’s 
benevolent intentions are not overwhelmed simply because of the scale of global poverty. 
The problem is caused by the rapid transition from historical contexts where empathy was 
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direct and relatively bounded, to contemporary contexts where such caring processes are 
impossible to consistently maintain. SCMT predicts greater hypocrisy in places where the 
transitions between contexts has been comparatively vast and/or fast, as individual-level and 
group-level adaptation processes have yet to catch up. 
The aim of SCMT is thus to encourage research capturing aspects of these multiple 
contexts. We need to understand further how people perceive their lives, choices and motives 
as varying between contexts, similar to the way in which Chapter 2 examined perceived value 
change over time. We need to understand further how the potentially problematic outcomes 
of contextual mismatches unfold, similar to the way in which Chapter 3 examined the effects 
of providing information about the context in which clothing goods are produced. We need to 
understand further the types of factors that have changed between contexts and that have a 
significant impact on pro-social values, attitudes, intentions and actions, similar to the way in 
which Chapter 4 examined the role of perceived complexity in judgements of behaviour. This 
work necessarily requires a wide range of data sources, experimental methods and expertise 
in several literatures. Each chapter has thus shown how the broad framework of SCMT can 
be used to inform comparatively specific and well-defined psychological processes. The 
model also inherently encourages the bridging of theoretical spaces that currently exist within 
psychology. Filling these spaces is crucial if social psychology is to play a greater role in 
tackling the problems it theoretically addresses (Ellemers, 2013). 
 Chapter 2 showed that people perceive their own values as changing over time. 
Additionally, the findings indicated that people did not see the motivational oppositions 
between values that have been found in previous research (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & 
Boehnke, 2004). This tells us two important things in relation to SCMT. Firstly, people are 
comfortable with changing the importance they attach to values depending on contexts, 
which in this case were time points across the lifespan. Secondly, thinking about values over 
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time does not cause people to see the inherent conflicts that concurrent pursuit of the values is 
likely to cause (e.g., aspiring for greater wealth, power and equality in later life). Whilst it is 
not possible to take a comparable values measure from individuals living in past social 
contexts, the historical evidence presented in the general introduction (Baumeister, 1987; 
Cushman, 1990) makes it plausible that people would have felt less free to alter their values 
over their lifespan. This lack of freedom may also have been accompanied with reduced 
ambition in pursuing oppositional values, as flexibility in primary motives was not seen as 
possible or perhaps even desirable. 
The contemporary perceived variability in values could be a positive outcome, if 
individuals feel truly free to shift their values depending on context and this offers paths to 
greater autonomy and wellbeing. Indeed, the evidence of a relative increase in the importance 
attached to values (particularly those relating to openness) from Study 2 suggests that taking 
a temporal perspective can help people to take an aspirational perspective on their values. 
However, the well-being data from Study 3 suggests that variance in different values is 
associated with both negative and positive states of wellbeing. From the perspective of 
SCMT, it is thus important that we understand further the real world effects of perceiving 
flexibility in values. Ideas that could address these effects will be discussed further in the 
future directions section. 
Chapter 3 investigated how ethical information can impact upon hypocritical 
intentions in the domain of purchasing. The findings showed that people could present a 
range of hypocritical positions. Initially, people demonstrated an intra-personal discrepancy 
of frugality and an inter-personally hypocritical suggestion that others were less frugal. 
Information about the human and environmental costs of manufacturing inverted this position 
and led people to demonstrate an intra-personal discrepancy of spending too little on a range 
of items. Again, the inter-personal hypocrisy came as they demanded others alter their 
 Page 229 
 
behaviour comparatively more, in light of the ethical information they had seen. Interestingly, 
this inter-personal hypocrisy appeared even in within-participants designs, suggesting that 
people were somewhat comfortable with demanding more from other people than they would 
demand from themselves. The addition of anchors into the ethical information provided the 
finding that higher anchors in general were more effective at increasing the gap between 
ought and actual estimates. 
These studies were revealing from the perspective of SCMT, as they highlighted the 
diversity of hypocritical positions available to people in a contemporary context. Individuals 
felt pressured from opposite directions to spend both more and less, and their stated should-
actual positions were strongly affected by the framing of the decision. This shows how 
people struggle to consume in ways that fit their values. Furthermore, as outlined in the 
introduction chapter, the majority of human societies have traded and consumed goods in 
production chains that were relatively direct and simple to understand. However, the rise of 
ever more complex production systems has led to consumers being ever more distant from 
producers, which has contributed to a weaker understanding of the consequences and side 
effects of purchasing. This contemporary perception of complex marketplaces and low 
consumer power makes trying to act in a morally consistent manner very difficult. Self-
interest in saving money could be one area where people feel they still have some control and 
this could help explain why bargain hunting is so prevalent (Darke, Freedman & Chaiken, 
1995). Unfortunately, the consequence of consumer pressure for cheaper prices is often one 
of exploitation of people and/or the environment in the production chain. Encouragingly, the 
information about the human cost of manufacturing had a substantial effect, suggesting that 
people do care about the distant consequences of their actions. A key objective for 
psychology is discovering how such benevolent concerns can survive in a modern context 
where, as economists often say, price is king. 
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One potential approach tackles the perceived complexity of the decisions directly. 
Chapter 4 outlined how perceived complexity can lead to less strong moral condemnation of 
a controversial behaviour. In line with existing theories of moral judgement (Hilton et al., 
2010) and blame (Malle et al., 2014), these effects were most pronounced when human 
agency was the focus of the question. Additionally, greater perceived complexity led to lower 
levels of perceived responsibility, self-efficacy, collective efficacy and collective action 
tendencies. Of importance, this effect of perceived complexity emerged even though the 
information given was essentially the same; it was merely chunked in a simpler or more 
complex manner. It matters whether the cause and effect process chains merely look simple 
or complex. 
A key aim of SCMT is to identify and isolate contextual differences that have 
changed over time. Contemporary societies undoubtedly contain more diffuse and complex 
networks relating to people and objects than their historical counterparts. Such complexity 
makes it harder for people to be confident in assigning responsibility, and this leads to the 
hypothesis that increased perceptions of complexity cause less willingness to morally 
condemn a problematic action. Our social cognition processes developed in societies where 
cause and effect could be more easily identified. In today’s world these processes find it 
difficult to cope with the intricate nature of society, leaving us in the position where we know 
an action leads to an outcome, but we cannot track the trajectory of the process. In other 
words, although we know more of action A leads to more of consequence B and we accept 
that consequence B is undesirable, we cannot easily use our existing judgement processes to 
assign responsibility to the cause of (or agent responsible for) action A. This leaves us in a 
position where behaviours become socially normal, despite seeming morally wrong. SCMT 
can help identify factors, such as perceived complexity, that have changed across contexts 
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and thus highlight reasons underpinning why morally wrong actions seem to maintain their 
prevalence, legality and legitimacy. 
Future Directions 
There a number of specific future directions that are worth pursuing in the short-term. 
The following suggestions are diverse and not easy to integrate smoothly with one another. I 
hence hope that the overarching theoretical position of SCMT helps keep the narrative 
coherent in this section, whilst also illustrating the potentially exciting research on offer. 
 SCMT is a theory defined by contextual influences. It is important that these 
influences continue to be acknowledged. Studying and treating individuals in complete 
isolation leads to theory with weak explanatory power (Haslam, Jetten, Reynolds & Reicher, 
2011). For example, an investigation into recycling found that the theoretical explanatory 
power of the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) was significantly reduced in areas 
where facilities were notably poorer (Knussen, Yule, MacKenzie & Wells, 2004). This 
important theory in social psychology focuses on individual-level predictors of behaviour 
(attitudes, norms, and perceived behavioural control), without explicitly modelling the 
context (except insofar as it is reflected through the individual-level variables). When it 
comes to generalising social psychological theory, context really matters.  
Consequently, one useful future research direction entails the examination of habits. 
Habits are routine behaviours that are automatically cued by contextual information (Neal, 
Wood, Labrecque & Lally, 2012). Accordingly, if we can set initial habits in motion which 
are closely aligned with people’s values, we may be able to harness the power of habitual 
behaviour for self-congruent actions when self-control is depleted (Neal, Wood & Drolet, 
2013). Habits could thus be a vital tool in challenging context mismatches, even when 
willpower is low, as they allow people to act in accordance with the values they consider 
Commented [CF30]: Spelling corrected. 
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most important. If the cherished value entails caring for others (which is one of the highest-
rated values globally, e.g., Bardi et al., 2009), this would mean setting habits that focus on 
benevolent values. For example, people can be encouraged to set aside a regular amount of 
time to devote to actions that align with their self-transcendence values. This could involve 
direct action to help other people, such as volunteering. Alternatively, less concrete forms of 
action, such as practicing mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003) could help people both with 
their well-being and their broader life goals. Such regular activities would provide a balance 
against the contemporary context of feeling powerless and overwhelmed at the scale of 
vulnerability in the world. In this way, habits can constrain the chances for hypocrisy in one’s 
everyday life. 
 Another important direction for future study involves considering how, as outlined in 
the introduction chapter, the accusation of hypocrisy can be a potent threat to self-integrity. 
Such threats can lead to defensive responding, rather than positive change (Sherman & 
Cohen, 2006). Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) suggests that being reminded of positive 
aspects of the self can reduce defensiveness and it has been used in several contexts to show 
that such defensiveness can be reduced. For example, recalling previous episodes of personal 
kindness helped reduce denial and increased pro-environmental intentions (Sparks, Jessop, 
Chapman & Holmes, 2010). Additional evidence suggests that self-affirmation processes 
work when focussing on intrinsic aspects of the self, rather than achievements (Arndt, 
Schimel, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 2002) and that the boost to the self comes because of a 
specific focus on the self-transcendent aspect of people’s values, rather than simply boosting 
the self-concept in general (Crocker, Niiya & Mischkowski, 2008). Furthermore, self-
affirmation procedures are more likely to work if the affirmation comes before the threat, 
rather than after a defensive response has been formulated (Critcher, Dunning & Armor, 
2010). If people are to succeed in overcoming negative outcomes caused by context 
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mismatches, we will need to integrate the findings above into any manipulations that could 
elicit feelings of the self being threatened. More broadly, it is important to understand further 
how people can strive for greater pro-social behaviour without suffering from the potentially 
deleterious effects of perfectionism (Terry-Short, Owens, Slade & Dewey, 1995). Ironically, 
if we are to reduce hypocrisy in the world, we may first need to learn how to accept that we 
all often act hypocritically. The key aspect of this recognition is ensuring hypocrisy does not 
then become normalised and socially entrenched, as has arguably happened for self-interest 
(Miller, 1999). 
 Aside from reducing defensiveness and considering explicit responses, it is also 
important to consider indirect measures that might help us understand how contexts 
encourage the prevalence of different types of hypocrisy. Indeed, using multiple methods in 
social psychology is vital if we are to truly understand the strengths and limitations of a 
theoretical position (Ellemers, 2013). Since the creation of implicit association tests 
(Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) they have been used to capture subconscious 
aspects of morality (Perugini & Leone, 2009). In addition, they have been used to calculate 
contrasts between explicit and implicit measures of attitude to test for potential heightened 
ambivalence (Briñol, Petty & Christian, 2006). Given SCMT’s assumption that the 21st 
century is a particularly productive context for hypocrisy, it would be worth investigating 
whether larger contextual mismatches lead to greater explicit-implicit ambivalence, 
particularly in moral domains. If implicit measures predict moral behaviour, but explicit 
measures predict action in hypothetical situations (Perugini & Leone, 2009), then implicit 
association tests would undoubtedly be a useful tool to consider, alongside the more explicit 
self-report measures of hypocrisy used in the studies reported above and elsewhere. 
 These potential agendas are important in part because of many positive aspects of 
decreasing hypocrisy. Integrity can be seen as standing up for what you believe, but aside 
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from self-consistency it also carries a dimension of needing to act with society’s interests in 
mind (Sparks & Farsides, 2011). Sparks and Farsides (2011) note that integrity is an 
understudied topic and suggest that addressing this issue would also help us understand the 
concept of hypocrisy further. From the perspective of SCMT, it is important to understand 
factors and individual differences that allow people to act with integrity when faced with 
competing motives derived from separate contexts. There are people who generally act pro-
socially and can influence others to do the same (Weber & Murnighan, 2008) and such 
individuals should be studied further to see whether they are also likely to act with greater 
integrity. 
Additionally, whilst understanding how to decrease people’s tendency for hypocrisy 
in general is a worthwhile aim, hypocrisy might also be a useful construct to encourage 
breaking down some of the barriers to pro-social action. Empathy has been used as an 
effective tool to encourage people to care about previously stigmatised groups (Batson, 
Chang, Orr & Rowland, 2002), although it appears important that individuals feel 
autonomous over the empathetic process (Pavey, Greitemeyer & Sparks, 2012). If defensive 
processes can be avoided, hypocrisy could be used to increase autonomously motivated 
empathy, as the motivation to act would be highly relevant to the individual’s personal 
standards and not simply a reminder of normative pro-social behaviour.  
We thus have a range of tools to help people be more who they want to be. The 
research ideas outlined briefly above show how SCMT can be integrated into existing theory 
to help make these tools more effective. At the same time, however, we need to consider how 
at a fundamental level we can avoid the negative effects of perfectionism, whilst harnessing 
the positive effects of striving to be the best we can be (Terry-Short et al., 1995). As a 
society, we thus need to consider how we avoid feeling overwhelmed by complexity and thus 
comparatively morally powerless, or we risk living in a world where the gaps between what 
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we think we should do and what we actually do will continue to grow. SCMT can help 
scientists and the public understand why such discrepancies exist, which in turn can lead to 
positive action. 
Practical Implications 
The previous section identified specific areas of social psychological research that 
SCMT could usefully work alongside. However, there are broader implications that SCMT 
produces that sit more at the boundaries of interdisciplinary science and contemporary 
politics. This section aims to outline how SCMT can work at these boundaries, to help 
encourage a more pro-social world. 
Habits were earlier introduced as a potential tool for helping people act more in 
alignment with the pro-social values they support, thus reducing hypocrisy. However, context 
mismatches cannot be solved by individual action alone. Organisations and governments also 
need to play a role in helping people live in a world that acts in accordance with their values. 
Presently, governments in most countries continue to pursue economic growth as the main 
path for national stability and progress (Eckersley, 2000), yet there is considerable evidence 
to question the logic of such a strategy. There is little or no relationship between increasing 
wealth and happiness, especially in already wealthy nations (Oswald, 1997) and pursuing 
perpetual economic growth poses a genuine threat to the very social stability it aims to 
nurture (Jackson, 2009). Furthermore, in the face of truly international challenges such as 
climate change, it is plausible to suggest that the current system of global governance is ill-
equipped to deal with these issues, as a key goal of each individual nation is to focus on their 
own best interests in the short-term (Attfield, 2003). 
Potentially then, we currently live in a world where our international systems of 
governance are not fit for purpose, at the same time as our national governments pursue 
 Page 236 
 
policies that threaten prospects of sustainability which do not even bring happiness in the 
short-term. Moreover, as outlined in the introduction chapter, the individual norm of self-
interest (Miller, 1999) is continually reinforced. The result is that businesses, social 
institutions and governments act in ways that are far removed from the pro-social values 
people tend to prioritise. SCMT can help to illustrate why such illogical tendencies exist and 
help to design interventions to break these apparent paradoxes. 
For example, one pilot study I ran looked at whether historical examples of successful 
social change could reduce the sense of being overwhelmed by current problems and thus 
inspire equivalent pro-social collective action in contemporary contexts. An additional factor 
of interest was whether framing past successes and failures as the responsibility of human 
efforts or technological efforts might moderate any inspiration effect. Accordingly, 
participants saw videos about the successful eradication of polio in India, or the failure to 
eradicate polio in Pakistan, with associated framing variants of human collective action or 
technological progress. Preliminary analyses suggested that the video that highlighted success 
via human action was the most likely to encourage positive ratings of self-efficacy, collective 
efficacy and collective action in other domains (e.g. tackling global poverty). Manipulating 
perceptions of contextual overlap could thus help reduce hypocrisy, from the individual level 
to the international governmental level. 
Of course, a key facilitator of long-term social change is the law. Ruhl (1996) outlined 
how the dynamic relationship between the law and society cannot be easily explained with 
reductionist scientific procedures. In order to understand how the law has developed over 
time to represent normatively desirable boundaries in society, he suggests we need to 
consider the multiple contextual influences that contribute to a dynamic system, similar to 
complexity theory in biology (Ruhl, 1996). A related concern for SCMT is that historical 
contexts continue to drive actions in contemporary contexts, long after they were helpful. 
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For example, the issue of food speculation used in Chapter 4 is one where no true 
cause and effect, between the individual speculator and the associated suffering of a person in 
the developing world some time in the future, could be realistically isolated. Yet, we can 
empirically demonstrate correlations between speculation, price volatility and starvation. A 
law primarily based on cause and effect may thus have worked effectively throughout the 
majority of human development, when societal complexity was much less intricate and hence 
where the link between perpetrator and victim could be easily drawn. However, we currently 
live within complex networks where cause and effect cannot be easily identified. In 
combination with the earlier points made regarding the suitability of global governance 
systems, this leads to dilemmas around how to deal with multifaceted issues, such as who 
should be held accountable for the Holocaust (Jones, 1999), how can countries be 
incentivised and legally accountable for their actions in relation to climate change (von Stein, 
2008) and how can corporations act both in the interests of society and their own financial 
performance (Devinney, 2009). 
If we continue to rely on causality to infer moral responsibility, we are unlikely to 
meet the challenges of living within such complex networks. Using SCMT, we can identify 
how historical legal precedents may no longer be appropriate for contemporary contexts and I 
would argue that this may require a fundamental shift towards a more correlational morality, 
supported by law. People use heuristics to make judgements in uncertain situations (Gilovich, 
Griffin & Kahneman, 2002) and one such shortcut people may employ is the law as a 
heuristic for moral acceptability, by essentially thinking “if it were that bad, it would be 
illegal”. Unfortunately, as social contexts have become more complex, behaviours that 
produce anti-social consequences, but whose responsibility cannot be assigned to an 
individual, have increased in likelihood. This issue relates to Freudenberg’s (2014) analysis 
of corporate actions that he terms as “Lethal But Legal”. 
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Legal frameworks can help us adapt society’s needs to contexts that change over time. 
But adapting laws and regulations can be a very time consuming process and contexts can 
change in other ways too. This dissertation focussed on how context mismatches can occur 
because of changes over time. However, geographical distance, technological development 
and psychological distance are other factors that could also be used to explain why people act 
hypocritically. For instance, the model could test whether people are more likely to act in 
alignment with the values they support when they are further away from their usual context. 
Might someone be as likely to act pro-socially if they are away on holiday and see a person in 
need, as they would were they in their home town or country? Equally, the pace of 
technological change is having fundamental impacts on social behaviour. Greenfield (2014) 
indicated how the current post-internet generation are facing new social problems, such as 
cyber-bullying and internet addiction, caused by ever greater integration between technology 
and society. Within a generation, our methods for meeting basic human social needs have 
changed considerably. A key question from the perspective of SCMT is thus whether greater 
contextual change, brought about via technological development, is making it more difficult 
for us to act in alignment with our intrinsic concerns.  SCMT should thus be extended to 
incorporate other factors that cause contexts to change and could thus cause context 
mismatches.  
Aside from how contexts can change, SCMT suggests that hypocrisy becomes deep-
rooted via cyclical feedback processes that make hypocritical tendencies socially normative 
(see Figure 1.4). It has been shown that recalling past social transgressions can effectively 
numb one’s conscience, thus lowering the required standard for acting pro-socially (Cojoc & 
Stoian, 2014). Similar processes may well occur at a more diffuse level with hypocrisy. If we 
do live in a time where people find it particularly difficult to consistently act in line with their 
values, then people may well normalise such discrepancies. This process would then become 
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cyclical and effectively form a meta-hypocritical position, where it becomes seemingly 
acceptable to act unacceptably and high levels of hypocrisy become viewed, wrongly, as 
merely being part of human nature. Humans are necessarily imperfect, but that should not 
inhibit us from trying to be the best we can be. 
Limitations 
 Before concluding this chapter, it is important to consider four limitations to SCMT in 
its current state. Firstly, the very early stages of this theoretical development and its 
necessarily broad position, combine to make the theory and the exact definitions of its 
component parts yet to be fully realised. Whilst all theories are flawed (Festinger, 
1987/1999), there is a great deal of work to be done to give SCMT the kind of precision that 
other theories in social science can offer. Although the current description offers a useful 
foundation for the theoretical architecture, the walls and the roof have yet to be completed.  
Secondly, the three core chapters presented here act only as examples of how the 
theory can be used to inform research. They do not act as unequivocal support for the theory, 
but they do show how it can help illuminate contemporary psychological processes in a way 
that existing treatments do not. The discussion sections within each chapter and this general 
discussion show how SCMT can be helpful in offering a different perspective on existing 
psychological questions. 
Thirdly, subjective interpretation is required in SCMT. As Baumeister (1987) and 
Cushman (1990) argued in their previously described works, evaluating historical data is a 
qualitatively different style of analysis compared to standard empirical methods in 
psychology, but the benefits of using such sources are far greater than the costs. 
Understanding the varying social contexts of history may demand that researchers consider 
information that is notably far removed from their usual data sources and may also offer less 
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opportunity for pure objective rigour. However, a historical perspective offers the potential 
for greater insight, and the risk of overstretching this perspective can be managed carefully if 
there is an ongoing, recursive dialogue bridging historical insights and data as they emerge. 
Finally, there is an important philosophical limitation. Furia (2009) provides a 
summary of why some political theorists and philosophers suggest that taking a stance of 
anti-hypocrisy is dangerous. To some extent, the arguments for avoiding an anti-hypocritical 
stance map onto the reasons to be wary of perfectionism. For example, if we set impossibly 
high standards for our leaders, we might never be able to trust them sufficiently in order to 
achieve positive social outcomes (Shklar, 1984). Additionally, acting defensively or using 
self-deception systems to avoid feeling hypocritical can be beneficial to the welfare of the 
individual in some circumstances (Critcher et al., 2010; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). There 
are thus reasons to counter-balance SCMT’s general emphasis on hypocrisy as being a 
broadly negative state. However, like Furia (2009) I would argue that hypocrisy is more of a 
threat than anti-hypocrisy to democratic societies, which aim to work in the interests of the 
many. Nonetheless, it is important to continue to develop both the philosophical and 
scientific elements of SCMT, as it progresses from its current formative stage. 
Final Conclusion 
 SCMT is a model that asks us to pay attention to multiple contexts and consider the 
simultaneous trajectories of change in contextual factors and motives. A key aim of this 
model is to be both theoretically robust enough to further our scientific understanding of 
human behaviour, but also accessible enough to non-scientists. Public interest in the science 
behind satisfaction with life can be seen by the growth of books written particularly for 
public consumption. Many of these books focus on modern contexts as being responsible for 
serious personal and social issues. The contexts include overwhelming amounts of 
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information (Brabazon, 2013), a lack of corporate legal progress (Freudenberg, 2014), rapid 
technological development (Greenfield, 2014), materialism (James, 2007) and social 
pressures to excel (Foley, 2010). Other books also show how we have evolved to make 
decisions that are often seen as sub-optimal in modern contexts, leading to irrationality 
(Sutherland, 1992), a disproportionate focus on short-term gains (Kahneman, 2012) and 
hypocrisy (Kurzban, 2012). Together, these texts demonstrate a wealth of evidence for 
interest in contextual mismatches, but what is lacking is a framework to integrate these 
different types of evidence within. SCMT can help fill this gap. 
 This dissertation started with a quotation relating to obesity and then extended the 
analogy to social psychological concerns. Returning briefly to this comparison, obesity has 
arisen not simply because of industrialised processes allowing calorific food to be 
comparatively cheap and abundant. Societies suffering from obesity epidemics also tend to 
have reliable sources of tap water, but there is not an equivalent epidemic of people suffering 
from hyponatremia. Similarly for psychological processes, social and cultural changes do not 
necessarily cause hypocrisy. Indeed, many positive consequences have resulted from human 
development. Nonetheless, certain contextual changes, in combination with important human 
motives, have led to problems for people trying to live in alignment with their core beliefs. It 
is thus the combination of previous contexts, current contexts and current motives that need 
to be considered concurrently if we are to understand why problems occur. The three central 
chapters of this dissertation have shown how SCMT can help address such concerns. Value 
instability, ethical consumption and the use of complexity as a heuristic for moral judgement, 
are all examples of how SCMT is applicable to contemporary scientific and social issues. 
 SCMT is in its early stages but it has powerful potential. It is also a theory that 
encourages greater attention towards multiple contexts for understanding how people and 
society interact. As stated previously, SCMT is an optimistically grounded theory and as 
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such, the more we can help people be who they truly want to be, the more we will see a pro-
social world. We currently live in a world where power is very unequally distributed, leading 
to the startling coexistence of super-yachts and starving children. Furthermore, such 
outcomes appear to have become popularly regarded as an unavoidable result of global 
economic, political and social complexities, and anybody who challenges this assumption is 
likely to face accusations of over-simplicity and naivety. SCMT offers a path away from this 
self-fulfilling prophecy, by providing contextual evidence that shows the flexibility in human 
potential. It is worrying that people who try and act pro-socially sometimes face antagonistic 
responses, possibly based on the consequent apparent threat to others’ sense of moral worth 
(MacFarquhar, 2015). However, as MacFarquhar (2015) notes, people who act heroically and 
pro-socially in times of crisis do not tend to face such accusations. We currently live in a 
world of daily crises, but perhaps because they are daily, they are reframed as non-critical or 
lacking in urgency. A broader contextual overview, via SCMT, would help us all see that 
such reframing is not inevitable. It is thus important to reaffirm that the current context is one 
of urgency. 
 The potential outcome of SCMT is a win-win situation. Not every pro-social action is 
cost-free in the short-term. However, as outlined in this thesis, there is a wealth of evidence 
that well-being for the self and society can be substantially enhanced by living in greater 
accordance with the pro-social values humans strongly support. If we can appreciate the 
wider contextual influences on our behaviour, highlighted by SCMT, we might all be happier 
in the short-term and the long-term. We will also then devote resources and attention away 
from things that fail to bring us fulfilment and towards those who need the resources and 
attention more – the vulnerable people in the world who have very little choice over how they 
cope with their suffering. SCMT is a theory of hope in humanity. A compassionate world is a 
possibility. 
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Appendix A; Scrambled sentences task 
 
Instructions: Please make a grammatical sentence out of each set of words. Each sentence 
should be four words long (leaving one word unused). 
 
Self Enhancement Sentences Self Transcendence Sentences 
myself without I after looked others without I after looked 
was powerful John always index was dependable John always index 
chair great feels achieving things chair great feeling benevolent is 
Matt great switch authority had Matt very switch broadminded was 
wealth Thursday Greg's liked I wisdom Thursday Greg's liked I 
being people keyboard like successful being people keyboard like peaceful 
oak capably they things distributed oak equally they things distributed 
man the ambitious was midnight man the helped really midnight 
being sale important is influential being sale important is honest 
sister had bracket prestige Suzie’s sister was bracket forgiven Suzie's 
woman status base the had woman loyal base the was 
great thumb showed Sarah dominance great thumb showed Sarah responsibility 
liked competent being Mark speak liked being tolerant Mark speak 
indicative money cherished Luke his indicative friendship valued Luke his 
along she coming enjoyed rug along she came faithfully rug 
the image Jim valued shopkeeper the genuinely Jim acted shopkeeper 
was mousse recognition reached social was mousse justice reached social 
Louise page power admired social Louise page global admired beauty 
enjoyed cat having James control enjoyed cat natural James surroundings 
persistent goals her Jo reached persistent environment the Jo protected 
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Filler Sentences 
asleep Friday the fell dog 
was the inflated thirsty tyre 
Emma yellow are lemons often 
cheetahs can alternative fast run 
watched the lines television girl 
fresh kicked John ball the 
she bed purple to went 
their mild today is it 
the notify book he read 
schedule pasta liked child the 
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Appendix D; Value instantiation items. 
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Appendix E: Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) 
 
Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 7 scale 
provided, indicate your agreement with each item by choosing the appropriate number. Please 
be open and honest in your responding. 
In most ways, my life is close to ideal 
The conditions of my life are excellent 
I am satisfied with my life 
So far I have gotten the important things I want in life 
If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing 
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Appendix F: Scale of Positive and Negative Experience (SPANE) 
 
Thanks for those responses. Now we would like you to think about what you have been doing 
and experiencing during the past four weeks. Then please report how much you experienced 
each of the following feelings, using the scale below. For each item, simply select a number 
from 1 to 5. 
Positive 
Negative 
Good 
Bad 
Pleasant 
Unpleasant 
Happy 
Sad 
Afraid 
Joyful 
Angry 
Contented 
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Appendix G: Flourishing Scale (FS) 
 
Thanks for those answers. Finally, please rate your agreement or disagreement with each of 
the following statements. There are eight statements to answer. 
I lead a purposeful and meaningful life 
My social relationships are supportive and rewarding 
I am engaged and interested in my daily activities 
I actively contribute to the happiness and well-being of others 
I am competent and capable in the activities that are important to me 
I am a good person and live a good life 
I am optimistic about my future 
People respect me 
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Appendix H: Identification With All Humanity (IWAH) 
 
How close do you fell to each of the following groups? 
1 = not at all close 
2 = not very close 
3 = just a little or somewhat close 
4 = pretty close 
5 = very close 
a. People in my community 
b. People in my country 
c. People all over the world 
 
How often do you use the word “we” to refer to the following groups of people? 
1 = almost never 
2 = rarely 
3 = occasionally 
4 = often 
5 = very often 
a. People in my community 
b. People in my country 
c. People all over the world 
 
How much would you say you have in common with the following groups? 
1 = almost nothing in common 
2= little in common 
3 = some in common 
4 = quite a bit in common 
5 = very much in common 
a. People in my community 
b. People in my country 
c. People all over the world 
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Please answer all remaining questions using the following choices: 
1 = not at all 
2 = just a little 
3 = somewhat 
4 = quite a bit 
5 = very much 
 
Sometimes people think of those who are not a part of their immediate family as “family”. To 
what degree do you think of the following groups of people as “family”? 
a. People in my community 
b. People in my country 
c. All humans everywhere 
How much do you identify with (that is, feel a part of, feel love toward, have concern for) 
each of the following? 
a. People in my community 
b. People in my country 
c. All humans everywhere 
How much would you say you care (feel upset, want to help) when bad things happen to: 
a. People in my community 
b. People in my country 
c. People anywhere in the world 
How much do you want to be: 
a. A responsible citizen of my community 
b. A responsible citizen of my country 
c. A responsible citizen of the world 
How much do you believe in: 
a. Being loyal to my community 
b. Being loyal to my country 
c. Being loyal to all mankind 
When they are in need, how much do you want to help: 
a. People in my community 
b. People in my country 
c. People all over the world 
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Appendix I: Humanity Esteem scale 
 
Instructions: The following statements ask about your beliefs and perceptions of human 
beings in general, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or gender.  That is, what are your thoughts 
about the average human being?  Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements using the scale below each statement. 
1. I feel that the human species is very valuable, at least on an equal plane with other 
species in the universe. 
2. I feel that human beings have a number of very good qualities. 
3. All in all, I am inclined to regard the human species as a failure. 
4. Human beings are able to prosper as well as any other species in the universe. 
5. I feel that human beings do not have much to be proud of. 
6. I take a positive attitude toward humanity. 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with the evolution of humanity. 
8. I wish I could have more respect for humanity in general. 
9. Human beings are useless at times. 
10. At times I think that human beings are no good at all. 
(items 1-10 scale from -3 strongly disagree to +3 strongly agree) 
 
11. Overall, how favourable are you toward human beings in general? 
 
(item 11 scale from -4 extremely unfavourable to +4 extremely favourable) 
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Appendix J; Models of food speculation used in video manipulation 
 
Simple model: 
  
Complex model (Study 2): 
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Complex model (Studies 1, 3 & 4): 
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Appendix K: Attributional Complexity (AC) scale 
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Appendix L: Need for Cognition (NFC) scale 
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
I believe that if I think hard enough, I will be able to achieve my goals in life.  
I am very optimistic about my mental abilities. 
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult and important to one that is somewhat important but does not 
require much thought. 
I tend to set goals that can be accomplished only by expending considerable mental effort.  
When something I read confuses me, I just put it down and forget it.  
I take pride in the products of my reasoning. 
I don't usually think about problems that others have found difficult.  
I am usually tempted to put more thought into a task that the job minimally requires  
Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much 
I am hesitant about making important decisions after thinking about them. 
I usually end up deliberating about issues even if they don't affect me personally.  
I prefer just to let things happen rather than try to understand why they turned out that way.  
I have difficulty thinking in new and familiar situations. 
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top does not appeal to me.  
The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me. 
I am an intellectual. 
I find it especially satisfying to complete an important task that required a lot of thinking and mental effort. 
I only think as hard as I have to. 
I don't reason well under pressure. 
I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. 
I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long term ones. 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking 
abilities. 
I find satisfaction in deliberating long and hard for hours. 
I think primarily because I have to. 
I more often talk with other people about the reasons for and possible solutions to international problems than 
about gossip and titbits of what famous people are doing. 
These days, I see little chance for performing well, even in "intellectual" jobs, unless one knows the right 
people. 
More often than not, more thinking just leads to more errors. 
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I don't like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.  
I appreciate opportunities to discover the strengths and weaknesses of my own reasoning.  
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.  
Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth about 
something. 
I don't like to be responsible for thinking of what I should be doing with my life.  
I prefer watching educational to entertainment programmes. 
I often succeed in solving difficult problems that I set out to solve.  
I think best when those around me are very intelligent. 
I am not satisfied unless I am thinking. 
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve. 
I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
Simply knowing the answer rather than understanding the reasons for the answer to a problem i s fine with me. 
When I am figuring out a problem, what I see as the solution to a problem is more important than what others 
believe or say is the solution. 
It's enough for me that something gets the job done, I don't care how or why it works.  
Ignorance is bliss. 
I enjoy thinking about an issue even when the results of my thought will have no effect on the outcome of the 
issue. 
 
 
